Problems of Self-Knowledge

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

This thesis is concerned with maintaining a particular theory of self-knowledge. I claim that self-knowledge is possible, even if it means a knowledge of one's own private mental states, and mostly contingent on a specific form of reflection, to be called "pure reflection." I shall reply to various criticisms against reflection as a means of self-knowledge, and try to show that admitting private mental states and a special status to self-knowledge does not lead us into skepticism of other minds. Finally, I claim that what I call "absorption" and "identification" explain why one does not always have self-knowledge; and why even when one attempts to know himself he often falls into error.

1. The term self-knowledge in current usage has two different meanings. These meanings can be epitomized in the following sentences: (1) "I know myself;" and (2) "Know thyself."

(1) The self-knowledge implied in the statement "I know myself" is knowledge of one's abilities and limitations, and of his behavior in certain situations. Ryle talks about this sense of self-knowledge in terms of knowledge of one's own capacities, abilities, personal qualities, character traits, motives, intentions, feelings, emotions, desires, wishes and plans; and also a knowledge of what one is doing at the present moment (CM, 158, 161, 166, 169, 171, 179, 183). Shoemaker divides statements of self-knowledge into two classes: first-person
corrigeable and first-person incorrigible psychological statements. The former includes first-person perception and memory statements, and the latter are statements about one's own "private" experiences (SKSI, 83ff, 215ff). Sartre characterizes self-knowledge as knowledge of one's own (self's or ego's) qualities, states and actions as well as of the choices one makes, including the "fundamental choice" (TE, 60ff; BN, 698, 708).

Considering the above conceptions we can say that self-knowledge is knowledge which has an essential and direct reference to oneself as its subject matter. For example, the statement "There is a tree in front of me" does not express self-knowledge, while the statement that "I see there is a tree in front of me" does. The former statement is directly about the tree, but the latter expresses my perceptual knowledge of the tree. Similarly, the statement that "I met Jones yesterday on the street," though involving a reference to oneself, does not express self-knowledge; while the statement "I remember that I met Jones yesterday" does. Daydreaming about what I shall do when I arrive in Paris next week is not an example of self-knowledge, whereas the knowledge that I have been daydreaming is. Knowing what one is presently doing, as well as knowing one's present bodily position, movements and so on are also part of this sort of self-knowledge. The past tense form of these sorts of statements, as well as inductive generalizations derived from them, are also self-knowledge statements.

It should be noted here that the grammatical form of a statement alone is not at times adequate to determine whether or not it expresses
self-knowledge. The context in which the statement is made should then further specify whether the knowledge claimed in the statement has a primary reference to the speaker.

(2) A second sense of self-knowledge is expressed in the maxim "Know thyself." It is not quite clear what this maxim means. If it means knowing that one does not know, as Socrates maintained, then "self-knowledge" here has the same meaning as in the first sense, for it is knowledge about oneself. If the expression means knowing what one's own "inner voice" says, and if one means by "inner voice" one's own better or considered judgment about things, "Know thyself" again describes the kind of self-knowledge discussed under the first sense. If, on the other hand, the expression means knowing one's own true identity, the meaning of "self-knowledge" depends on what sense we give to the term "identity." The self one knows here may be, as in the Advaita Vedanta school of philosophy, the Universal Self. Self-knowledge in the sense described under (1) would then be only a means for this sort of knowledge. One has to first know oneself in the sense of (1) before he can realize that his "Real Self" does not fit that description. Or, one could mean by knowledge of one's identity a sort of non-interfering, non-justifying or non-condemning awareness of one's specific actions as well as of his deeper motives, beliefs and attitudes. I think that it is in this sense of knowing one's identity that self-knowledge is generally considered to be redeeming and valuable; for it delivers one from the trials of day-to-day living.
There seems to be a continuity between the first and second meanings ascribed to self-knowledge above; for in order for one to know his identity, and free himself from what he actually is (i.e., his conditionings), he must first know in a non-interfering way what he in fact is. Thus, in this thesis, I shall use self-knowledge in both of the above senses.

2. Objects of self-knowledge can be of different sorts. A person can know either his present, or his past particular thoughts, feelings, states of mind, sensations, actions, motives and their causes and effects, or, he can know his general characteristics or patterns exhibited over a number of instances of thought, behavior, states of mind, sensations, feelings, and so forth.

The means of self-knowledge can also be of different kinds. introspection can give one knowledge of some contemporaneous internal phenomena such as one's present bodily sensations, position and movements, and sometimes of one's feelings and moods. Reflection is a means for one to know his immediately past or distantly past particular objects—although some of them may be contemporaneous with reflection. One can learn about himself by observation, such as looking at his bodily positions, hearing his own voice speaking, watching the movements of his limbs, observing the causes or effects of his sensations, feelings, emotions, thoughts or actions in the external world. Although all these are direct ways of obtaining self-knowledge, this thesis is concerned primarily with the direct acquisition of self-knowledge through reflection; and hence, when I refer to direct self-knowledge I shall mean knowledge obtained through reflection.
Besides the above, we have indirect means of obtaining self-knowledge. Deductions from various generalizations one knows about oneself or from effects of one's behavior on oneself and others offer indirect knowledge of oneself. So do inductive generalizations made from various particular instances of objects of self-knowledge, and testimony concerning oneself from other persons. While a means of knowing (oneself or others) enables us to obtain information, it does not guarantee its truth. The same means of knowing can also lead us into error.

Several contemporary philosophers (Ryle, Wittgenstein and Shoemaker) claim that there is no significant difference between the means used in obtaining knowledge of oneself and knowledge of others, if one uses any means at all. However, the burden of my thesis is to show that at least some significant self-knowledge cannot be gained without using what I shall call reflection.

3. Acquiring self-knowledge should be distinguished from justifying it by verification. One may be in possession of knowledge which he may or may not be able, even in principle, to justify to others (e.g., one's knowledge that he has a headache). However, this does not imply that merely because he is unable to justify it to others he is not justified in possessing such knowledge or making a claim to it, for one can justify it to himself using various means, such as checking his memory. Since the process or means by which one obtains self-knowledge need not be the same as the means which he uses to justify or verify it, and since the
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means which he uses to verify self-knowledge for himself are not the same as the means he can use to justify it to others, it only follows that in such cases where he lacks the means to verify it to others, he cannot justify his knowledge to others.* Also, he does not have to wait until he has justified

*The concept of verification collapses when one has to verify his present claims about himself in terms of his future behavior; for he might deliberately act to tally his predictions, even though his behavior might have been otherwise, had he not made the predictions. Thus he might "verify" his predictions by making them come true. If, however, there is a break in the continuity of consciousness between one's predictions and his actions, and acts without any conscious intention of proving his predictions, then we can say (provided we do not postulate unconscious intentions) that his predictions are verified by his actions. The problem, of course, is much simpler when other persons predict on the basis of their knowledge of a person some future action of his without his knowledge that they did so.

such knowledge even to himself in order to be justified in making a knowledge claim. There is no need to justify one's knowledge even to himself unless there is a reason for doubt.

In case of doubt, one could justify to himself his knowledge claims by consulting his memory more carefully, or checking his memories for internal consistency and coherence with various generalizations he otherwise knows to be true about himself and the world. But in order to justify to others a self-knowledge claim, say about one's motives, reference to his behavior is the only recourse. Others could cite thoughts or feelings he expressed before as evidence, but this presupposes that they have already trusted in his sincerity and honesty.
The tests or criteria by which we determine errors in self-knowledge claims are of two sorts, depending on whether the statements expressing self-knowledge are about one's own purely private experiences, and whether the criteria used are for oneself or for others. There is no way of directly justifying one's private experience statements to others, but others can have indirect evidence such as the speaker's sincerity and honesty or whether his statements seem to be an integral part of his mental life, some of which they can observe in his behavior. When statements of self-knowledge are not about one's private experiences, the tests we use to justify them to others are the same as those we use to justify our statements about others, that is, by referring to observable behavior.

There is also a difference between the ways in which one deceives oneself and deceives others. Deception of others is by definition a deliberate process. The person admits the truth to himself, but willfully conceals it from others. If others expose his deception the person is embarrassed or disturbed. He may even deny that he has any part in it. Self-deception, on the other hand, may or may not happen with the explicit knowledge that one is doing so. In fact, most simple cases of self-deception occur without the explicit knowledge that one is involved in it. The person may be minimally aware of what he is doing, but he does not admit this to himself. Even if he knows that he is involved in self-deception, such knowledge may not altogether free him from it. On the contrary, it may involve him deeper in it, because, perhaps, deception has been taking place at a "deeper level." To obtain an impartial knowledge of
oneself is not an easy task, for one frequently deceives oneself because
the knowledge that he conceals from himself is either painful to admit or
detrimental to his prestige or self-image. It is, however, possible to ob-
tain a self-knowledge which is free from prejudices and biases by looking
at oneself from a "third man's point of view" and by examining one's pre-
judices, interests and motives "objectively."

Self-knowledge, when it is of a non-justifying, non-condemning
or impartial sort, has a tendency to free one, at least temporarily, from
one's motives, assumptions and the conflicts generated by them. Knowl-
edge of other sorts, i.e., knowledge of the world and other persons, on
the other hand, creates such changes only indirectly, if at all. For ex-
ample, it might generate self-reflection in an individual, or make one
clarify his goals and choices (by providing more information on which to
base them); or it might inform the person of certain consequences of his
actions.

One might suppose that obtaining impartial knowledge of the world
and other persons is far easier than obtaining a similar knowledge of one-
self. However, this is true only to the extent that one's self-interest is
not at stake in the former. For instance, it is quite patent how we pro-
ject our interests, biases and prejudices into the judgments we make of
others; or how our personal biases enter even into scientific investigations.
Impartial self-knowledge, since it includes knowledge of one's prejudices
and biases, can help one obtain an impartial knowledge of other persons
and the world.
Plan of Thesis

The remainder of the first chapter briefly explains and discusses some basic terms used in the thesis. It also gives a short account of the historical significance of the thesis.

Chapter II of the thesis is concerned with showing that reflection is a necessary means for at least some significant self-knowledge. In it I shall also be concerned with replying to some standard criticisms against such a thesis. In chapter III, I shall attempt, to show how self-knowledge is possible even though it might involve reference to private objects; how, notwithstanding Wittgenstein’s objections, it is possible to have a certain kind of private language which can refer to private objects; and how such a thesis does not lead us into skepticism of other minds. Chapter IV tries to reply to a particular brand of criticism of reflection as a means of self-knowledge, viz. Shoemaker’s attacks on self-awareness. It also contains a critique of his own positive theory of self-knowledge. Chapter V is chiefly interested in showing that Ryle has not succeeded in proving that there is no essential difference between the means of self-knowledge and knowledge of other persons. In chapter VI I shall show that Sartre’s theory of consciousness and self-knowledge fails to explain why we do not always have error-free self-knowledge even though we have the data concerning ourselves with us all the time. I trace the source of the defect in Sartre’s theory to his belief that consciousness cannot be something, in the sense that it cannot be identified
with something. In chapter VII I shall show how consciousness can be identified with something. Absorption, i.e., the process in which consciousness is identified with something, and identification account for the ignorance concerning oneself and fallibility which is characteristic of self-knowledge claims. Chapter VIII indicates how pure reflection, i.e., the awareness of one's "fundamental" identifications without the means of further identifications, dispels such ignorance and error, and how it is thus a necessary condition for self-knowledge. This chapter also describes some procedures and attitudes necessary and helpful for acquiring self-knowledge. It will also discuss a few tests for self-knowledge.

III

Explanation and Discussion of some Basic Terms

I have already explained above what I mean by 'self-knowledge' and 'direct self-knowledge'. I shall not attempt here any precise definition of the terms 'mental' and 'psychological'. They are to be understood as applying generally to the following classes of phenomena: 1) Subjective impressions, feelings and sensations, including bodily sensations, dreams, images, daydreams, hallucinations, illusions, and experiences of any kind are 'psychological'. In a derivative sense, verbal expressions of these phenomena are also psychological. 2) Phenomena having the characteristic of intentionality such as thoughts, intentions, motives, hopes, wishes, beliefs, expectations, desires and fears; and phenomena
whose nature is symbolic and which depend for their existence on their being experienced by a conscious agent are psychological. So are, in a derivate sense, the verbal expressions of these phenomena. 3) Any intentional or deliberate action for which the agent could be held responsible is also psychological.

'Object' in psychological contexts in general means any object of experience, awareness, response or identification; as for example, a physical object, an idea, an experience, a mental state or process, a person, a role, an attitude, an event, an occurrence, a place or a situation. 'Response' in general means the attitudes we take toward objects we are aware of, including our thinking about them, desiring or avoiding them.

Another set of terms which needs some explanation is "public" and "private". A 'private' object (or occurrence) is something that cannot in principle be observed by another person, but which one is aware of (either explicitly or implicitly) "in" oneself. Sensations of internal organs are an example of private objects. Of course, their verbal expressions can be publicly apprehended. What I mean by "cannot in principle be observed by another person" is that one cannot give any systematic set of procedures or conditions which can be adopted by another person so that when these conditions occur and the procedures are used the other person could be said to observe the given phenomenon. Although other persons cannot observe one's pains and other sensations, by virtue of the fact that they can observe his behavioral expressions of pain, they can observe and know that he is in pain. 'Internal' when used in psychological
contexts means 'private'.

A 'private use of a word' means the use of a word to refer to a private object. It however does not mean that other persons cannot understand its meaning. It only means that when one uses the word in this way, other persons must accept that he has the final word on whether the word actually refers to the private object he claims it does, unless they impugn his sincerity and honesty. In contrast, a 'public' object (or occurrence) means an object which is publicly observable; or for the observation of which one could provide certain conditions and procedures. Similarly, a 'public use of a word' means the use of a word for which it is possible to supply publicly observable conditions (criteria) and procedures to determine whether the word is used correctly.

I take 'consciousness' and 'awareness' as primitive notions and hence as incapable of definition. I shall use these two terms as synonyms.

Every act of consciousness is either a judging 'explicit' consciousness of an object or a non-judging 'experiencing' of it. To be 'explicitly' aware of an object is to judge it as such, distinguish it from other objects, relate it to one's past experience. 'Experiencing' of an object is a mere "sensing" of it without judging it as such, and without responding to it. Although responding implies judging, not all judging need involve responding (as, for example, in pure reflection). Every act of consciousness is also an 'implicit consciousness' of itself as such. We are also 'implicitly aware' of our bodily sensations and mental states every time we have them, even though we are experiencing or are explicitly aware
of other objects at the same time. 'Implicit awareness' is also a non-judging awareness. Whereas experiencing of an object is a separate and independent act, 'implicit awareness' is not a separate act. It is always a co-ordinate background awareness accompanying acts of awareness.

My distinction between explicit and implicit awareness roughly corresponds to Sartre's distinction between thetic or positional and non-thetic or non-positional awareness (BN, lxx ff). There is, however, a difference between Sartre's notion of thetic consciousness and my notion of explicit awareness. For Sartre, every consciousness of an object is an explicit consciousness, whereas I maintain that there are certain experiences such as 'absorption' (to be explained below, Pp. 19-20) in which we merely experience objects without explicitly judging them as such. Sartre also thinks that whenever we are positionally aware of an object we take attitudes toward it, but I do not think we must do so, unless we include in the meaning of "attitude" not taking an attitude also.

Every experiencing of an object or explicit awareness of it is accompanied by a co-ordinate implicit awareness, not as a separate act, but within the same act of awareness. With Sartre I shall call such implicit awareness the 'pre-reflective cogito'. It is necessary to postulate such a pre-reflective cogito for the following reasons: If we had no such co-ordinate implicit awareness, either we would not be able to know that we have had our own previous awareness, experience or states (which is false), or we know them only by remembering them later. Suppose we know them by remembering them, it would be hard to explain how we could remember
them when we did not know them before when they occurred. Also, when we reflect on a previous experience of ours the knowledge we have of the experience is not of something totally new, but of something that has already been there in the background. The knowledge is one of revelation. This implicit awareness, on the other hand, could not itself be an explicit knowing, for then it would be a separate act; and every act of awareness would then imply an infinite number of acts of awareness. Thus, when I am experiencing a strange event, I have a co-ordinate implicit awareness of this experience; or, when I am aware of a chair explicitly, I am also implicitly aware of my awareness of the chair. While such experiencing or explicit awareness of objects is occurring, I am also implicitly aware of my body.

There is a significant difference between Sartre's notion of the pre-reflective cogito (BN, lix ff) and mine. Since Sartre does not recognize experiencing as a possible act of consciousness, he claims that every consciousness of an object implies an implicit consciousness of oneself as distinct from the object. But, in my view, while we are experiencing an object there is not even an implicit awareness of oneself as distinct from the object of one's awareness, although there is an implicit awareness of the experiencing. Sartre, however, is right in maintaining that when we are explicitly aware of an object we have an implicit awareness of ourselves as distinct from the object of our awareness. Such implicit awareness becomes explicit in "reflection."
In general I shall not distinguish between 'reflection' and 'introspection', as I construe introspection as a subspecies of reflection (in the sense of internal awareness of one's own mental states). However, in some special contexts, especially in chapter II, I shall speak of them as if they are distinct. Then I shall use 'introspection' to refer to the internal awareness of one's own bodily sensations or some psychological moods. In such contexts, what distinguishes introspection from reflection proper is that the objects of introspection are contemporaneous with the act, while in reflection they may or may not be so contemporaneous (see chapter II for details). I shall use 'reflection' and 'self-awareness' as synonymous.

'Reflection', unlike the pre-reflective cogito, is a separate act. In reflection, we are explicitly aware of what we were previously only implicitly aware of. 'Reflection' can thus be defined as an explicit awareness of 1) a previous experiencing or 2) a previous explicit awareness of an object, or 3) a sensation or a mental state we were previously only implicitly aware of. In other words, every act of reflection presupposes a previous implicit awareness of what is reflected on and there is always an implicit awareness of the act of reflection. In this way, reflection is quite different from memory, which presupposes a previous explicit awareness and knowledge of its object. What seems to be an exception to this rule, namely, the immediate knowledge we have of pains and certain other mental phenomena, can still be explained as following this rule by saying that in these cases there is an instantaneous reflection on the state we
have been implicitly aware of, brought forth either by the intrinsic intensity of the phenomenon itself or by some other factor such as our curiosity as to what is occurring in our mind. Every act of reflection, since it is itself a separate act of awareness, involves its own co-ordinate implicit awareness, i.e., its own pre-reflective *cogito*, which in turn could become explicit in a further reflection.

Reflection can be of two kinds; 'impure' and 'pure'. 'Impure' reflection occurs when we reflect on our own experiences or states through identifications (i.e., through the conditioning of our consciousness by our past experience); and 'pure' reflection occurs when we reflect without such identifications. These terms, borrowed from Sartre, as used here are somewhat different in meaning from his. Sartre's pure reflection occurs when we are aware (as, for example, in moments of anxiety) of the true nature of our consciousness, which for him is pure spontaneity, freedom, pure choice and a nothingness. In this reflection we are aware of all the meanings with which we endow the world around us as spontaneously originating from our meaning giving activity (and not as inherent in the objects of the world). In impure reflection we are aware of ourselves as a psychic entity, an ego, with its states, qualities and actions. In it we attribute our experiences to our states, which in turn we attribute to the ego. Since for Sartre, the ego, its states and qualities are all illusory, true self-knowledge occurs for him only in pure reflection (see chapter VI for details).

'Identification' is the coloring or conditioning of our consciousness by our past experience of objects in which we do not judge objects as such
(which is a mere "experiencing" of objects), and in which we are not aware of ourselves as distinct from the object of our experience or from the experiencing itself. Such an experiencing is called 'absorption'.

One is also 'absorbed' in what one is implicitly aware of. Absorption is the experience or process in which identification takes place. When we are identified with an object we regard other objects or another occurrence of the same object or other instances of the same sort of object through the past conditioning, and explicitly judge and respond to them from that point of view (see chapter VII for details).

IV

**Historical Significance of Thesis**

In contemporary philosophy, the analytical and phenomenological schools are divided as to the means and scope of self-knowledge. Philosophers of either school are not clear as to why a person deceives himself, or why his account of himself falls short of the ideal of self-knowledge, and differs, sometimes radically, from another person's impartial account of him.

I Philosophers of the analytical school have problems in recognizing reflection as a valid means of knowledge, for this seems to involve publicly inaccessible and mysterious phenomena which seem somehow to create the object one attempts to know. For these philosophers self-knowledge is limited to either what is publicly known or what could be
public but is "suppressed" or "hypothetical" behavior.* In such accounts

*This is at least true of Ryle. See CM, 181, 184, 269, 301ff.

of self-knowledge the process of suppression and the nature of the sup-
pressed phenomena, as well as by what means they are known remain
mysterious. Some of these philosophers (e.g., Shoemaker) recognize
self-knowledge of publicly unobservable phenomena in the form of incor-
rigible statements, but it is not clear how they would account for such
knowledge. The others (e.g., Wittgenstein) do not consider such knowl-
edge as knowledge at all. Such a position is a reversal of a previous
position in the history of Western philosophy, namely, skepticism con-
cerning the knowledge of other minds based on a belief in the privileged
access to one's own private mental phenomena, especially sensations,
which supply the only (meager) basis to infer the existence of the exter-
nal world and other minds.

With regard to the means of self-knowledge, although philosophers
like Ryle admit retrospection as a means of self-knowledge, it is not clear
how it can be considered as a means, if, according to him, it is to be
understood as a form of memory (CM, 159ff). In order for memory or retro-
spection to act as a means of knowledge of one's own states or experiences,
it is generally believed that one must have first known them when they
occurred. However, it is not true that we do know all our experiences
or states of mind whenever they occur at the time they occur. Moreover,
if a state or experience is already known, then it is difficult to understand
how retrospection could be called a means of first-hand knowledge.

Phenomenologists like Sartre, on the other hand, admit reflection as a means of self-knowledge, but do not satisfactorily explain why one often fails to use pure reflection as a means of self-knowledge. In particular, Sartre fails to explain why even when one does reflect one only has impure reflection and not always pure reflection. The reason for this failure seems to me to lie in the fact that Sartre does not allow in his theory for anything to count as consciousness being determined by something other than itself (so that it is not free to reflect purely on itself). This in turn is due to the fact that the phenomenological method as practiced by Sartre does not recognize the fact of consciousness being given in reflection as having been something (in its past) as evidence for its being something (or being identified with it); for it requires that consciousness be given as being something in the present as evidence for its being something. But this is to ask for the impossible, for it is impossible for consciousness to be something and to be given as being something at the same time.

My thesis attempts to fill these gaps and place self-knowledge on a legitimate foundation, as well as provide a place for reflection as a genuine means of self-knowledge. It also explains why one often fails to achieve the ideal of self-knowledge, and gives the conditions for overcoming this failure. Finally, the theory of self-knowledge presented in this thesis will attempt to bridge the gulf that exists between the analytical and phenomenological schools, especially in the important area of
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self-knowledge, by suggesting corrections to both sides.
CHAPTER II

Reflection and Self-Knowledge

In general, contemporary philosophers in the analytical school approach the problem of what is self-knowledge by limiting it to what can be ascertained (or judged) by persons other than the speaker as knowledge. One consequence of this is not to recognize self-awareness or reflection as a means of self-knowledge, for it cannot be demonstrated to others as the basis on which one obtains self-knowledge.

In this chapter, I present a friend's account about herself which I think contains good examples of self-knowledge and briefly mention some contemporary philosophical explanations of them. I try to show how their explanations are inadequate, and why reflection is necessary to explain at least part of the self-knowledge in the account. Finally, I reply to some typical objections raised against reflection or self-awareness by analytical philosophers and some possible objections which could be raised from their point of view.

I

A friend of mine once gave me the following account of herself concerning an emotional problem which she had to face:

For some time I have been realizing how anxious and insecure I was becoming on certain occasions; and this was a problem for
me(a).* This anxiety prompted me to reflect upon my past (c).

* Letters following statements in the account mark different kinds of self-knowledge statements and will be discussed at the end of the example.

One of the things I discovered was that ever since I was a child I was repeatedly exhorted by my parents to achieve various goals (b). I found that I felt insecure in some situations because I was uncertain of the outcome of my performance—as in competitive situations such as debating (a). It looked as if the uncertainty itself arose because I failed sometimes in performing well, and the consequences of this failure were painful to me (a). These failures made me feel worthless (c). I was also afraid of parental admonition (a). I saw that the fear this might happen again made me feel more uncertain and insecure on later occasions (c). Except for this background, I didn't see why I should feel insecure about the outcome of my performance.

It now became clear to me that it was the fear that I might not succeed and also the fear of the consequences of not succeeding that were responsible for my problem. It was also clear that as long as I had this fear, and as long as I felt the insecurity which resulted from it, my performance would lack the caliber it might otherwise have had. I know this because on some other occasions when I had no opportunity to think about my performance and was totally involved in what I was doing, I had no difficulty in performing well (a). On such occasions I probably didn't have the time to let my fear interfere with my performance. So, it seemed to me that I now would have to understand this fear in order to understand my problem of insecurity.

To be sure, there is no way of knowing beforehand on most occasions whether I am going to succeed in what I am doing. There is nothing I can do about the future except try to improve my skills and not worry about my past failures. Exactly what were the consequences I was afraid of? First, I considered parental admonition (d). I live by myself now, and my parents are not here, and hence cannot reproach me. Even if they were here, I do not know if they would reprimand me if I failed at some task, for they might have improved their understanding of me for all I know. Suppose they would criticize me. Why should that bother me? Suppose they were to withdraw their financial support from me? Couldn't I make a liv-
ing otherwise? I felt hurt when they admonished me before (a). Why? It must have been that the belief in my own worth was affected. How did I happen to have this feeling or belief in my own worth? Probably because I had succeeded at some task and was praised for this success. The praise must have caused some pleasant feeling in me which led me to identify myself with the success of my performance. Now I asked myself why I should have this feeling of worth, why can't I just be without any worth whatsoever? (d). Picturing myself as being worthless at first seemed very painful to me (d). I felt as if I were sinking into a bottomless abyss, I was suddenly very lonely, and it seemed as if I had no ground to stand on (d). Then it became clear to me that I could exist without feeling the need for a constant evaluation of my worth as a person. I found that the tendency to judge myself as worthy or unworthy because I had succeeded or failed at a certain task was part of the process of seeking worth (d). Now, I saw, at least for the present, I could exist without having to have any special importance (to myself or others), or having to seek any worth (d). I could perform tasks and activities, but I was no longer worried about fulfilling myself through my accomplishments (d), for I realized that this had been the reason for my insecurity in the first place (d). I needed to reflect on many such situations in order to understand how pervasive my urge was for finding worth in my life and in my relationships with others. I found that not only my life was dominated by this urge (c), but that others' lives were dominated by it too. Reflection on my problem gave me new insight and attitudes toward my life and daily work in general. If, after certain efforts, I could not for some reason do certain tasks according to a high standard of proficiency, I would go on to other tasks necessary for living (f). Gradually I was thus able to free myself not only from the problem of insecurity regarding the outcome of performances, but also other problems involving insecurity (a), such as using my relationships with people to give me a sense of importance. I feel now that I can participate in activities which interest me without trying to judge myself either in terms of my performance of them, or by comparing my performance with others (e). I have to go for a job interview tomorrow, but I don't feel insecure any more about it (e).

The account as a whole represents a series of statements about my friend's problem and how she solved it. Although the above is a genuine ac-
count of a person's self-exploration, it does not consist solely of what are considered self-knowledge statements. The account reveals part of a process of investigation into herself by questioning herself, formulating hypotheses to account for her behavior and mental states, and then applying the hypotheses that seemed appropriate to particular instances in her life, as well as projects for her future.

The following is a classification of the different kinds of self-knowledge statements within the account:

(a) First-person generalizations about her past performances (and her responses to them).

(b) First-person reflections on a series of memories (not directly about herself).

(c) First-person general statements about a series of past private experiences.

(d) First-person statements of particular past private experiences.

(e) First-person statements of private experiences in the present (What Shoemaker would call first-person incorrigible psychological statements).

(f) First-person general statements about intentions for the future.

(a) and (b) can be, in principle, verified by other persons, while (c), (d), and (e) cannot be directly verified or falsified by others. Errors could be detected in (c), (d) and (e) by others only indirectly, by finding inconsistencies either between these statements and her behavior, or between these statements and her further statements about the same objects. In the case of (f), statements of intentions for the future, there may or may not be future observable behavior to test her statements against. However, the absence of behavior would not necessarily falsify her present statement of intention.
for the future. I shall call (f1) those statements in which behavioral evidence is lacking, and (f2) those in which it is not.

28. The above list could be extended to include the following sorts of self-knowledge statements:

   (g) First-person statements of bodily pain.
   (h) First-person statements of bodily position.
   (i) First-person statements of intentional action in the present (e.g., I am writing a letter).
   (j) First-person perceptual statements.
   (k) First-person memory statements.

As in the case of (f), (g) can be divided into (g1) which have behavioral evidence to verify them, and (g2) which lack behavioral evidence to either verify or falsify them. The remaining classes of statements (h through k) can all be in principle verified by other persons. I shall refer to this entire extended list of types of self-knowledge statements in the following sections when mentioning which statements different philosophers accept or reject as genuine cases of self-knowledge and why. It is my intention to show that most of the types of statements in the above list (with the exception of generalizations) are obtained through reflection, (or introspection in the cases of g and h).

II

Some contemporary philosophers would not recognize certain statements (viz., d, e, to f2) in the account in section I as self-knowledge statements, because another person could not judge whether one knows or is mistaken. In this section, I shall show that even supposing it is necessary for another person to be able to judge that one has self-Knowledge,
the evidence, on the basis of which another person judges, need not be
direct, and need not be obtained in every case.

Wittgenstein and Anscombe would not recognize some of the state-
ments mentioned in the list in section I as genuine cases of self-knowledge
because another person could not judge whether one knows or is mistaken,
viz., d, e, f2 and g2). Wittgenstein argues that statements of these
forms can only be considered as either behavior (PI, *244), or merely what
we are inclined to say, but not as descriptions of private sensations or
states of mind (PI, *290-293). The primary reason that he does not recog-
nize these cases of self-knowledge statements is that the sensations, feelings,
or states of mind referred to in these statements have no behavioral expres-
sions which others could use as criteria. These criticisms are dealt with
extensively in chapter III. Anscombe only recognizes statements about
bodily positions and statements of intentional actions. She says that
these statements are "non-observational, " or known without means (I, 13,
14) and are expressions of self-knowledge only because others can judge
whether the speaker knows or is mistaken. In the cases where another
person cannot judge, Anscombe says we can only "say that" (I, 13. 14).
However, neither Wittgenstein nor Anscombe explain why it should make
any difference to the fact of one's having a certain kind of knowledge
whether others can judge that he knows it.
Shoemaker, on the contrary, does recognize these statements (d, e, f2 and g2) as self-knowledge statements. He calls them incorrigible first-person psychological statements (SKSI, 215-6). The fact that they are sincerely and honestly made is a sufficient condition for their being true. Insincerity and dishonesty of the speaker are ascertained by non-verbal criteria, such as behavior conflicting with the statements. Shoemaker says that these represent self-knowledge because we are trained to make such statements when certain facts, such as our being in pain, occur (SKSI, 243). He, does not, however, explain what becomes of the status of these statements if there are no non-verbal criteria for ascertaining the sincerity or honesty of the speaker.

From the above discussion two questions emerge: what difference does it make to a person's self-knowledge claim if another judges it true or false, and what happens to the status of these statements when another person cannot judge the sincerity or honesty of the person, on the basis of his behavior or further statements.

There does not seem to be any reason why a person's knowledge of himself should be contingent on another person's being able to judge that he knows. In cases in which other persons cannot judge whether or not one is mistaken in his knowledge about himself, he has no means to demonstrate to them that his knowledge is true. If other persons have to judge whether he knows something about himself or not, they must be able to obtain evidence for or against his knowledge claim. In the case of incorrigible statements, since there is no direct evidence that can bear upon the knowledge claim, others can judge that one knows by ascertaining
his sincerity and honesty. But Shoemaker seems to assume that others must be able to ascertain the sincerity and honesty of the speaker in the context of every knowledge claim he makes. This assumption seems unwarranted, for others could judge that one is probably making a true statement of self-knowledge if they have reasons to believe in his sincerity and honesty in general (i.e., in the great majority of cases, where they could directly ascertain his sincerity and honesty). Such is possible in the account given in Section I.

Furthermore, there is also another sort of indirect evidence that can be obtained by others in the above account, which would give grounds for them to judge that the woman does know what she claims to know. Her incorrigible statements "fit in" or are an integral part of the whole account. It would be preposterous to claim that the rest of the statements in the account are knowledge statements and only these (d, e, f2) are not, because we cannot judge them to be so. Also, others can test her general sincerity and honesty with respect to many other statements not only in the account but elsewhere. Moreover, the account as a whole can be judged by others to be probably true by trying to apply the procedure she described in the account to themselves and see if it "works." Suppose they do not succeed in solving similar problems of their own by the same method. They could then try alternative ways of solving such problems which work not only in their own case but in others' cases as well. If they could understand the reasons why these alternative solutions work, they should also be able to attempt an explanation as to why she succeeded in solving her problem,
or why she thought she solved her problem, with the method she described. It would indeed be quite odd if neither her procedure nor their own alternative method worked either for most occasions of similar problems, or for other persons in similar contexts. If either of the methods did not work, and they have not found reasons for why they did not, then their investigation into the methods has not proceeded far enough.

Suppose she offered in her account another procedure, which also includes some incorrigible statements—for example the procedure that sincerely believing that she is capable of succeeding not only brings her success, but also lessens her feelings of insecurity. We, in this example, could point out to her that this account of hers is not quite satisfactory, for one must first admit to himself the fact that he is insecure before it is necessary to postulate (and try to believe) that he is capable of succeeding. Then, the problem remains as to how one can make oneself believe sincerely in his capabilities when he knows that, he in fact doubts his confidence. No formula, such as praying to God, or comparing oneself to people inferior to oneself in performance, seems to be able to create a lasting sense of self-confidence. Thus, if the woman presented this "positive thinking" as a method for overcoming her problems of insecurity, we would have to doubt the validity of her account as a whole, including the self-knowledge statements in it. Even then it would not follow, however, that the incorrigible statements (particularly d, e, and f2) included in her account are false.
In other words, although particular incorrigible statements are about particular private experiences, and thus as isolated elements are unverifiable, by the fact that they are embedded in accounts of problem solving which makes a difference in the observable life of a person, and by the fact that these accounts are intersubjectively verifiable, there is a possibility of talking about such experiences and their properties and, thus, have grounds to judge whether another person knows the private experiences that he claims to know. In the above two respects, that is, in the sense of the possibility of ascertaining the general sincerity and honesty of a person, and in the sense of our being able to judge whole accounts in which incorrigible statements are embedded, others could consider these incorrigible statements as self-knowledge statements.*

*For further treatment of this matter see chapter III.

III

In this section I try to show briefly how theories of Anscombe, Shoemaker and Ryle do not adequately explain how the self-knowledge contained in some of the statements mentioned in the list in section I is obtained.

Anscombe would explain some of the statements (h,i) as expressing non-observational knowledge, that is, knowledge without any means. Nothing, for example, would show a person his bodily position or his intentional action (1, 13,14). She does not deny that a person may have certain kinaesthetic sensations when he knows the position of his limbs, "but that does not mean that one knows it by identifying the sensations one has" (1.49).
Similarly, Shoemaker would explain the basic self-knowledge statements in section I (d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k) as due to the i-act that we are trained to make them only when certain facts occur. Some of these statements he would characterize as incorrigible statements (e, f2, g2 and probably also d). I have already mentioned in section II how he defines these statements. Some other statements in the list (j, k and probably also f, g, h, i) would be corrigible statements. Corrigible statements are those against which others can find evidence. Corrigible statements have a non-personal and a personal component: For example, in the statement "I remember that I met Jones yesterday" the non-personal component is "I met Jones yesterday." Shoemaker argues that we are trained to assert incorrigible statements when the statements are in fact true, as making a statement "I have a headache" when we in fact have a headache. Similarly, we are trained to assert corrigible statements only when we know the non-personal component is true and when certain bodily facts are obtained such as, in the case of perceptual statements, our head being turned toward the object of perception, our eyes being open, or, in the case of memory statements, our having actually been a witness to the event we report remembering in our statement (SKSI, 241). Neither of these kinds of statements are known through anything like self-awareness of one's private experiences or one's perception or memory (SKSI, 92ff).*

*See the last section of this chapter and chapter IV for some of his objections to the thesis that self-awareness is a means of self-knowledge.
Neither of these above accounts seem satisfactory to me as an explanation of how we obtain self-knowledge. Neither explain why it is, if we do not use self-awareness or some other means similar to it, that whenever we are in a bodily position or mental state, we do not always know it, or whenever we perceive or remember we do not know that we do. Shoemaker does not explain, moreover, how we can make incorrigible or corrigible statements without knowing that the private experience or perception or memory occurred.

Ryle would explain some of the statements in section I (b, k) as being due to remembering, some (e and probably also d) due to what he calls retrospection, which seems to be a form of memory, some others (f, g, h, i, j, k) due to noticing or eavesdropping, and statement (a) as an inductive generalization based on (i).* In Ryle's view, however, none of these processes are to be equated with self-awareness or introspection. Ryle claims remembering and retrospection are means of knowledge, but it is not clear how it is possible in his theory to remember or retrospect on something which one did not know before when it was occurring. For example, he does not explain how it is possible for the woman who gave the account in section I to retrospect (if retrospection is to be considered as a form of memory) on her feeling of being empty, which she did not know when it occurred. Nor are his explanations of "noticing", "being alive to" or "eavesdropping" entirely clear. He construes them as achievement

*For a fuller discussion of the point see chapter V.
verbs, but "achievement" indicates that it is the culmination of a certain activity; and it is not clear what activity is contemplated in these cases. It is also not clear how one could eavesdrop on one's own mental processes while they are going on. Thus it seems to me that none of the above three accounts explain adequately how we obtain the self-knowledge contained in the statements listed in section I.

IV

In this section I shall be concerned with showing that reflection is a necessary condition for obtaining most of the self-knowledge contained in the account in section I. My arguments can also be applied to the other self-knowledge statements listed in section I. I shall also give a brief explanation of reflection.

1. It is clear that the woman could not have acquired most of the knowledge in the account through observation, because there was nothing to observe in the experiences which she reported in many of her statements (d, e, f). The statements she made about her own performances (a) also could not have been based on observation, for how could she observe herself while she was busy performing? The statement she made about her parents exhorting her to achieve various goals (c) was based on a series of memories, but in order to make the statement she must have reflected on them as a whole. Her statements about her past private experiences, or how she performed and responded to her performances could not have been based on memory (assuming that she did not make them before this account). For there are many occasions when one has private experiences,
or one acts, without knowing that he has them or he so acted. And when he knows that he has them either a moment or sometime later, how could he be said to remember them if he did not know them when they occurred? As I argued above, neither can it be said that the self-knowledge in the account is obtained without any means, for then she should know the facts about herself whenever they occur. Hence, there must be a factor which is necessary for her to be able to know these facts about herself. This factor must be of a sort which is neither external observation, nor memory, but something like introspection, reflection or self-awareness (or internal non-sensory observation) or noticing. This factor cannot be an automatic self-awareness which necessarily accompanies all mental states; for then we would be knowing automatically all our mental states as and when they arise. Maintaining such an automatic awareness would, as Ryle argues (see section V below), lead us into an infinite regress. It could be introspection, if introspection is understood as an internal observation (which is not automatic) of something that occurs in the present, for example, one could be said to know his bodily position or bodily sensations through introspection. But introspection does not explain much of the other sorts of knowledge where we seem to know phenomena about ourselves which no longer exist, but which we have been or have experienced just a moment ago (e.g., our having been angry). The factor could not be just noticing either, for unlike Ryle's concept of noticing (CM, 207), the factor is an activity, in the sense that it is something we deliberately do, and can continue doing, and do with different attitudes and points of view.
which interfere with what we observe and change its character and intensity. Noticing does not do all these things. Thus the factor must be a form of reflection or self-awareness in a non-automatic sense.

2. Reflection, as I conceive it, has the following properties: 1) Strictly speaking it should not be confused with introspection which is only an awareness we have of our bodily states and sensations as well as certain psychological moods, which are contemporaneous with the act of introspection. The objects of reflection, on the other hand, are usually of a moment ago or from sometime in the past. It is, however, not always easy to draw a hard and fast line between introspection and reflection. For example, in many cases of reflection the act of reflection reinvokes the immediately past emotion (or other responses) and makes it present by taking different justifying or resisting attitudes to it. 2) It presupposes a previous implicit awareness of what we have been experiencing and we now reflect on. 3) It is paying an explicit attention on what one has previously been only experiencing or only implicitly aware of. 4) It is an activity, and it can be deliberately undertaken. 5) It gives us access to both private and public occurrences (our private experiences, behavior, actions, perceptions and memories) in ourselves. 6) It is capable of levels; for example, when one reflection becomes the object of another reflection the latter is a second level reflection (i.e., an explicit awareness of a previous first-level reflection, which in turn has a previous experience or explicit awareness as its object.) 7) It implies an implicit awareness of itself which becomes explicit when a higher level
reflection takes place. 8) It could be pure or impure: Impure reflection can turn an immediately past object into a present one, judge it and modify or distort it, while pure reflection is always of an object as it has been. 9) Although reflection does give us a privileged access to certain phenomena which others cannot have access to except through our avowals of the phenomena, it is not infallible. One could make mistakes either of categorization, or of time (in the case of distantly past objects), or one could distort the object through impure reflection (see chapter VII for details). 10) Reflection is an internal (i.e., publicly unobservable) activity, although its objects sometimes are not. Hence it cannot be demonstrated to others. 11) Since reflection is a revealing of what we have already been implicitly aware of before, the knowledge gained through reflection is not totally surprising: it has the characteristic of revelation. However, there is no question of its giving us knowledge, because it enables us to explicitly know and make statements about ourselves which would not be possible otherwise.

V

In this section I attempt to reply to some typical objections contemporary philosophers have raised, and to some possible objections that could be raised from their point of view, against reflection or self-awareness as a means of self-knowledge.

1. First of all, there is the objection, which both Shormaker*

*I shall pay special attention to Shoemaker's version of the argument in chapter IV.
and Ryle have raised in different forms, that self-awareness involved on infinite regress. I shall present here first Ryle's version of the infinite regress argument against automatic self-awareness, and then his similar argument against a non-automatic introspection, and reply to each in its turn.

a. Ryle argues as follows: If every mental state is essentially conscious and hence automatically known, what about the mental state in which such a knowledge is contained? Is it also conscious and automatically known by another mental state? If it is, then the mental state which contains this knowledge must also be known by another, and the latter by a third, and so on ad infinitum. Thus we are led into an infinite regress, or we are forced to postulate a mental state which is not automatically known and hence is not conscious. If we postulate the latter, we contradict the original definition of mental states as being essentially conscious (CM, 162-3).

This objection raises a serious difficulty only if I maintain that every mental state is automatically and explicitly conscious of itself. But I only maintain that for every act (or state) of consciousness there is an automatic implicit awareness of it. Since implicit awareness does not amount to knowledge, and since it is not a separate act of awareness, every mental state is not automatically a knowledge of itself. Such a knowledge is obtained only when we are explicitly aware of the original act (or state) through reflection. Thus the infinite regress cannot be generated.
b. Ryle has another version of the infinite regress argument, this time in the form of drawing out the consequences of holding a form of non-automatic introspection, which, he says, nevertheless, involves double attention when it does take place. For example, when I discover that my watch has stopped, I also discover at the same time, if I introspect, that I discover that my watch has stopped. Suppose such a double attention is not explained away as a swift switching back and forth of attention, which, Ryle argues, philosophers are reluctant to admit, there must be a limit to the number of the "possible synchronous acts of attention". This entails that there must be mental processes which are not introspectible, i.e., those which encompass the maximum number of synchronous acts of attention. From this it follows that there are at least some mental processes which are not known through introspection. Ryle asks how do we know that such processes occur. If the answer is that we know them by some form of automatic self-awareness, then the infinite regress objection that has been raised in a) can be raised against this self-awareness also (CM, 164-5).

My reply to this objection is as follows: There are three different cases to be considered here: 1) Introspection (what I call self-awareness) of processes which themselves involve paying attention to something (e.g., perceiving, remembering, thinking about or imagining something): in such cases there is no doubt attention involved because at the moment of self-awareness the original act of attention is interrupted and does not take place any longer; that is, self-awareness here is of the immediately past act of attention, and not of a simultaneous act. 2) Self-awareness (or
Ryle's introspection) of psychological moods such as depression: Here again there is no double attention because the mood itself is not an act of attention to something. It is a sort of atmosphere or feeling which pervades our mental life at the time. 3) Introspection of bodily sensations; having a bodily sensation implies only an implicit awareness of it; the sensation itself is not an explicit attention to something. Hence introspection of bodily sensations does not involve double attention.

Thus, in none of the above cases of mental states or processes does introspection (or self-awareness) involve double attention.

c. Perhaps one might think that a similar objection can be raised against my thesis, that is, that every mental state (or an act of awareness) implies an automatic implicit awareness of itself as being such a mental state or experience. One might ask, in the manner of Ryle, how do we know that we have had this implicit awareness? If the answer is that it is through reflection that we are aware of it, then, the objection continues, since every act of reflection (here of the implicit awareness) implies a previous implicit awareness, we seem to be forced to postulate an implicit awareness of this implicit awareness; and, by trying to answer how we know that we have had this latter implicit awareness we are forced to maintain another reflection which implies another implicit awareness of this implicit awareness and so on ad infinitum. And thus we seem to be caught in an infinite regress of implicit awarenesses.

My answer to this objection is as follows: Every act of consciousness is either an explicit (i.e., judging) consciousness or (non-judging)
experiencing of its object (including a previous act of consciousness) and an implicit consciousness of itself as such a consciousness or experience. Similarly, every mental state or experience we have has an implicit awareness of itself. Reflection is making explicit such an implicit awareness.

We do not need to postulate another implicit awareness of the implicit awareness of the act of consciousness or state of mind, because the same act of reflection which reveals to us the previous experiencing or explicit awareness or mental state also reveals our implicit awareness of it. The reason that it does so is that the knowledge of the object that it gives is not that of a totally new object, but of an object that has already been in the background of our awareness. Such a knowledge does not totally surprise us; it reveals to us an object which has already been there in the field of our consciousness, but which we were only dimly aware of.

d. Another possible objection to the thesis that every act of awareness is an implicit awareness of itself is that the thesis involves us in the following sort of infinite regress: Let 'M' be a mental state or an act of awareness; let 'O' stand for any object; let 'E(O)' stand for either the experience or explicit awareness of the object; and let 'I' stand for the implicit awareness of the act. Then the thesis can be represented as:

\[ M = E(O) & I(M). \]

But by substitution for 'M' we get

\[ M = E(O) & I(E(0) & I(M)); \]

and since the substitution can be repeated ad infinitum there results an infinite regress.
The alternative to the above formulation, the objection goes on, is to say, 

$$M = E(O) \& I(E(O)).$$

Then the infinite regress is terminated, but there is no awareness of $M$ at all, which implies that we can no longer maintain that every mental state has an implicit awareness of itself.

This objection, like c) is also similar in form to Ryle's objections mentioned above. The objection is formulated in such a way that in either of the forms of representation it assumes that there are two separate acts of awareness in every act of awareness, viz. one, an awareness of the object, and two, a separate act of implicit awareness of the act or mental state; whereas my explanation of implicit awareness denies that it is a separate act. The equations do explain a certain fact about awareness, viz. that every act of consciousness is also a consciousness about itself; but they are incorrect insofar as they contain one act of awareness on the one side of the equations and two separate acts of awareness on the other.

2. The second type of objections have to do with the lack of similarity between self-awareness (or introspection) and observation (through sense-perception), as a means of knowledge.

a. For example, Shoemaker argues against the assimilation of awareness or direct acquaintance (self-awareness, in my terms) to perception and observation. If awareness were like perception and observation, he argues, similar things could be said about both awareness and
observation (SKSI, 92ff, 220ff). For instance, there are empirical ways of determining, other than by my observation, whether or not I am justified in making the statement that I see an object. In the case, say, of my pain, there are no criteria which could justify me in making my statement. There is nothing to indicate that I am not aware of my pain except my assertion to that effect.

In chapter IV I shall argue in detail for some sort of independence of the object of awareness from the act of awareness; and I shall also argue there that such independence need not exist in all cases of self-awareness. Here it will suffice to point out that the relationship between reflective awareness and its object is contingent. Our having a mental state is necessarily connected with our implicit awareness of it. But this implicit awareness is not the same as the explicit awareness which happens only when we direct our attention to it in reflection. Thus there is only a contingent relation between the mental state and the explicit awareness of it in reflection. However, the gap between the two appears almost non-existent when there is an instantaneous reflection of phenomena such as intense pains, tension, resistance, excitement or fear. Although it is not possible for us to point to a thought of ours in the present and say that we are not aware of it (for the act of pointing to the thought ipso facto is an act of explicit awareness), we could be thinking without our being aware of the fact that we are thinking. There could also be empirical criteria on some occasions which another person could use and judge, for instance, that we are daydreaming. He could also judge that we are so
absorbed in our daydreaming that we do not know that we are daydreaming
(without pointing this out to us, for such a pointing would bring an instan-
taneous reflection on our daydreaming).

b. Another objection of the same type is offered by Ryle.
He objects to introspection (and this objection could apply to my notion of
self-awareness as well) by saying that there is no way of deciding between
two conflicting introspective reports, whereas reports of perception can be
decided upon by an appeal to facts (CM, 165).

Let us assume here that introspective reports are the same as reports
of "internal" phenomena based upon reflection. It is not quite clear from
Ryle's objection what kind of conflict is envisaged here. 1) Is it a con-
flict between two reports which we give at two different times upon what
we have introspected on in ourselves? 2) Or is it a conflict between
two individuals disagreeing as to what they introspect about a certain
phenomenon, say thinking, one saying that whenever he thinks he only
has visual images, and the other saying that whenever he thinks he only
has auditory images. 3) Or is it a conflict of impressions two people
might have of a similar situation?
Suppose the conflict is of the first kind. The situation then is per-
haps something like this: we give two inconsistent reports about what we
have discovered in ourselves, say about a particular motive of ours.* The

*In this context, we are speaking of a motive for an isolated indi-
vidual action, and not a motive for an action or a series of actions for
which there could be inductive evidence.
conflict may be due to a change in our opinion as to what our motive has been for an action; or it may be due to the fact that we forgot that we made the statements which conflict with each other. When we do change our accounts about our motives, it is usually either because we have acquired further information about our actions, or because our new version better explains the facts known to us about ourselves. Such a change of opinion is not justified unless it is supported by reasons or grounds for the change. The further information or explanation for change gives the grounds for saying that the revised report is truer to the facts than the original report. If the conflict is due to the fact that we forgot that we made an earlier report which conflicts with the new one, and if we are made aware of this fact, then we can check back and see which one of the two reports accords truly with all the facts we know about ourselves. On the other hand, if the conflict is between, two memory statements about our "internal" events, this conflict can be resolved by our checking which one of the memories coheres with the rest of our memory system and with many of the general facts which we happen to know about ourselves and the world. The fact that we are the final authority as to which of the two reports is true does not imply that there are no ways of checking which of them is true, or that there are no facts which in our own mind resolve the conflict. It only means that there are no publicly verifiable facts which would resolve for others the conflict between the two reports.

If the conflict is between two individuals disagreeing about what each thought he "observed" within himself concerning a general mental phenomenon such as thinking, we could attempt to resolve this conflict
by finding out first whether each person has the same meaning in mind for "thinking" and "what happens when he thinks." This we could do by trying to determine in what sense both accounts could be true. It may well be, for example, that when one of them is thinking only auditory images appear while when the other is thinking only visual images appear. If this is so, then there is no conflict between the two accounts, because both of them could be true, given the fact that thinking can occur in different individuals through different means or vehicles. It is also possible that by "thinking" one of these individuals may mean the preliminary stages of thinking, while the other may mean the end result of it, that is, the explicit report one makes to oneself. Or, by "thinking" one of these individuals may mean a very passive kind of reverie or thinking by "free association", while the other may mean an active and goal directed thinking consisting of a "dialogue with himself." When we thus determine the sense in which each of these individuals use the terms "thinking" and "what happens when he is thinking", we should be able to reconcile the two conflicting reports. Then, in the senses specified, both the apparently conflicting accounts would become true. If the conflict still persists, then it probably means that we (as arbitrators of the conflict) have not quite understood in our own mind in what way these reports could both be true and "fit in" with the rest of the two reporters' (and our own) mental life. For, it would be very odd if two human beings should use utterly conflicting processes when they are engaged in the activity which we all call thinking. What this example shows is not that introspection (in my terms, reflection) is not a means
of self-knowledge, but that the conflicts between introspective reports can sometimes be settled by clarifying the terms in the reports and by relating the accounts to the rest of the mental life of either of the reporters or of the arbitrator of the dispute.

As a third possibility, the conflict in reports may be due to the difference in the impressions different people have of the same situation, I do not know if any of us try to resolve such conflicts, because here there is no problem of two people truly reporting* what they felt, but of there being a difference between the impressions they had. And this difference of impressions is a result of many factors, such as the differences of background and present mood. Thus, such "conflicts" are not even a problem.

*I shall argue in chapter III that if we have reasons to believe in the general trustworthiness of a person's reports, then we can in general trust his introspective reports to be accurate, i.e., that they do report what they purport to report, although in particular cases we have no way of ascertaining the accuracy of such reports other than by relying on the speaker's testimony.

3. Another objection of Ryle against self-awareness is that no one in fact justifies his claims to self-knowledge by means of self-awareness (CM, 161).

It seems to me that we do not do so, not because self-awareness is not a means of self-knowledge, but because it cannot be demonstrated as such to others, it being neither a physical nor a publicly observable activity. Nor is there any need to do so for ourselves. If self-awareness were not a necessary condition for self-knowledge, there would be no reason why we do not know ourselves all the time. In this objection Ryle
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seems to confuse what we need in order to know about ourselves with what
we need in order to justify our self-knowledge statements to others.
Whether or not we have self-awareness makes all the difference between
knowing ourselves and being ignorant of ourselves.

4. Another type of objection, raised by Ryle, concerns the infal-
libility and privileged access which introspection is supposed to provide
us. Ryle argues with Hume that there are some states of emotion or pas-
sion which cannot be coolly scrutinized. If we say we are scrutinizing
these states of emotion then it means that we are no longer experiencing
them; and if we are experiencing them, then it follows that we are no
longer scrutinizing them. We can only examine such states in retrospec-
tion, i.e., by "catching ourselves" when we are just leaving or soon after
we have left these states. Thus, "if retrospection can give us the data we
need for our knowledge of some states of mind, there is no reason why it
should not do so for all" (CM, 166). But such retrospection neither gives
us a privileged access, nor is it infallible as claimed by the introspection-
ist theory (CM, 166).

I think both the traditional theory of introspection and Ryle's theory
of retrospection are too simplistic as explanations of what occurs when we
go through violent emotions. First, there are moods such as depressions
which can be introspected upon while they are still occurring. Even the
violent emotions such as intense fear or anger do not often pass away as
soon as we start introspecting them. On the contrary, we at times exag-
gerate their intensity in the process of 'introspecting' (or 'reflecting,' in
my terms) them, because we take various attitudes toward them such as guilt or avoidance. This occurs because while still being in the states of emotion, we resist or justify them through our attitudes. In such cases our self-knowledge claims may be in error, but not because the emotional state no longer exists, but because we distort them through the attitudes we take toward them. Second, even in cases where the violent emotion passes away as soon as we reflect on it (or introspect it, in Ryle's terms), our reflection reveals the immediately past emotion which is no longer intense, but which we have all along been implicitly aware of. Thus the knowledge we obtain through reflection is not as much a knowledge which results from chasing a past object which no longer exists as the making explicit an implicit awareness of an emotion experienced a moment ago. There is only one type of error that is possible here, viz. of miscategorization. Third, when we reflect on such an immediately past intense emotion, we sometimes reinvoke it; i.e., we make it present and exaggerate its intensity by the various resisting or justifying attitudes we take toward it. Here too, error is possible, but because of distortion. Although error is possible in all the above three cases, it does not follow, however, that introspection (or reflection) does not provide us with privileged access. Ryle seems to confuse privileged access with infallibility.
CHAPTER III

Self-Knowledge, Private Language and Skepticism
(Wittgenstein's Critique of Private Language)

Wittgenstein's attempt to dispel skepticism regarding other minds led him to raise doubts as to the meaningfulness of self-knowledge statements as describing private mental states. This reversal seems to me unwarranted. In this chapter, I shall argue three points: 1) with certain qualifications, we can say that words in our ordinary language can and do refer to private mental states; 2) self-knowledge statements as descriptions of private mental states are meaningful; and, 3) admitting these two theses does not involve any skeptical consequences as to the knowledge of other minds.

The first section in the following is introductory; it will explain how accepting the notion of private language seems to lead to skepticism of other minds. It also contains a summary of Wittgenstein's arguments against private language. The remaining three sections deal with the above three points in that order.

I

1. It seems as if in our own case our mental states are only contingently related to their behavioral expressions, for there is no absurdity in supposing that the former occurs without the latter, or vice versa. For example, if I in fact feel pain, but for some reason decide to suppress it,
then there is pain feeling but not pain behavior. If, on the other hand, I pretend to feel pain when I actually do not, there is only pain behavior without the feeling of pain. Thus it seems as if there are two logically unrelated concepts of pain: that of pain feeling, on the basis of which I assert that I am in pain; and that of pain behavior, on the basis of which another person judges that I am in pain, or I judge that another person is in pain. The former concept refers to my feeling, to which I have a privileged access, for only I can know that I have pain, and the latter to the behavioral manifestations of pain which both I and another person can equally well observe, but which can supply, at best, only probable "inductive" grounds for inferring that another person has pain feeling. Such inductive grounds are based on a constant conjunction between pain feeling and pain behavior in my own case. However, this does not seem adequate for inferring, on the basis of the analogy between my behavior and another person's, that the latter has feelings similar to the ones which I experience. Such a conclusion is impossible for me to verify even in a single case, because there is no way I can observe the feeling of another person outside of his behavior, except by having his feeling. But it is theoretically impossible for me to have another person's feelings. As Wittgenstein puts it: "I can only know that I have personal experience, not that anyone else has" (BBB, 48). So it seems that admitting the thesis that words can refer to private mental states, that is, admitting the concept of pain which refers only to my feeling, seems inevitably to lead us into skepticism of other minds.
Wittgenstein in his later works (BBB and PI) attempts to refute with meticulous care both the thesis that words refer to private sensations (and its skeptical consequence), and the thesis that we can never know that another person has feelings. He attacks these theses piecemeal. In particular he criticizes the following implications of them: Words refer to sensations (PI, *243, 244, 256, 258, 260, 265, 269-71, 273, 274, 277, 281, 380). I observe my own sensations (PI, *288, 289, 417, 671-3, pp. 187-9, BBB, 50, 51, 56). Only I can know my own feelings (PI, *246, 247, 251, 253, 310, 408, 409, 637, 638, 660, pp. 185-189, BBB, 48, 55). Another person cannot have my pain (PI, *253). I must always know when I am in pain (BBB, 55-57). Only from my own case do I know what the word "pain" means (PI, *293, 295). Only my pain is real (BBB, 48, 56, 57, 60). Experiences other than my own are inconceivable (BBB, 59, 60). I cannot feel another person's pain and hence cannot observe it (PI, *253, BBB, 48-55). While I know I am in pain I can only conjecture or believe that someone else is in pain (PI, *303, BBB, 53-54). I infer that another person has feelings by observing his behavior (PI, *293, 302, 303, 350, 385, 398). I can (inwardly) undertake to call THIS "pain" in the future (PI, *263). When I say "I am in pain" I am at any rate justified before myself (PI, *289).

Wittgenstein thinks that philosophical puzzles such as skepticism concerning other minds arise out of the misuse of words in our ordinary language. The philosopher's concern should be to restore language from metaphysical to ordinary use, and then the puzzles will disappear (PI, *116, BBB, 26-28, 44, 45). The result of misusing words is to mystify
common sense with puzzles which it cannot solve. We can only defend
common sense by curing philosophers of their temptation to attack com-
mon sense (BBB, 58). Wittgenstein also argues that only our ordinary
language is worthy of the name of language. All other forms of language
are such only by comparison (PI, *494). By this Wittgenstein seems to
imply that all our concepts are, and must be, ultimately derived from
ordinary language, and that philosophical puzzles would disappear if we
carefully describe the various ordinary uses of the key words that occur
in philosophical discussions. For example, to determine the use of the
word "pain" in ordinary language, Wittgenstein asks how a child learns
the use of the word "pain" and answers that people teach the child the
word "pain" as substitute behavior (e.g., saying "I am in pain!") when
he cries in pain (PI, *244).

3. The following is an outline of Wittgenstein's arguments against
the thesis that words refer to private mental states, and his own explana-
tion of mental state words.

Wittgenstein defines private language as one that cannot in prin-
ciple be understood by anyone except the speaker. Only the speaker
knows what the individual words in the language refer to (PI, *243). If
words do refer to private sensations, as in a private language, and if
this language is to be used for communication, it necessarily defeats
its own purpose; for, the speaker cannot know if he uses a word in this
language correctly the same way each time he uses it, and so cannot be
said to understand it. This follows from the definition of private language.
56.

In other words, I (as speaker) have no way of knowing that each time I use a word to refer to a sensation if I am using it to refer to the same object, for I have no test to find out whether or not I am right. As Wittgenstein says, I have no criterion for the correctness of the use of the word (PI, *257, 258), I might think I have some private tests; but this will not do, since a private test is a contradiction in terms. For example, it is possible to imagine that I always misidentify the sensation which the word is to refer to (PI, *270), because I may always misremember a past sensation when I have to compare a present one with it to see whether or not I am applying the same word to the same sensation each time (PI, *265), I might suppose that I am at least subjectively justified in using the word, because I satisfy myself that the present sensation is of the right kind, by checking it with an imaginary table of sensations. This subjective justification, however, is not genuine, for justification consists in appealing to something independent (of the speaker) (PI, *265).

Wittgenstein also attempts to refute the hypothesis that the word "pain" can refer both to something known by everyone and to something known only to the speaker (i.e., the sensation or feeling of pain). He says this hypothesis is meaningless because it does not make any sense to doubt whether I know my pain. Hence it is senseless to say that I know my pains (PI, *288, 408). The temptation is to think that when I say "I know I am in pain," I am describing my state of mind (PI, *290). Wittgenstein suggests that the statement "I know I am in pain" has no use in our language (Pi, *290-293). The model of "object and name" misleads
us into thinking that we have something which we are describing when we say "I know I am in pain." If we press this model and generalize it from our own case to everyone, we must assume that each person has his own particular picture which he is describing. In that case the name might describe a different object in each case, no object at all in some others, and objects which are constantly changing in the others. Thus the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant (PI, *293). Expressions of the form "I am in pain" are therefore not to be understood as descriptions of private states of mind, but as exclamations or behavioral expressions of pain. "The verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it" (PI, *244).

In the second part of the Investigations, Wittgenstein modifies somewhat his view that statements of the form "I am in pain" are to be construed as pain behavior. He says,

> Describing my state of mind (of fear, say) is something I do in a particular context... Is it, then, so surprising that I use the same expression in different games? And sometimes as it were between the games? (PI, p. 188)

This seems to mean that expressions of the form "I am in pain" could have, among others, the use of describing one's state of mind. When he tends toward such a view, Wittgenstein would say that the grammar of such descriptions is different from that of the descriptions of, for instance, a room (PI, *290, 292). One is not reading off something when one is describing a mental state (PI, *292). It is even questionable if there actually is something which I am describing (PI, *292, 293). And the description is only what I am inclined to say (PI, *386).
II

1. It is not very clear exactly what Wittgenstein's notion of private language is. It is not clear whether he is arguing against 1) the view that words in our ordinary language refer to private sensations, when there are in fact no behavioral expressions for them, or 2) the view that words in natural (or ordinary) language refer to private sensations for which there can be no behavioral expressions, or 3) the notion of a purely hypothetical private language which is supposed to be intelligible only to the speaker and which only he "appears to understand".

In general, Wittgenstein seems to confuse the three different notions of private language mentioned above. For example, when he says

But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and the rest - for his private use? - Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language? - But this is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language (PI, *243).

he seems to argue against the third kind of private language. In another place he says:

Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand? How do I use words to stand for my sensations? - As we ordinarily do? Then are my words for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensations. In that case my language is not a 'private' one. Someone else might understand it as well as I. - But suppose I didn't have my natural expression of sensations, but only had the sensations? And now I simply associate names with sensations and use these names in descriptions (PI, *256).

Here it is not clear whether Wittgenstein intends to argue against the first or the second type of private language.
Although his objections to private language seem to apply mainly to the second and third notions, I think he at times clearly intends to argue against the first notion of private language also, as in the following passage:

Don't always think that you read off what you say from the facts; that you portray these in words according to rules. For even so you would have to apply the rule in the particular case without guidance (PI, *292).

In the above passage Wittgenstein is arguing that we must have rules to guide our uses of words not just in general, but on every particular occasion; that is, his objections would apply not only to uses of words referring to mental states for which there are not and can never be behavioral manifestations, but also to those words referring to mental states which, might have behavioral manifestations, but do not in fact have on some particular occasions.

Someone like Ryle might argue that in cases in which there are no behavioral manifestations, there is still no privacy in the sense of a privileged access, but only a lack of evidence which is due to the fact that the person is inhibiting his behavior (CM, 172-4). I shall argue in the fourth section that it may very well be theoretically impossible in particular cases to do anything to obtain such evidence, and hence the language used in such cases can still be considered private language. In other words, there are cases in which no criteria can be available by which another person can judge that a person has a private content.

2. In the remainder of this section I shall argue that Wittgenstein's objections to private language do not validly apply to the first notion of
private language (mentioned above) which I shall call 'derived' or 'relatively private language'. I shall argue later in this section (at 5) that for this sort of use of word—that is, the private use of words in which there are in fact no behavioral expressions but in which there could be at times—it is reasonable to suppose that a person's sincere and confident avowals, reports or descriptions in general accurately describe his mental states. I shall also argue in that context that it is reasonable to suppose that in general if a person sincerely and confidently claims so, then he does in fact remember his sensations accurately and does identify them correctly.

Wittgenstein's arguments are relevant and successful with regard to the second sort of private language mentioned above, which I shall call 'absolutely private language' or 'purely private language'. I shall argue that our ordinary language in fact does contain this sort of uses of words, and I shall explain how words acquire such uses. Here I admit that we have no ultimate criteria to determine the correctness of such private uses of words in ordinary language except the speaker's avowals. But I shall argue that this situation does not reasonably end in skepticism. I shall completely ignore the third notion of private language mentioned above, namely the purely hypothetical private language, as not being relevant to my purposes.

Wittgenstein's objections are divided for my purposes into three classes. The first class of objections deal with the possibility for misidentifying sensations because we may be systematically misremembering them, for lack of criteria for the sameness of sensations or images. The second
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class of objections have to do with the transition from the sensation to
the description of it in words. The third class concerns the meaningful"-
ness of self-knowledge statements. I shall deal with .the first two clas-
ses of objections together in this section and with the third class in the-
ext section.
Examples of the first class of objections by Wittgenstein to private
language are the following:

Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign "E" in my diary.
I discover that whenever I have a particular sensation a manometer
shows that my blood-pressure raises. So I shall be able to say
that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus. This
is a useful result. And now it seems quite indifferent whether I
have recognized the sensation right or not. Let us suppose I reg-
ularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that
alone shows that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere
show. . .(PI, *270).

"Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word
'pain' meant--so that he constantly called different things by that
name--but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the
usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain"--in short he uses it
as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned
though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism
(PI, *271).

"Before I judge that two images which I have are the same, I must
recognize them as the same." And when that has happened, how
am I to know that the word "same" describes what I recognize?
Only if I can express my recognition in some other way, and if it
is possible for someone else to teach me that "same" is the cor-
rect word here. For if I need a justification for using a word, it
must also be one for someone else (PI, *378).
Examples for the second class of objections are the following:
But isn't the beginning the sensation—which I describe?—Perhaps
this word "describe" tricks us here. I say "I describe my state
of mind" and "I describe my room." You need to call to mind the
difference between the language-games (PI, *290).
Don't always think that you read off what you say from the facts; that you portray these in words according to rules. For even so you would have to apply the rule in the particular case without guidance (PI, *292).

If you say he sees a private picture before him, which he is describing, you have still made an assumption about what he has before him. And that means that you can describe it or do describe it more closely. If you admit that you haven't any notion of what kind of thing it might be that he has before him—then what leads you into saying, in spite of that, that he has something before him?... (PI, *294).

How do I recognize that this is red?—"I see that it is this; and then I know that that is what this is called." This?—What? What kind of answer to this question makes sense? (You keep on steering towards the idea of the private ostensive definition.) I could not apply any rules to a private transition from what is seen to words. Here the rules really would hang in the air; for the institution of their use is lacking (PI, *380).

3. That certain words—e.g., mental state words—in our language cannot be used meaningfully and correctly without the speaker experiencing certain states of mind, and that hence those experiences must be at least part of the meaning of the words, can be argued for as follows: Our criterion for justifiably saying that a person used those words correctly is his behavior. Suppose his behavior convinces us that he is merely imitating others' behavior; and hence it is not a genuine expression of the mental state in question. Let us suppose that the mental state in question is, for instance, love. The speaker's behavior simulates all the external manifestations of love, and he claims that he loves someone, but an impartial observer could tell that the behavior does not show genuine love, because it lacks feeling and so forth. In such circumstances we are inclined to say that the speaker has not yet learned the correct use of the word "love." But how do we explain the fact that a person who is fully
grown and who has learned the rest of his vocabulary well has not yet learned the correct use of this word? The only explanation that can be given is that the person has not yet known what love is. When we are further pressed as to what we mean by this, we would say that he has not had the experience of love, or that he has not felt love toward anyone. The criterion for our saying this is his behavior, but our meaning is not his behavior. Our meaning is that he does not know what love is, or that he has not experienced love, and that he only acts as if he were in love.

Wittgenstein confuses in general the meaning of a statement or the conditions which make it true, and the criteria for making it justifiably. Accordingly, he raises the question how do we know that the speaker lacks the experience (PI, *315). If we answer that we know in our own case that when we lack a certain experience we don't use the word referring to it correctly, he would object to this, saying that this is a rash generalization from one's own case (PI, *293). The fact of the matter is that what makes the statement that the person lacks an experience true is the fact that he lacks the experience, and what justifies us in making the statement is the behavior of the person we observe. But we cannot know directly the fact that the person lacks the experience—only the person himself can know this. I shall argue in the next section that a person can be said to know his own experiences or the lack of them. I shall also show how words acquire meanings so that we can use them to refer to other persons' experiences without actually having or observing these experiences ourselves.
4. In general, I agree with Wittgenstein's thesis that all our concepts are and must be ultimately derived from the concepts in our ordinary language (see p. 55 above). But I disagree with him about his theory that the meaning of words consists in their use (PI, *43), and his theory about the meaning of mental state words. Mental state words in ordinary language are never such that they cannot refer to private mental states when there are no behavioral manifestations of them. How is it that they have this capacity?

The primary or what I shall call the "core" use of mental state words is such that we never make a division between the internal or private mental state and its behavioral manifestations. When we learn the primary use of these words, we do not make a distinction between, for instance, pain feeling and pain behavior. The basis for judging private mental states differs depending on whether they are one's own or others' that are being judged: feelings are the basis in my own case, the behavior, causal circumstances or sincere avowals are the basis in the case of the others. But what we mean by pain in these different cases is not different. When we say someone is in pain, we do not just mean that he shows the behavior of pain, or that he was hurt by a stone, or that he cries in pain, but rather that he is in pain.

Both the concept of the feeling of pain and the concept of the behavioral manifestations of it are abstractions out of this core concept or mental state, and are derived from it. When I am in pain and there are no external circumstances such as behavior which show that I am in pain, one
of the derived concepts of pain, namely pain feeling, comes into use, of course, through the word "pain." I know that I feel pain, but, since I do not express it in behavior, another person has to take my word for it. When we realize that another has only been pretending he was in pain and was not in fact in pain, then also the second derived concept of pain, namely pain behavior, comes into use. Now we say that he acted as if he were in pain but he was not in fact in pain. When we are pressed to explain what we mean by saying that he is not actually in pain, we say that he does not feel it. We are also keenly conscious of this division when we watch someone writhing in pain, but for some reason or other he is unable to describe the nature of his pain. In this context we know that the person is in pain, but we do not know what the nature of his pain is, because he cannot tell us, and because we cannot observe his feeling.

Here again what makes my statement that someone is in pain true is not merely the fact that he behaves as if he is in pain, but the fact that he is in pain. When in certain circumstances, such as when someone pretends and he does not express his pain in his behavior but merely says he is in pain, we are inclined to say that it is the fact of his either feeling or not feeling pain which makes the statement that he is in pain true or false. But what justifies us in saying that he is in pain may be his behavioral expressions, or the causal circumstances or his sincere avowals and descriptions of his pain. We may be proven wrong later in our belief that he was in pain, but we could still say we were justified at the time in judging that he was in pain.
Given the core and derived concepts of mental state and their corresponding uses of a mental state word (say, "pain"), it is easy to see how we can use the mental state word independently to refer to the feeling alone, as when for instance we are frustrated or depressed or insulted and exhibit no behavioral manifestations of the feeling. Then our avowals are the only basis another person can use as evidence to say that we are in the mental state. Similarly another person can make statements about his own mental states when there are no behavioral expressions for them. We can understand his statements although we do not always know whether or not they are true.

5. I shall now argue that unless we have special reasons to doubt a person's sincerity and honesty in particular cases, although we in fact lack behavior or external circumstances as evidence, if a person sincerely and confidently avows certain feelings or private experiences, then his avowals are generally true, and if he sincerely and confidently claims to describe in his reports the private feelings he has, then his descriptions are more often true than not.

Suppose someone systematically misreported or misrepresented his feelings; that is, suppose that his reports were empty in the sense that there was nothing which they reported or represented, or that the person said he had y whenever he actually had x or z or something else (x, y and z stand for private experiences). There must be some explanation for this systematic misreporting or misrepresentation: either the person is lying or pretending or he must not understand what the words he is using...
mean. It will be granted that at least some of his mental states have behavioral expressions, causal circumstances and behavioral consequences. The person does not always know when his mental states have such external circumstances surrounding them and when not. It is a matter of accident that some of the mental states have behavioral consequences and others do not. I am of course assuming here that if he is pretending, or lying, or if he does not understand the meaning of his words, this would reveal itself, at least sometimes, in his behavior. If this is true, then it cannot be held consistently that a person always pretends or that his avowals never truly represent or report what he feels. For pretension and lying are so only in contrast to a sincere and truthful report or representation of a feeling. Suppose that the person sometimes pretends and at other times he reports his feelings truly. In such a case we would not know which of his feelings he is reporting truly and which he is misrepresenting or pretending to have. If we cannot clearly differentiate when he is reporting his feelings truthfully, and when he is not, we have no way of trusting his avowals at all, because this difficulty would arise sooner or later equally in the avowals for which there are supporting (or disconfirming) external circumstances. Then we would generally mistrust his avowals. But this would frustrate the person’s own purposes and interests in practical living, for he cannot get any responses from us when he needs them. So, it is a matter of necessity for him to reveal through his behavior the distinction between lying or pretending and a true report of his feelings.
Another possible reason for a person's systematic misrepresentation of his feelings is that the person does not understand the words he is using in his avowals and descriptions, such as "feeling" and "pain". If this is so, then he could not use these words correctly with respect to others either, because our learning of these words does not make any distinction, as far as their core use is concerned, between the first and third person uses of these words. If we suppose that he is misusing these words only in their private use, and that this is what causes the confusion, this will not do either, because in order for him to learn to identify his private feelings he must have relied on the core use of the words in the first place.

We must now suppose that he has been systematically misrepresenting his feelings because he has been consistently identifying them incorrectly, which in turn is due to the fact that he has been systematically misremembering his feelings. From our assumption that the presence or absence of behavioral manifestations of private feelings is only accidental, it would follow that such misremembering and the consequent misidentifying would make a difference in the trustworthiness of the person's avowals and descriptions generally, and this would enable us to discover that he has been misremembering and misidentifying his feelings systematically. Thus we would start doubting his remembering capacity in general and not merely with respect to his private feelings which in fact have behavioral manifestations.
Finally, it cannot be coherently maintained that persons only exhibit feeling behavior and make avowals about feelings without ever in fact having any feeling, and that human beings are generally only automata, for if this assertion is true in general it will have to be true in our case as well. But we know that at least in our case this assertion is not true. Hence as a general assertion it must be false. (I shall argue in the last section of this chapter that we must consider other human beings as persons, just as we consider ourselves as persons.)

From the above it can be concluded that when a person sincerely and confidently makes avowals and descriptions about his feelings for which there are in fact no behavioral manifestations (but for which there could be on occasions), they are in general true. In the last section of this chapter I shall argue that in particular cases in which a person's avowals and descriptions are false, we may have no means of determining this fact.

6. There are then the feelings, flashes, sensations, images and so forth in us for which there are not and can never be any behavioral manifestations except our avowals of them. Wittgenstein himself uses words meaningfully to refer to such phenomena:

'I can see or understand a whole thought in a flash in exactly the sense in which I can make a note of it in a few words or a few pencilled dashes.' What makes these notes into an epitome of this thought? (PI, *319, See also PI, *342).

Wittgenstein is not here disputing the occurrence of these private phenomena. His tendency is never to dispute, their occurrence but to say that our
only criterion for saying that a person has the phenomena is that he himself says so (PI, *344). In the above quote he is indicating that we have no criterion for saying that the words we use to express a certain thought are a correct translation of that thought.

However, if we can understand the words referring to these phenomena and yet there can be no behavioral expressions for the phenomena, then how do such words acquire meaning in our language? The use of such words must indicate a further extension of their core use. Such words acquire their meaning by means of analogy to their public uses, for flashes and pictures are public occurrences which everyone can observe. However, we do not and cannot justifiably use any other word which is far different in meaning from these, words to refer to these mental phenomena without grossly misinterpreting them, if we wish to communicate our experiences to others.

There is another way in which words acquire absolutely private use. This occurs when we use words to refer to absolutely private mental states on the basis of their analogy to the relatively private uses of words referring to feelings and sensations for which there can be behavioral manifestations, but for which at times there are none. For example, we learn to name our bodily feelings and sensations on the basis of their analogy to pain feelings, for which there can be behavioral manifestations.

A third way in which we learn to use words absolutely privately is by discovering that sometimes the words so used by others to describe their private experiences aptly describe our experiences also, or by being able
to imagine ourselves in circumstances described by others and 'vicariously' experience the feelings they reported. In these circumstances we understand others' reports about their private experiences, and for the above reasons believe that their reports are probably true, without our being able to show that they are.

Wittgenstein would not grant such absolutely private uses of words because he does not see the distinction between another person's understanding what a person says when he uses words absolutely privately and his knowing that the person is using the words correctly. Wittgenstein might reply that we may understand what another person says, in the sense that we respond to his words appropriately, but, he would ask, how do we know whether the other person understands the words he is using or he only "appears to understand" (PI, *269). However, it is not clear why, in order for us to understand his words, we have to know that the other person understands them. Even supposing that we must know this, there is no reason why it is not sufficient for us to know that he in general understands the meanings of the words he uses, although we may not know that he understands them in a particular context, i.e., when he uses the words absolutely privately, for, it is reasonable to assume that the words he uses absolutely privately are an integral part of his vocabulary in general. Therefore, we can assume that he understands the meanings of his words even when he uses them absolutely privately.

To be sure, in the context of absolutely private uses of words, Wittgenstein's objections to private language are germane. For surely we
have no ways of testing whether the person is not systematically mis-
identifying by consistently misremembering the particular feelings and
flashes. It is logically possible that this particular part of his memory
system is impaired. There would then be no tests independent of the
person's thinking to show whether he was using the words correctly or
not. There would also be no distinction between the person's thinking
that he remembered a feeling correctly and his actually remembering it.
But given the soundness of the person's memory system in general, and
his understanding of the words in language in general, what is the like-
lihood of this particular part of his memory system being impaired, and
thus his misunderstanding this particular part of his vocabulary?

Thus the fact that our ordinary language allows uses of words
without there necessarily being public criteria for testing whether or not
we are using the words correctly on all occasions, that is, the fact that
words in our ordinary language have sometimes absolutely private uses,
should not disturb us. Since Wittgenstein was absorbed in a particular
view of language he was prevented from recognizing this fact about our
ordinary language. For it would be extremely odd to think that a person
used all the words in his vocabulary correctly, except for just those words
which referred to purely private mental states. Similarly, it would be
quite unusual for a person's memory system to be generally in tact, ex-
cept for its being impaired only in the particular area of absolutely pri-
ivate feelings. If we were not to make such an extravagant assumption, we
would not be unjustified in considering these memories as a sub-class of
our memory system in general. In particular contexts, when a person is in doubt, he can surely check a particular memory of a purely private feeling with other memories of the same soil or other kinds of memories, if they are connected, and determine if it is true by seeing if it coheres with his memory system in general, given the general trustworthiness of his memory system. (In the next chapter, I shall present Shoemaker's arguments for showing that a person's sincere and confident memory statements are generally true.)

Supposing that a person's sincere and confident memory statements are generally true, then it could be argued that the fact that a subsystem of such memories coheres with the rest of his memory system and with the generalizations he knows about the world enhances the relative trustworthiness of the subsystem. Shoemaker, however, argues that particular memories of ours cannot be checked against the rest of our memory system (SKSI, 253-254). He says: suppose the memory whose truth is in question conflicts with the rest of my memories. How does such a conflict occur? For example, I seem to have two memories: First, that there was a parking lot at a certain place two days ago, and second, that I remember seeing a tall building in the same place yesterday. One of these memories must be false. Conflict in this context is to be understood in terms of both the memories together being incompatible with a general truth I know about the world, e.g., that tall buildings are not built in a day. Shoemaker says that my memory system alone is not sufficient to give me the general knowledge of the world. For it is possible, according to him, to make complicated
generalizations on the basis of my past experience which conflict with the experience of other persons. Suppose I formulate, a set of generalizations which are consistent with a majority of my memories, but are inconsistent with the rest, it does not follow that the recalcitrant memories are false. For I could formulate a different set of generalizations which could save an equally large but different set of memories so that memories that would be "false" according to the first set of generalizations would be "true" according to the second set and vice versa.

I doubt very much whether such an experiment could be carried out without introducing an element of the miraculous, or without the person being a paranoid or amnesic. In the last case we would have reason to doubt his memory system as a whole. From the person's own point of view, it is not easy to see how such an experiment can be carried out successfully to the end without at least some of his memories conflicting with his other memories (and perceptions), and without at least some of the so-called veridical memories conflicting with some generalizations which he seriously believes, and on the basis of which he proceeds with his practical living, unless, of course, he happens to believe in a completely magical world. It is difficult to say whether or not Shoemaker's claim is true unless it is illustrated by a specific example; but he has failed to provide such an example. Even if his claim were true, given the general trustworthiness of our memory system, it seems safe to conclude that if a particular memory coheres with the rest of our memory system, then its truth and reliability are, at least relatively, if not absolutely, increased.
75.
From the discussion in this section it can be concluded that words in our ordinary language have a justifiable relatively private use, and a slightly less justifiable, nevertheless reasonable, absolutely private use. Thus, a relatively private language which is derived from the core use of mental state words is possible, and an absolutely private language does in fact exist. The words of the absolutely private language acquire meaning mainly on the basis of analogy with the public and relatively private uses of words.

III

In this section, I shall argue that self-knowledge statements as descriptions of private mental states are meaningful, contrary to Wittgenstein's suggestions that they are not.
1. The following are the kind of objections which Wittgenstein raises against the meaningfulness of self-knowledge statements as applicable to private mental states:

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behavior, for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them. The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself (PI, *246).

I turn to stone and my pain goes on. Suppose I were in error and it was no longer pain? But I can't be in error here; it means nothing to doubt whether I am in pain! That means: if anyone said "I do not know if what I have got is a pain or something else", we should think something like, he does not know what the English word "pain" means; and we should explain it to him. How? Perhaps by means of gestures, or by pricking him with a pin and saying: "See, that's what pain is!" This explanation, like any other, he might understand right, wrong, or not at all. And he will show which he does by his use of the word, in this as in other cases.
If he now said, for example: "Oh, I know what 'pain' means: what I don't know is whether this, that I have now, is pain"—we should merely shake our heads and be forced to regard his words as a queer reaction which we have no idea what to do with. . . That expression of doubt has no place in the language-game; but if we cut out human behavior, which is the expression of sensation, it looks as if I might **legitimately** begin to doubt afresh. My temptation to say that one might take a sensation for something other than what it is arises from this: if I assume the abrogation of the normal language with the expression of a sensation; I need a criterion of identity for the sensation; and then the possibility of error also exists (PI, *288).

What I do is not, of course, to identify my sensation by criteria but to repeat an expression. But this is not the **end** of the language game: it is the beginning. But isn't the beginning the sensation—which I describe?—Perhaps this word "describe" tricks us here. I say "I describe my state of mind" and "I describe my room". You need to call to mind the difference between the language-games (PI, *290).

Don't always think that you read off what you say from the facts; that you portray these in words according to rules. For even so you would have to apply the rule in the particular case without guidance (PI, *292).

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means—must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly? . . . . . . if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and name' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant (PI, *293).

"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"—On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it (PI, *244).

I know I have pain is redundant (BBB, 55).

Describing my state of mind (of fear, say) is something I do in a particular context. . .

Is it then so surprising that I use the same expression in different games? And sometimes as it were between the games? And do I always talk with very definite purpose?—And is what I say meaningless because I don't?" (PI, p. 188).
But here is the problem: a cry, which cannot be called a description, which is more primitive than any description, for all that serves as a description of the inner life. A cry is not a description. But there are transitions. And the words "I am afraid" may approximate more, or less, to being a cry. They may come quite close to this and also be far removed from it. We surely do not always say someone is complaining, because he says he is in pain. So the words "I am in pain" may be a cry of complaint, and may be something else. But if "I am afraid" is not always something like a cry of complaint and yet sometimes is, then why should it always be a description of a state of mind? (PI, p. 189).

(I cannot accept his testimony because it is not testimony. It only tells me what he is inclined to say) (PI, *386).

Besides the above Wittgenstein has another set of objections to the notion that we can observe or feel or inwardly see mental states and thus that we can describe them (see, for example, BBB, 5 Off). I shall not deal with them here because I shall deal with similar objections of Shoemaker in the next chapter.

From the above quotations the following can be gathered: Wittgenstein believes that statements of the form "I am in pain" are to be construed as pain behavior and not as descriptions of mental states. The statement "I know I am in pain" is redundant and has no place in our language. The reason for this is that it does not make any sense for me to doubt about myself if I am in pain. A reason for believing that statements of the form "I am in pain" are not descriptions of states of mind is that there are no criteria which allow us to judge whether or not we identify them correctly.

If we construe statements of the form "I am in pain" as descriptions of states of mind, such descriptions should not be confused with descriptions of publicly observable objects. The model "object-name" has no place
in such descriptions and hence the private object is irrelevant in such descriptions, At; best such descriptions by other persons cannot be construed as testimony, but only as what they are inclined to say.

2. Criticism of Wittgenstein's views:

a. Wittgenstein says that statements of the form "I know I am in pain" are redundant and have no place in our language, and hence they cannot be considered as statements describing private mental states or as expressing knowledge of them (BBB, 55).

To be sure, the circumstance of being in pain are such that my being in pain automatically implies that I know I am in pain. In these circumstances it is redundant to say that I know I am in pain. Does this mean, however, that the statement "I know I am in pain" is meaningless or is not descriptive? As Searle argues in Speech Acts (Pp. 141-45), is Wittgenstein not confusing the meaning of a statement with the conditions of its assertion?

It does not even seem certain that whenever a person is in a mental state he knows that he is in such a state. To be sure, when he is in pain he does in fact know that he is. But when someone is totally involved in a daydream or in a state of intense anger, he does not necessarily know that he is in such a state (i.e. daydreaming or anger), because he is too involved to reflect on his state. In these circumstances the person's behavior might show that he is in a certain mental state, but it could also show that he is not explicitly aware of what his particular thoughts are in such situations or the quality of his experience. If we make him aware of
the fact that he has been daydreaming or angry at someone, then we may cause him reflect instantaneously on his state of mind, and then he can report what has gone on in his mind a moment ago. But sometimes he may not be able to reflect at all, and might even deny that he was in such a state. Thus, I think that Wittgenstein would come to very different conclusions if he had not considered pain as a paradigm case of mental states.

b. Wittgenstein says that it is senseless to raise doubts about my knowledge of my own mental states (PI, *246), and hence statements of the form "I am in pain" are not to be construed as knowledge statements.

It seems to me, however, that there are two ways in which doubts can arise in my mind as to the accuracy of my description of my private experience: 1) The feeling or sensation may not be sufficiently clear (i.e., isolated from other experiences) and distinct in my mind to enable me to have an accurate descriptive knowledge of it. Or, 2) my description may not be wholly appropriate to the experience I have had. For example, when I try to describe my pain I know that I am definitely wrong if I describe my pain as dull and pervasive, when in fact it is sharp and localized. We improve our knowledge in the first case by trying to recapture the experience either by remembering it more clearly or by putting ourselves again in the same situation which caused our experience, as by revisiting a place which gave us a certain experience. In the second case, we modify our descriptions with more appropriate words until we are satisfied that we have
captured the uniqueness of the experience in words. (Novelists and poets are adept at such skills; in fact, this is how they can communicate their experiences to us.) In either case the criterion to judge whether our description is accurate is our own satisfaction. Wittgenstein does not consider this as a genuine criterion, because he requires something "independent" of the speaker to be a criterion (PI, *265). Here he seems to exclude by definition as a genuine criterion anything which other persons cannot observe and use. I do not see any justification for such an exclusion. I shall argue in d. below that we can have (intersubjective) grounds to believe that others' descriptions of their private experience are probably accurate, although we cannot show this to someone who doubts our belief.

c. Wittgenstein also says that the statement "I am in pain" is not a description of a mental state but a behavioral expression, akin to a cry (PI, *244). However, in other places he changes his mind somewhat and says that the statement could have a descriptive function among others (PI, pp. 188-89). In general it seems to me that Wittgenstein confuses the distinction between the meaning of an expression and the use or function it has for us. It is true, as Wittgenstein says, (PI, p. 189), that the expression "I am in pain" can be put to a variety of uses. However, this does not mean that the meaning of the expression is changing with all these uses.

d. Even if Wittgenstein agrees that the expression "I am in pain" sometimes does describe a mental state, he would say that the grammar of this description is different from the grammar of the description
of, say, a loom (PI, *290, 292). He would say that we are not reading off something which we are watching when we are describing a mental state (PI, *292). That it is questionable that there actually is something which we are describing (PI, *292, 293), that that something is irrelevant for the correct use of the word (PI, *293), and that when we describe a mental event we can only say that our "description" is what we are inclined to say (PI, *386). All these arguments can be reduced ultimately to the claim that there are no independent criteria for verifying whether or not our descriptions are true.

Wittgenstein, however, does not give any explanation as to why we are inclined to give such descriptions and not others, and why different people sometimes agree, as they in fact do, as to what they are inclined to say (when they give similar descriptions of their experiences), especially when the experiences occur in similar circumstances.

How can we account for the fact that two people sometimes do agree in their descriptions, i.e., in what they are inclined to say? Suppose we answer that two people who are involved in a similar situation would be inclined to say the same thing about the situation. But then a further question can be raised: why is it that they at times also differ in what they are inclined to say? The answer to this question is that the persons' background, training, sensitivity and present mood are perhaps different such that what they are inclined to say is an interaction of these factors with what they perceive as the present situation. In other words, given the fact that the above factors are common between two persons, it is more
likely than not that they will be inclined to say the same things in similar situations. If this is so, then how can we distinguish between what a person is merely inclined to say and his description of a feeling or experience? If two persons do agree in what they are inclined to say about a situation, what prevents one of them saying that the other indeed is describing his feeling or experience of the situation? If the person is describing his state of mind, then he must be describing something, and that something which he describes must be his state of mind or feeling which he is reflectively aware of.

In this context Wittgenstein would probably say that it is possible to imagine that two people have all these factors in common and yet they are still inclined to say conflicting things in the same situation. This is logically a possibility, but it is a possibility which we cannot understand, for there is no reason for it. Instead of postulating such unexplainable possibilities, is it not more reasonable to accept the fact that there must be reasons for disagreements, though we may never know in particular what the reasons are, and that an agreement exists because the persons making the descriptions are in fact describing the same experience or state of mind? Here the criterion for our saying that the persons are describing the "same" state of mind is their statements, but what we mean is that they actually have two similar states of mind (or the same state of mind).

When another person describes his state of mind, we do not usually doubt that he understands the words which he is using in his description, even though we have no way of testing his understanding in each particular
instance. When we do not agree with his descriptions of a situation which we have also been involved in, we only doubt if he is correct (or accurate) in his descriptions, although we do not express our doubts, because so far as we know there is no objective way of settling a dispute about such descriptions.

Thus, it seems to me unjustifiable to claim that statements of the form "I am in pain" are not descriptions, and statements of the form "I know I am in pain" are meaningless and do not express self-knowledge; for, the fact that individuals agree sometimes in their descriptions of experiences in similar situations gives us reason to believe that they are describing a similar experience, although they cannot show this to us.

IV

One might suppose that admitting the private use of mental state words as indicated above might involve skeptical consequences as to the existence of other minds. I shall argue that it need not do so. In this section I shall generally distinguish between two different sorts of skeptical questions: 1) we have no reason to believe in general that other persons have minds or that they have feelings in the same sense that we have them; and 2) we have no means of knowing whether a person is pretending on a particular occasion to have a certain feeling when he in fact has none. My arguments are against the first sort of skepticism, whereas I grant that there may very well be certain occasions when we are never be able to determine whether a person has a particular feeling or not, and hence we are forced to remain in doubt.
I. The traditional skeptic, at least according to modern representations of him, claims that there are two logically unrelated concepts of pain: one that is applicable to me when I judge that I am in pain, and another which is applicable to the other person when I judge by his behavioral expressions that he is in pain. The two concepts are independent of each other. Furthermore, the relationship between feeling and behavior or the expression of feeling is purely contingent in my own case: namely, one of either constant conjunction or causation. Thus, the skeptic would argue, we have no grounds for inferring on the basis of the analogy (i.e., the similarity between my behavior and others' behavior) that other persons are capable of any feeling similar to what I experience in myself as pain feeling.

The skeptic would first argue that we have no valid reason to believe that another person is capable of any feeling, because we cannot observe his feelings as we can observe directly or be immediately aware of our own. We can only observe his behavior, and we can never be sure, except in our own case, that the behavior is connected with feeling. Descartes expresses such possible doubt—though in a rudimentary fashion—when he asks whether the men he has been watching through the window may not all be automata, i.e., incapable of any feeling (Meditations, II, 31).

If the theory of language which I presented above is true, then the "core" use of mental state words is such that there can be no doubt as to whether other persons in general have feelings. Publicly observable behavior of others is a sufficient criterion to justifiably say that the mental state which is referred to by a mental state word does in general occur. The private
use of the mental state word which the skeptic employs in order to raise
his doubt is only an abstraction from the core use. Later in this section
I shall try to justify the thesis that the core use is primary, at least in
our ordinary language.

What about particular cases in which a person is pretending or
lying; that is, what if he behaves as if to all intents and purposes he has
a certain feeling when he does not in fact have it? Ryle argues that we
can have inductive evidence which is our criterion for deforming whether
or not someone is pretending (CM, 172-4). Contrary to Ryle, I think that
although it is possible in general to have criteria with which to determine
whether or not someone is shamming or pretending, it is doubtful that we
can always have criteria to determine that a person is doing so. Ryle pre-
sumes we cannot observe certain facts (i.e., a person's behavior and so on
that can be used as evidence) in particular cases because they are in fact
not available to us (CM, 173). But I shall argue that we cannot observe
them because there is nothing we can do, even theoretically to obtain such
evidence; in this small class of cases neither inductive evidence nor any
physiological evidence would show whether or not the person is pretending.

We might suppose that at least logically, it not empirically, it is
possible to imagine an experiment in which we could feel another person's
feelings directly and thus observe them, much as we feel our own. and so
it would be possible to know if he is pretending or not. To determine if this
is possible, let us imagine a situation in which our nervous system is con-
nected with that of another person. We might think that we then could have
a direct feeling and perception of the other person's feelings, (The situa-
tion is similar if through mental telepathy we could observe the other per-
son's feelings.). Here it is still possible that we may think we are ob-
serving the other person's feelings, while he may in fact be pretending
and somehow creating the effect of a feeling in us. Even if we conceive
of a situation where our body is connected to the suspect's body through
a common nervous system, this would not make much difference for there
are still two independent brains to distinguish our two persons. Thus it
is still (logically) possible that we are mistaken in thinking that we were
feeling the other person's feeling, say, of pain; for he might still be man-
ipulating his nervous system in someway to create that effect in our brain.
We cannot take for granted the verbal report of the other person as a criter-
ion for his having the feeling, either. No matter how far we extend this
case, as long as there are two distinct persons involved (i.e. , as long as
they have two separate identities) there is always a possibility for doubt
about what is occurring at the other end of the common nervous system.
Only when there are no longer any distinctions between two persons (i.e. ,
if they become identical) does the doubt cease to
exist; but then so does the problem.

On the other hand, one might suppose that we could be mentally
in the immediate presence of the other person so that there is no "distance"
or "space" between us and him, and suppose then that we could perceive
and feel each other's mental states directly. In this case we would have
lost all our ordinary criteria for the effective identification and differentiation
of the two persons because personal identity here has to be ascertained by some kind of criteria such as personal characteristics, experiences and so forth. Then it would be difficult to distinguish my feelings from the other person's feelings—both of which I claim to observe, for feelings are part of the experiences which constitute personal identity.*

*See p. 124-5 below for a further argument in the same lines.

Thus, it is empirically and logically impossible for us to feel and observe another person's feelings in the same way that the other person himself feels or observes his own feelings, and hence it is impossible to discover on some occasions if he is pretending in his external behavior.

2. I have tried to show above (see 69-75.) that in a small minority of cases mental state words can and do have purely private uses (as when we talk about certain feelings in our body, flashes, images and so forth) for which there can be no behavioral expressions except the avowals of the speaker. In such cases we have no criteria except the person's sincere and confident avowals for judging whether or not the person has them. However, the skeptic, considering such cases as basic, might argue that what I have called the "core" use of mental state words is not really so, and that the purely private use of words is the basic use; and thus he would argue we have no reason to suppose that another person is a person at all or that he has feelings like our own.

The skeptic here would assert that the argument from analogy is invalid because we have never observed another person's behavior being directly associated with his feelings, for we have never directly observed
his feelings. To argue that we know another person has feelings or a mind like our own by generalization from our own case is to commit a fallacy (see, PI, *293, 302, 350) because this already presupposes that he is a person like ourselves, that is, having feelings and a mind. To make this generalization we must be sure that we are generalizing to the right sort of object; we must be sure that the object whose behavior we are comparing with ours and generalizing upon is a person like ourselves. And this already presupposes that he has a mind and feelings. But that is begging the question. The skeptic might claim that such a fallacy is implicitly imbedded in my 'core' use of mental concept words.

To the skeptic's claim I can give the following reply. The fact that we regard other persons as persons at all is not based on our observation of ourselves having feelings, but on the fact that we all use language in the same way, to communicate our feelings to each other, and to respond to each other's needs. We may recall in this connection Wittgenstein's remark that I do not believe that the other person has a soul, but I have the attitude that he has one (PI, p. 178).

We cannot use words with a certain meaning, expect others to understand and respond to us, and at the same time refuse to understand their words (which have the same meaning) and respond to them. For if we have the attitude that other people have no feelings or mind, such as we have, very soon this would not only affect our reciprocal relationship with others, but, in fact, we could not even have learned in the first place to identify them as such and thus considered ourselves as persons.
Here I agree with Wittgenstein, Strawson and Malcolm in their assertions that in order for us to doubt that another person has feelings exactly, or much like, the feelings we have, presupposes that we already consider ourselves as a person, which in turn presupposes that we have the ability to distinguish ourselves as a person from other persons whose personality is in question (Wittgenstein, PI,*398, Malcolm, "PI", 373, Strawson, Individuals, Pp. 96ff) "If I know it only from my own case, then I know only what I call that, not what any one else does." (PI, *374).

This learning cannot take place unless words have a commonly understood core use in which the meaning of words does not differ from person to person. If it does differ, then it is not a language and hence cannot be used for communication; it would be purely a private language; and all the arguments which Wittgenstein raised about private language would apply to it.

If we have learned to use the core concept to apply to mental states in general, then we could use the derived concept (the relatively and purely private uses of mental state words) only in special cases. But I do not generalize this use, as the skeptic does, to apply to all cases and say that other people may not be persons, that is, that they may not have feelings and minds. If I deny that the core use of a word is primary in my learning and hence in my later employment of the word, then I would have to admit that other people could teach me mental state words not on the basis of behavioral expressions but on some other "mysterious" basis. But we know of no such basis. Thus, inasmuch as I allow another person...
the right and justification to ascribe mental state words to me when he teaches me such word. On the basis of behavioral criteria and other external circumstances, I have an obligation to ascribe mental state words justifiably to other persons with the same meaning and on the basis of similar criteria. But this I cannot do without supposing that other persons are persons and have minds. To assume otherwise would be to use words with different meanings to apply to different persons, and thus to use no language at all. Then there would be a breakdown of communication in day-to-day practical living.

One might object to the above argument by saying that another person is justified in ascribing mental state words only to me because I have additional and direct evidence which I can use to support his ascription, which I do not have when I ascribe them to another. We ask in reply, what is this direct evidence evidence for. How was I able to accept any mental ascription as justified before learning the use of the word. I must have already learned the use of the word before I could consider my private experience as primary evidence for the correct attribution of the mental state word. In other words, the order for private experience to act as evidence (even as private evidence) for anything. I must first have learned to identify private experiences, i.e., name them. And this identification could not have been done only by the private experience itself as basic evidence.

Thus others are justified in using mental state words to apply to us and we are obligated to and justified in using them to apply to others. As I argued above, this does not always guarantee the truth of the ascription,
because some mental state words have purely private uses in the sense that they are used to refer to feelings that do not have behavioral consequences except verbal avowals. In those particular cases if someone is pretending or shamming, it is not always possible to have criteria with which to determine if he is pretending. But this position is far from skepticism. For skepticism is only the general doubt that we have sufficient grounds to believe that other persons have feelings or minds at all, not the specific doubt whether someone has a particular feeling, or is at the moment pretending he has one.

Thus skeptical conclusions do not follow from the theory of language which I have presented in the second section.
In his book *Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity* Shoemaker claims that the fact that self-knowledge statements are always or almost always true when sincerely made cannot be explained by the assumption that they are made or justified on the basis of criteria:

> Our ability to know first-person psychological statements to be true, or the fact that we make them (for the most part) only when they are true, cannot possibly be explained on the supposition that we make them on the basis of criteria (SKSI, 214).

Shoemaker considers first-person psychological statements to be a paradigm of self-knowledge statements. Examples of first-person psychological statements are: "I see a Eucalyptus tree on the hill;" "I remember meeting Jones on the street yesterday;" "I have a headache;" and "I have an after-image." Shoemaker also argues that the general truth of such statements can be explained only on the assumption that we make them sincerely only when certain facts are true about ourselves (e.g., when we are in pain), or when certain bodily facts obtain (e.g., our eyes being open and directed toward an object of a certain kind), or when certain things have happened to us in our past (e.g., our witnessing a past event) (SKSI, 228, 229, 238, 239).

In this chapter, I shall argue that his arguments for his first claim are inadequate and his second claim, although true, is not completely so.
I shall argue that his latter claim has to include among its conditions self-awareness or some such factor in order to be adequate as an explanation of why self-knowledge statements are generally true, since it is a factor which enables us to make self-knowledge statements, even though we cannot use it to justify them. The first two sections in this chapter have to do with the presentation of Shoemaker's criticism of the traditional theory of self-knowledge as he construes it. In the third section I shall present his own positive theory. The fourth and fifth sections contain my criticisms of Shoemaker's arguments, and the sixth concludes my discussion of Shoemaker.

2. The traditional theory of self-knowledge which Shoemaker challenges asserts, according to him, that immediate awareness or acquaintance is the criterion on the basis of which we make first-person psychological statements, and it is this fact which explains why such statements are always or almost always true (SKSI, 84, 92ff, 119ff). For example, it is not only the fact that I see a Eucalyptus tree on the hill, but also the fact that I observe that I see the tree, which enables me to make the statement "I see a Eucalyptus tree on the hill," The mere fact of making the statement sincerely makes the statement true, since making the statement sincerely presupposes that the speaker is immediately aware of the fact which he reports in his statement. (Since such an awareness concerns the facts about oneself, I shall call it 'self-awareness'.) To take another example, it is not merely the fact that I have a pain or an after-image but the fact that I am aware of that fact which
enables me to make the statement that I have a pain or an after-image.
In his criticism of the traditional theory and in his own positive theory Shoemaker makes a distinction between incorrigible and corrigible first-person psychological statements, which he explains as follows:

Among the corrigible statements are perceptual statements of the ordinary sort—i.e., statements in which the reported object of perception is a material object or a publicly observable state of affairs—and memory statements. It is characteristic of these that a person can make such a statement sincerely, i.e., believing it to be true, when in fact the statement is false and could in principle be discovered to be false by other persons. Among the incorrigible statements are statements about "private" experiences and mental events, e.g., pain statements, statements about mental images, reports of thoughts, and so on. These are incorrigible in the sense that if a person sincerely asserts such a statement it does not make sense to suppose, and nothing could be accepted as showing, that he is mistaken, i.e., that what he says is false. While sincere first-person statements of the first sort can be discovered to be false by reference to the criteria for the truth of the statements, this is not so of statements of the second sort. That a statement of the second sort is a sincere assertion is itself a logically sufficient condition of its being true, and that such a statement has been asserted with apparent sincerity is itself criterial evidence that it is true (SKSI, 215-216).

Thus, in the examples mentioned above (p. 92) the first two are corrigible and the second two incorrigible first-person psychological statements.

Some of Shoemaker's criticism of the traditional theory concerns both corrigible and incorrigible statements, and the rest of it concerns only the corrigible statements, although one could imagine modifications of the latter to make it applicable to incorrigible statements as well.

Shoemaker's criticism of the traditional theory concerning incorrigible statements (which is also applicable to corrigible statements, is
as follows:

Incorrigible statements are not made on the basis of criteria. More specifically, the traditional view that I know that I am in pain by being "acquainted with" or "aware of" some entity or fact, in this case my being in pain, is senseless. If it does make sense, then it should be possible to meaningfully ask whether I am in pain without being aware of the fact that I am in pain. But this is not possible. There is no distinction between being in pain and believing that one is in pain. Hence it makes no sense to say that incorrigible statements are made on the basis of criteria (SKSI, 220).

The traditional view, according to Shoemaker, arises out of a mistaken assimilation of awareness to perception. This assimilation is mistaken because not all that can be asserted about perception can be applied to awareness: for example, in the case of knowing something through perception, there is more than one way of knowing it; but not so in the case of awareness. And in the case of knowing something by perception it is possible to point to the object other than by means of perception and say that one does not perceive it. But this is not possible in the case of awareness. Thus one cannot say, "I know P (where P stands for any statement) because I am aware of P or acquainted with P, " as one can say, "I know P because I observe that P, in the sense that I perceive that P" (SKSI, 220-1).

When one says, "I know that P because I am aware of the fact that P" he is not giving any evidence, but is merely stating that he is in
a position to know that P without any evidence (SKSI, 221). In other words, one is not justifying one's statement "I know that P" by giving as evidence the statement "I am aware that P"; for justifying a statement is not simply claiming that one's statement is justified, but trying to show to others that it is, so that it must be possible for them to see whether it is justified (SKSI, 223). If being aware of P were evidence for a person's knowing that P, that is, if being in a position to know P without any evidence were a relational property, then whether a person who is in pain and thinks that he is in pain is in fact aware of the pain would be an open question which can be settled empirically. In other words, it should be possible for the person to be in pain without his being aware of the pain (SKSI, 222). Or, more generally, it must be possible for someone to think that he is in pain without being entitled to say without evidence that he is in pain. Neither of these, however, is a true possibility, for nothing counts as showing that one is not aware of his pain except his saying so (SKSI, 224). Hence neither a person's ability to make the statement "I know P" nor the fact that it is always (or almost always) true whenever he makes it sincerely is explainable on the assumption that the statement is made on the basis of criteria. In other words, awareness is neither the means of knowing that P, nor is it the evidence for saying that one knows that P.

This form of argument is also used by Shoemaker to show that we do not know and justify corrigible first-person psychological statements on the basis of a non-physical criterion such as self-awareness or
acquaintance; for the fact of perception or memory is on a par with pains and images. In Shoemaker's view, just as it is impossible to have pains or images and not believe that one has them, it is also impossible to perceive or remember something and not believe that one is perceiving or remembering.

II

The following two arguments of Shoemaker against the traditional theory of self-knowledge are concerned with corrigible statements only:

1. The traditional theory that corrigible first-person psychological statements are made on the basis of criteria leads us into an infinite regress. Let us suppose that I cannot be entitled to assert that $P$ on the basis of observation unless I know that I observe that $P$. And let us also suppose that the only way in which I can know that I observe that $P$ is by observing myself observing that $P$ or by observing the fact that I am observing that $P$. These suppositions lead us into an infinite regress. To know that $P$ it would not be sufficient that I observe that $P$, I must also know that I observe that $P$, and to know this I must observe that I observe that $P$. Let "$p^n$" be the statement "I observe that $P$, " and the same argument can be given again. To know that $P'$ I must observe not only that $P'$, but also that I observe that $P'$, that is, I must observe that I observe that $P$. Let "$p^n$" be the statement "I observe that I observe the $P$, " and a similar argument can be given again-and so on ad infinitum (SKSI, 121).
2. The distinguishing mark of corrigible first-person psychological statements is that they could be false, even when they are sincerely made, and that they could be discovered to be so by others. If the statements are sometimes false, this can be known by discovering that certain bodily facts do not obtain which are necessary for the statement to be true; for example, when someone states sincerely that he perceived a Eucalyptus tree on the hill in front of him, we can establish this statement to be false if we ascertain that his eyes are not open or his head is not turned toward the hill where there is a Eucalyptus. Similarly, if he claims to remember that he met Jones on the street the day before, we can establish that his statement is false by showing that he was not present in those surroundings the day before.

However, if these bodily facts do obtain, and if the statements are sincerely made, then it follows from the corrigibility of first-person perceptual and memory statements that such statements are generally true. Such statements are generally true when sincerely made because they are sincerely asserted only when certain things are true of the body of the speaker. But the fact that these statements are sincerely made only when certain bodily facts hold cannot be explained by the supposition that the criteria for the truth of these first-person statements consist of facts that are logically independent of bodily facts, namely self-awareness, or by the supposition that these statements are made on the basis of these bodily facts, i.e., because the speaker observes that these facts hold. It can only be explained by the supposition that the bodily facts are or are part of the criteria for the truth of the statements (SKSI, 228-9).
1. Shoemaker's positive theory of self-knowledge: Shoemaker believes that incorrigible first-person psychological statements are not made on the basis of criteria for their truth. To be entitled to assert them, it is sufficient that they are true when they are asserted (SKSI, 217). For example, it is the fact of my being in pain and not my having evidence of this, or of my observing myself being in pain, which justifies me in asserting that I am in pain.

Corrigible first-person psychological statements are not made on the basis of criteria for the truth of the whole statement, but only on the basis of the criteria for the truth of their non-personal component. For example, in the statement "I see that there is a Eucalyptus tree on the hill," "There is a Eucalyptus tree on the hill" is the non-personal component. What justifies me in asserting the statement "I see that there is a Eucalyptus tree on the hill" is my knowing on the basis of my perception that the statement "There is a Eucalyptus tree on the hill" is true, and not on the basis of observing my perceiving and thus knowing that the whole statement is true (SKSI, 217).

In the case of incorrigible statements, the fact that the speaker sincerely and honestly makes them is sufficient condition for the truth of these statements; that is, whenever they are sincerely and honestly made, they are true. The sincerity and honesty of the speaker are themselves ascertained by "non-verbal criteria" such as, when a person grimaces, bites his lip, and says, "No, it does not hurt at all" (SKSI, 216).
Corrigible first-person psychological statements are generally true when sincerely asserted. The reason for this is that such statements are sincerely asserted only when certain bodily facts hold true of the speaker, as in the case of perception:

... if a person's eyes are open and directed toward a certain object, and if in addition he sincerely claims to see that object or an object of that kind, then there can be no doubt that he does see that object. Likewise, if a person was (in identical with in accordance with physical criteria of identity) a witness to a past event, and if in addition he sincerely claims to remember that event, then there can be no doubt that he does remember that event (SKSI, 227-8).

The statement that first-person corrigible psychological statements are generally true when sincerely asserted is a necessary and not a contingent truth. Shoemaker shows this by means of the following arguments:

i)

A primary criterion for determining whether a person understands the meaning of such terms as "see" and "remember" is whether under optimum conditions the confident claims that he makes by the use of these words are generally true (SKSI, 231).

If most of a person's perceptual and memory claims are false, this would not show that the person's eyesight is poor, or his memory is defective, for in that case he would be cautious in making his statements. But it would show he does not understand the meaning of the words he is using, or that he does not use the words with their established meanings.

So to suppose that it is only a contingent fact, which could be otherwise, that confident perceptual and memory statements are generally true is to suppose that we have no way of telling whether a person understands the use of words like "see and remember," or means by them what others mean by them, that we can never have any good reason for regarding any utterance made by another person as a perceptual or memory statement,
and that we could therefore never discover the supposedly contingent fact that perceptual and memory statements are generally true. And this is a logically absurd supposition (SKSI, 23)-2).

ii) If one maintains that this is a contingent truth, one must also hold that it is only a contingent truth that one's own sincere and confident perceptual and memory statements are generally true. That means that it could have been the case that my own sincere and confident perceptual and memory beliefs could have been generally false.

If I were to say "I confidently believe each of these things to be true, yet it could be the case, and for all I know is the case, that all or most of them are false. " surely I would be confessing that the beliefs in question are completely irrational, and that none of them can legitimately be said to constitute knowledge (SKSI, 233). Yet is is inconsistent to assert that I know that these confident beliefs are true, and at the same time assert that they could have been false. Hence, it is a necessary truth that such confident beliefs of mine are generally true (SKSI, 234).

(Shoemaker mentions the above as a separate argument, but it is not worth serious consideration because it involves a fallacy, "namely, an ambiguity in the term "could. " In one sense of "could" if one knows one's confident beliefs to be true, it still could be the case that all of them are false in the sense that there is a possibility that all of them or most of them could have been false. In the other sense of "could" none of these statements can be false, because in fact we know them to be true. The statements could not be false because they are in fact true. So, the mere fact that one confidently asserts one's perceptual and memory beliefs to be true does not imply that in the first sense of "could" they could not all
(or most of them) be false. And it is in the first sense of "could" that contingent statements "could" all be false. It is, however, in the second sense of "could" that a speaker says that his confident perceptual and memory statements "could" not be false.)

iii) Suppose I know as a matter of contingent fact that most of my confident perceptual and memory beliefs are true. How do I know this? Let us suppose I know this by induction.

But it is plainly absurd to maintain that I have established empirically that my own confident perceptual and memory beliefs are generally true, and that I rely on my individual perceptual and memory beliefs because I have established this generalization (SKSI, 234).

I could establish this generalization only on the basis of observation and memory. But before I can do this I must allow that "for all I as yet know it may be that my perceptual and memory beliefs are generally false" (SKSI, 235). That is, I cannot use anything which is derived from observation or memory as evidence to establish this generalization. Suppose I can start with a knowledge that I seem to perceive certain things, or remember certain things. But I cannot make use of such knowledge unless I already know that in general I do perceive and remember what I seem to perceive and remember. In order to allow this I must already know that my confident perceptual and memory beliefs are in general true (SKSI, 234-5).

If I cannot establish this generalization empirically, then I cannot establish it at all. But this has the absurd consequence that I can never be justified in asserting anything on the basis of observation and memory. If this generalization is true of my own confident perceptual and memory
beliefs, then it is also true of those of other persons, for they can use the same argument about themselves.

Thus, it is a necessary truth that anyone's confident perceptual and memory beliefs are generally true. But there is a contingent truth with which this necessary truth is sometimes confused, viz., that human beings in fact make statements (or utter sounds to that effect) only when certain bodily facts obtain, or only when certain things are true of their past (SKSI, 238). This contingent truth is explained by the fact that human beings are so trained in using their language that they make first-person perceptual and memory statements only when the conditions mentioned above hold. The ability to utter certain sounds when certain conditions are obtained does not require that the speaker should have known or established that these conditions exist (SKSI, 241-2). The capacity of human beings for making such statements under these conditions (or any other) is to be explained by physiology (or other natural sciences) and not by epistemology.

IV

1. Shoemaker's criticism of the traditional theory as applicable to both incorrigible and corrigible first-person psychological statements rests on the following premises:

i) In order for self-awareness to be criterial evidence for first-person psychological statements, it must be possible for the facts which I claim to know to exist without my being aware of them. That is, it must be possible for the object of knowledge to exist independent of the
evidence on the basis of which I make a self-knowledge statement.

ii) In order for self-awareness to be criterial evidence for first-person psychological statements I must be able to point to the object of knowledge and be able to say that I am not aware of it.

iii) If anything is to count as a means of knowledge, it must be possible to also know this object by some other means. That is, if awareness is the only means of knowing something, then it cannot be counted as a means of knowing.

iv) If I am justified in asserting that I know that P on the basis of the criterial evidence of self-awareness, then I must be able to justify it to others; that is, I must be able to demonstrate it to others. In other words, others must be able to observe whether the evidence in question in fact obtains or not (SKSI, 222-3).

In the following four subsections I shall argue against the above four premises. I shall argue in (2) below that there is a sense in which the independence of the object of knowledge from the means of knowing does obtain when awareness is used as a means of knowing, although it does not in the sense given it in premise (ii). In (3) I shall argue that the condition mentioned in premise (i) (namely, independence) need not always obtain in order for self-awareness to count as criterial evidence. I shall also argue in (3) that if such independence is not always necessary for awareness to be a means of knowledge, then the condition mentioned under (ii) in particular is not necessary for awareness to be considered as a means of knowledge. It seems that the only possible reason for Shoemaker (if there
Is another, he has not provided it) to hold premise (iii) (that is, that it must be possible to know the object by more than one means) seems to be his belief in premise (i) (viz., that the facts which I know by awareness must be capable of existing without our being aware of them). Accordingly, I shall argue in (4) that if premise (i) need not always be true then the condition mentioned under (iii) need not always obtain for self-awareness to be counted as a means of knowing. Finally, I shall argue in (5) that the fourth premise involves the fallacy of ambiguity.

2, Shoemaker's objections against the traditional theory of self-knowledge do not show so much that we do not use the non-physical criterion of self-awareness or acquaintance in order to make self-knowledge statements as the fact that in certain cases the objects which we know immediately are not always independent of the means of knowing. And in those cases we have no way of distinguishing between our actually knowing something, and our merely thinking that we know it. That is, we then have no way of distinguishing between knowledge and error. For example, when a "private mental experience" occurs, it is quite possible, as I shall show presently, that at the time of its occurrence we are not aware of it, and hence we are ignorant of it. But in cases where we are aware of it, there is no distinction between our thinking that we know it and our actually knowing it, at least in so far as its occurrence is concerned—although it is possible to err as to the exact nature of such an occurrence.

It is not quite true as Shoemaker claims that there is absolutely no independence of the object of knowledge from the means of knowing in
all occurrences of "private mental events." Only in some cases, such as our being in pain, is it true that the occurrence of the mental event coincides with our awareness of it. For example, there are occasions when we do not know that we are thinking. Or there are occasions when we know in reflection that in our immediate past we have been angry, daydreaming, or mildly depressed, but that at the time of their occurrence we were not explicitly aware of such events, and hence we did not know that they had occurred. On some of these occasions another person can assert on the basis of our appearance or behavior that we are daydreaming or depressed, and he can also observe that we are not aware of the fact of our daydreaming or depression. Of course, when he points this out to us, or when we reflect on the fact later by ourselves, we immediately become aware of it. Thus, in the above cases, it is absolutely false that there is no difference between thinking, daydreaming or being depressed and believing that we are thinking or daydreaming or depressed. In other words, it is quite possible that on many occasions mental events or objects exist without our being explicitly aware of them, although it is impossible for us to point to them as they occur and say at the time that we are not aware of them; for any act of pointing automatically implies that we are aware of the object to which we are pointing. Shoemaker seems to require that the second sort of independence (i.e., our being able to point to an object and say we are not aware of it) is also necessary to grant awareness the status of a means of knowing.
3. Granting that some sort of independence of the object of knowledge from the means of knowing it is necessary, and the possibility of error should obtain in general, there is no reason why such a requirement must be satisfied in all particular occurrences of mental events. In other words there is no reason why in particular cases having a phenomenon should not imply automatically knowing it (as for example in the case of our awareness of pains or in the case of instantaneous reflection on our thinking). Thus there would be no reason why we cannot grant awareness the status of a means of knowledge.

4. Shoemaker does not anywhere in his book justify his claim that there must be more than one way of knowing an object. In fact, it is not clear what he means by this claim. Does he mean that we should be able to know the object by more than one sense, or that more than one person should be able to know it. or does he mean both? In either case, knowledge of private mental phenomena seems to be ruled out by definition. - It could very well be the case that "private mental phenomena" are known only by awareness, although it is not always the case that they are known whenever they occur. This fact alone, however, should not preclude us from granting that awareness can supply us with the evidence for making self-knowledge claims, in the sense that it is a necessary condition which enables us to make self-knowledge claims.

5. In premise (iv) mentioned above Shoemaker seems to make an imperceptible transition from the notion of being justified in making a self-knowledge statement to the notion of giving a justification for one's
own statement to others by showing to them that his statement is justified. This fact is evidenced by the following passage:

In general, being in a position to know something without evidence can be said to consist in having a property/ normally a relational property (standing in R to something), that one might not have had. Given that we know of the existence of such properties, there is an obvious sense in which we explain someone's ability to make true statements of a certain kind by saying that he has a property of the appropriate sort, for we know that any normal person who had that property would have that ability. There is an equally obvious sense in which the having of such a property can justify a person in making a statement, for it gives the statement, if it is of an appropriate kind, a high likelihood of being true. But such explanations and justifications can be given only where it is possible in principle to establish empirically whether a person does have the appropriate property, i.e., is in the appropriate position. For in giving such a justification for a statement of one's own one is not simply claiming that one's statement is justified, but is trying to show that it is, so it must be possible for others to see that it is (or that it is not.) (SKSI, 222-223).

It is, however, clearly possible for me to be justified in making a self-knowledge statement by possessing the criterial evidence, namely, the fact that I am aware of the truth of the statement, without my being able at the same time to justify my statement to others by demonstrating this evidence to them so that they can ascertain whether or not I actually possess this evidence. The fact that others cannot ascertain whether I possess the evidence or not is no reason to say that I do not in fact possess it. Moreover, it can be shown that such a condition as awareness is, in general, necessary for making self-knowledge statements, for if this were not the case, there would be no reason why we do not always know the facts about ourselves.

Knowledge of the occurrence of mental events is present whenever and only when there is an explicit awareness of these events. The
awareness is what justifies me in making self-knowledge statements, although I cannot demonstrate this awareness to others, and hence I cannot justify my self-knowledge statements to others by showing that the evidence for such statements does obtain (in the case of private experience statements), and that I was in a position of being aware of the facts reported in the self-knowledge statements. The reason for this is not that awareness is not a necessary condition for knowing facts about oneself, but that whenever I make a sincere and confident self-knowledge statement, the making of the statement presupposes that I was in a position to know the facts reported in the statement, (although whenever the facts occur I am not always in a position to know them).

Shoemaker does not recognize (or give due consideration to) the fact that we do not always have knowledge of our own mental phenomena, because he does not distinguish (along with other contemporary analytic philosophers) between self-knowledge and the statements expressing self-knowledge, or at least he does not talk about self-knowledge apart from talking about self-knowledge statements. Sincerely and confidently making self-knowledge statements automatically implies that one has self-knowledge, and hence one is aware of the facts one is reporting in the statements, which in turn implies that the facts occur. But the occurrence of the facts about oneself does not automatically imply that one is aware of them, or that one knows them to exist; nor does it imply that one makes statements about them. A consequence of this talking about self-knowledgae statements without talking about self-knowledge is that one
could talk about self-knowledge statements as though they could be made
without his being aware of (hence knowing) the facts that occur within
him, because making sincere and confident self-knowledge statements
already includes such a condition.

6. Considering Shoemaker's designation of incorrigible state-
ments as a category of self-knowledge statements, it is not clear in
what sense incorrigible first-person psychological statements are to be
considered as expressing self-knowledge. If these statements are always
true when sincerely asserted, nothing would show that the speaker is mis-
taken or in error; and thus, the genuine possibility of error which Shoe-
maker himself seems to require does not obtain. Also, Shoemaker in the
following passage denies that such statements express the knowledge
that some state of affairs occurs in the speaker:

I am not denying (or affirming) that statements like "I see an
afterimage" and "I have a headache" can legitimately be said
to be known to be true by the person who asserts them. What
I do wish to deny is that such statements assert, or express
knowledge, that some particular afterimage is perceived by the
speaker or that some particular headache belongs to the speaker
(SYS1, 97).

If this is so, how are incorrigible statements to be considered as expres-
sing self-knowledge? In our ordinary sense of knowing, statements ex-
pressing knowledge report a certain state of affairs which the speaker
claims to know to occur. If this is not the sense in which incorrigible
statements express knowledge, it is not clear in what sense they do.
Moreover, if we consider these statements as language behavior which a
person is trained to exhibit when certain state of affairs occurs within
him*, then again, it is not clear how such behavior is to be construed as

*Some such view could be extracted from Shoemaker's discussions on pages 216, 217, 238 and 239 (SKSI).

knowledge.

Furthermore, Shoemaker claims that incorrigible statements, when they are sincerely made, are always true, and that it does not make any sense to doubt them. The sincerity and honesty of the speaker are ascertained by nonverbal criteria (see above p. 99). But this criterion is not really adequate in determining whether a statement made by the speaker is true, since what the criterion can at best show is an inconsistency between the speaker's present statement and other statements or behavior of his. When the two agree, we can say that his present statement is probably sincerely made, and hence probably true. But this agreement alone does not inform us that the speaker's statement is in fact true, for it is conceivable that the speaker is acting or lying, in spite of the fact that the non-verbal criteria do not show any inconsistency between the speaker's statement and his other statements or behavior. On the other hand, if two statements (or his present statement and behavior) are inconsistent with each other, then it only follows that at least one of them must be false, and hence that at least one of them is insincerely made. But the criteria do not show which one of the statements is sincerely made and which insincerely; and hence we would not necessarily know if the present statement is sincerely made or if it is true. Thus non-verbal criteria alone are not adequate to show whether an incorrigible statement a person makes is sincere or true.
1. Shoemaker claims that corrigible statements are generally true when sincerely and confidently made. However, analysis of the meaning of the terms "sincerely" and "confidently" would reveal that their meaning includes the condition of self-awareness (or some such factor). Furthermore, the analysis will also show that self-awareness is a necessary condition for making of these statements, even though it is not part of the publicly verifiable truth conditions of the statements.

The words "sincere" and "honest" could not merely mean that the non-personal component of the corrigible first-person psychological statement is true, or that certain bodily and behavioral conditions obtain. If this were so, then it would be a tautology to say that first-person corrigible statements are sincerely made only when the non-personal component is true and certain bodily and behavioral conditions obtain. The word "sincerely" would then add nothing to the rest of the statement. So the words "sincerely" and "honestly" must mean that the speaker believes that the statement he makes is true. But it could not be that the speaker believes that only the non-personal component of his statement is true, and not believe that the statement as a whole is true, Shoemaker, however, does not recognize this possibility. Instead, he introduces the condition "on the basis of perception" (or memory) in the belief about the non-personal component being true, as for example in "If the speaker asserts that P on the basis of perceiving that P." But if such a qualification is added to the non-personal component of the first-person self-knowledge statement, then it would be hard to distinguish the result...
113.

(i.e. , "I assert $P$ on the basis of perception") from the whole corrigeble
first-person statement (i.e. , "I see that $P$"'); for it is difficult to imagine
what the first-person equivalent of "believing that $P$ (or asserting that
$P$) on the basis of perception" is, except that it means for the speaker
that he believes that he sees (perceives) that $P$. Nor is it possible for
the speaker to believe that the statement as a whole is true merely on
the basis of knowing that the non-personal component is true. For
again it is possible for the speaker to know that the non-personal com-
ponent is true without knowing that the statement as a whole is true.
Thus there must be something other than the perception of the tree, for
instance, that enables the speaker to know the truth of the whole state-
ment, "I see that there is a Eucalyptus tree on the hill." And what
could this additional factor be except something like self-awareness?

Hence self-awareness (or some such factor) is a necessary condition
for making sincere first-person corrigeble psychological statements (and
one could with necessary changes formulate a similar argument for in-
corrigeble statements as well), since it is implied in the meaning of
"sincere" and "honest".

Thus, it is because self-awareness (or some such factor) is im-
plied in the meaning of "sincere" that Shoemaker could afford to ignore
it as one of the criteria which make corrigeble statements true. Other-
wise he would have recognized (as I argued above pp. 109-10, in the
case of incorrigible statements) that there would be no reason why when-
ever we see something or remember something, we do not always know
that we do, nor do we always make statements to that effect. If self-awareness is recognized as a necessary condition, then it could be mentioned as another criterion along with the non-personal component, bodily criteria and certain facts being true of the past of the speaker, as a truth condition for the corrigible statements (see SKSI, 228), since a person makes these statements only when self-awareness occurs. This condition, however, is not something one could use to justify one's self-knowledge statements (to others), but it is what enables him to make them. Such a thesis as the above would still be consistent with Shoemaker's positive theory, viz., that we are trained to make corrigible statements only when certain conditions occur, except he would include self-awareness among these conditions.

2. Turning now to Shoemaker's infinite regress argument (see p. 97 above), it is of course true that in order to be entitled to assert that P, I must know P, and if I know that P, then I am entitled to assert that P. Shoemaker starts with the following hypothesis which he thinks leads to an infinite regress: "I cannot be entitled to assert that P on the basis of observation unless I know that I observe that P." But when he actually formulates the infinite regress argument, he omits the qualification "on the basis of observation" and says, "to know that P. . .it is not sufficient that I observe that P; I must also know that I observe that P." The error in his argument lies in omitting the qualification mentioned above. Supposing he does not omit the qualification and means by "asserting that P or knowing that P on the basis of observation"
only "asserting that P or knowing that P because I have seen that P (or observed, that P)", then the infinite regress cannot be generated. For in order to assert that P I must know that P by (e.g.) observing that p. I do not have to observe (or know) that I observe that P. Similarly, in order to know and assert that I observe (or know) that P, I only have to be aware (observe) that I observe, (or know) that P. But then there is no scope for infinite regress, because I do not also have to observe that I observe that I observe that P.

VI

In conclusion it can be mentioned that Shoemaker has not really shown that first-person psychological statements are not made on the basis of criteria. He is right in claiming that first-person psychological statements are always (or almost always) true, when sincerely made because we are trained to make them only when certain facts and bodily conditions occur. But this explanation ignores (as I argued above pp. 109-10, 112-14) the additional fact that we can and do make them only when another condition also obtains, namely, when we are aware of the facts or when we are aware that we perceive an object or remember an event. That we do not always know, and hence do not always make statements about, private experiences or our perceptions or memories, should be an indication that self-awareness, among other conditions, is also necessary to know them or make statements about them. Thus, just as Shoemaker's theory that we make first-person psychological statements sincerely only when certain facts or conditions occur includes
self-awareness as part of the meaning of "sincerely", the traditional theory that self-knowledge statements are made on the basis of the criterion of self-awareness could be interpreted to mean that whenever we are aware of ourselves, our awareness automatically implies that the facts we are aware of occur. This is the explanation of why self-knowledge statements are generally true, just as Shoemaker's theory explains the general truth of self-knowledge statements by appeal to the fact that we are trained to make them only under certain conditions. The difference, then, between the two theories may not be as great as it might seem.
CHAPTER V

Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Other Minds

(Ryle on Self-Knowledge)

Ryle, in his work *The Concept of Mind*, claims that there is no essential difference between our knowledge of ourselves and our knowledge of other persons, both with respect to the objects of knowledge and the means of acquiring such knowledge. In this chapter, I shall challenge such a view.

Traditional theories of knowledge, according to Ryle, have regarded phenomena such as sensations, images, feelings and thoughts as elements of the stream of consciousness, and therefore as being part of the "stuff" of the mind (CM, 199-200). They were supposed to be privately observable constituents of our minds (CM, 205). Only we can know that we have them (CM, 15). Direct awareness or introspection enables us to have a privileged access to these phenomena, and to know that we have them (CM, 15). Ryle tries to show the absurdities involved in such a doctrine and proposes an alternative account which would not involve any mysterious "internal" or "private" objects or processes. Ryle's own general view is that there are no two series of events— one physical and the other mental—taking place in human beings, events which are independent of each other and only contingently related to each other. Instead, he says that there is only one series of events (CM, 160-1, 167), There are differences among the events, depending on
whether some law-like propositions of different logical types do or do not apply to them (CM, 167). Thus the statements about a person's mind are logically of a special type, but they do not indicate that there is a special series of events taking place in the inner recesses of his mind (CM, 167-68). For example, it is not appropriate to say that a person's mind chooses and knows; rather one must say that a person's knowing and choosing are mental facts (CM, 168). Similarly, self-knowledge should be defined as the knowledge one has of the events and processes of his mind. It means rather a person's assessment of his own long term inclinations, motives and capacities, and application of them to explain his particular actions and behavior (CM, 168). Self-knowledge also means a person's knowledge of what he is doing, thinking, or feeling at the present moment (CM, 169).

In the first section I shall mention Ryle's objections to the privacy of various mental phenomena such as sensations, feelings, images and thoughts, and reply to them. In the second section I shall mention and reply to Ryle's objections to the traditional theory that we know our sensations by means of a kind of "internal" observation. Since I have already considered and replied to Ryle's criticisms of the traditional theory of introspection and self-awareness (in chapter II), I shall not repeat those criticisms here. In the third section I shall present and criticize Ryle's attacks on the traditional theory of heeding. Section four contains a presentation of Ryle's own theory of heeding and my criticism of it. In section five I shall present Ryle's own theory of self-
knowledge and argue that it is not itself immune to the objections which he has raised against the traditional theory of self-knowledge.

I

1. Ryle argues that there is nothing private or "mental" about phenomena such as sensations. Any sentient creature might have a series of sensations. There is a sense in which my sensations are "private" to me, namely, that another person cannot have them. But this is not to say that there is a relation between me and my sensations such that I might or might not be in such a relationship, and someone else might be instead. When I say, for instance, that I have a twinge, I am not asserting a relation between myself and a thing, namely, a twinge. A twinge does not stand for an episode, although the assertion "I had a twinge" says that an episode took place (CM, 209). Ryle would like to talk about feelings in much the same way as he talks about bodily sensations (CM, 84).

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Ryle is correct in saying that the relations which he refers to do not exist between myself and my sensations, such that I could say that I do not have them, but that another person has them instead. This is because the description of sensations necessarily involves a reference to myself. There are, however, other relations which are possible between myself and my sensations: for example, I can say that I do not at present have the sensation I had yesterday, or that this sensation I have now I did not have yesterday. For sensations to be objects of a relation,
there is no reason why they should stand to their owners in the same way as external objects do. The fact that I am able to give identifying descriptions of sensations independent of whether or not I now have them should be sufficient to show that they are objects in their own right, though they are not like external objects. If their relation to me is such that other persons could, have them, then there would be no sense in claiming that they are still private. For example, Ryle himself says the statement that "I had a twinge" asserts that an episode took place, but he does not mention what the episode in question is. Presumably this episode is my having a twinge, which need not have happened to me. That is, I need not have this twinge which I now have; I might have another kind of sensation instead. Is this not sufficient to claim that a twinge is something which I might or might not have had, and hence, that I stand in a certain relation to it?

2. Ryle says that images are not special "pictures," i.e., special objects in a special "mental space", as the traditional theory supposes. He says that when we say we see an image, we only fancy we see something, when actually the thing itself does not exist (CM, 248). Similarly, imagining oneself humming or talking consists in:

   a series of abstentions from producing the noises which would be the due words or notes to produce, if one were talking or humming aloud. Fancying one is listening to a known tune involves 'listening for' the notes which would be due to be heard, were the tune being really performed. It is to listen for those notes in a hypothetical manner (CM, 269).

i) Ryle's account of images does not, however, explain after-images, and is thus inadequate as a theory of images in general. For example,
when we have an after-image of a bright object, we do not fancy that we
are seeing any object which exists in the world; but we do know we are
seeing an after-image. We do not believe that the image which we see is
an object in the public world; yet no one would deny that after-images
exist.

ii) Furthermore, if fancying ourselves humming or talking con-
sists in a series of abstentions, and fancying ourselves listening to a tune
consists in listening to the tune in a hypothetical manner, then either these
abstentions and listenings in a hypothetical manner are actual occurrences
or they are not. If they are actual occurrences, then they must be private
occurrences, because there is nothing publicly observable about them. If
they are not actual occurrences, then it is not clear how they can be re-
garded as anything at all, let alone as fancying. That is, if Ryle is to
distinguish between fancying something and not fancying at all, or be-
tween abstentions and not doing anything at all, he must admit that the
distinction consists in some sort of an occurrence.

iii) Ryle tries to explain the phenomenon of fancying one is list-
ening to something in terms of a metaphor of hypothetically knotting a
cord as when a person "maneuvers his hands and fingers without any
cord in them" (CM, 267). Even though the person is not actually knot-
ting a cord, he is in fact doing something with his hands, and others can
observe these movements, Ryle explains the difference between this ac-
tivity and "hypothetically" listening to or fancying one sees something
by saying that the latter are not activities. He explains "hypothetical
listening" further by saying that the person, for instance, has learned a tune and not forgotten it, and has "the proper niche ready for each note as it comes" (CM, 268). But is not "having something ready" an active process of recalling? Ryle does not consider such a process as a "doing" or an activity because doing for him seems to consist in performing a muscular activity. There seems to be no warrant for such an assumption. Moreover, whether or not we call such listening or fancying doing, the fact remains that it consists of an occurrence, and this occurrence is not publicly observable. Hence, the occurrence must be private, unless Ryle wishes to rule out by definition anything which is not publicly observable as non-existent. Similarly, even if imagining oneself humming, for example, consists in a series of abstentions, an active abstention in our ordinary sense consists first in thinking of doing something, and then in deciding not to do it, with or without the additional factor of making preparatory movements to do it. But the thinking and deciding in this case are occurrences which are not publicly observable; hence, they must be private.

3. The thoughts which are supposed by the traditional theory to precede the overt announcements, according to Ryle, are themselves "soliloquised or muttered rehearsal of the overt statement itself" (CM, 269). Ryle says, suppose that the traditional theory asks in what does the significance of this soliloquised expression consist and answers that it consists in yet another thought which corresponds to it. He asks if this would in turn be just another rehearsed announcement for which there is another corresponding thought and so on ad infinitum. He says that
we are thus led into an infinite regress (CM, 296). Ryle's alternative to this traditional view is that saying something significant does not consist in doing two things, i.e., overt announcements and the soliloquised rehearsal of them, but consists in saying something in a certain frame of mind.

Not by rote, but on purpose, with a method, carefully, seriously and on the qui vive ... . Saying something in this frame of mind, whether aloud or in one's mind, is thinking the thought (CM, 296).

Ryle is saying then that thinking a thought consists in saying something in a certain frame of mind, and when the thought is not said aloud, then we are saying it "in our head." In other words, unexpressed or unspoken thoughts should be construed as suppressed speech or silent soliloquies (CM, 181, 184). And just as there is nothing "private" about outspoken thoughts, there is nothing private about "silent" thoughts, i.e., thoughts which are not overtly expressed.

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i) It is doubtful if anyone ever maintained the traditional theory of thinking in the form in which Ryle is objecting to, viz., that saying something meaningfully consists in saying something else at the same time, although within oneself. What the traditional theory might have been proposing is that to say something significant is to say something while at the same time thinking about what one is saying. It is only by defining thinking itself as saying something significant that Ryle can express the traditional theory in terms in which he can reject it. If we do not accept Ryle's formulation of the traditional theory, then it does not make sense to ask what is the significance of the muttered rehearsal, for
the thinking with which one says something significant is not itself a muttered rehearsal, and if thinking is a state of mind (then it does not make sense to ask the significance of a state of mind, because it itself is the significance of what is said.

ii) Even supposing that the traditional account is false, Ryle's own account—viz., that saying something significantly consists in saying it in a certain frame of mind which is to be ascertained by some test—confuses the distinction between what saying something significantly is, and how we determine whether someone has said something significant.

iii) Ryle argues that it is the natural tendency of a child to utter all his thoughts and that the child has to learn later to suppress or withhold them so that others cannot hear them (CM, 181). He also thinks that unspoken thoughts are to be construed as mere suppressed speech or silent soliloquies. From these two premises he concludes that there is nothing private about silent thoughts. The opposition which Ryle maintains between "natural" and "learned" in the first premise is not quite clear, especially in view of the fact that the child has to learn to speak the language which he speaks, and not just the suppression of his speech. Even if we have learned to suppress some speech (or all of it) when we were children, it does not follow that all silent thought is always deliberately suppressed speech. And even supposing that all silent thought is such suppressed speech, it still does not follow, as Ryle would like to maintain, that such suppressed or silent thought and speech is only contingently private. If a person conceals a physical object, we can imagine
procedures which would make the person reveal the object which he has concealed. We could thereby discover the concealed object. Perhaps Ryle thinks that in the case of suppression of thoughts procedures such as torture or bribery might make a person reveal his private thoughts. But the analogy between these two cases is false. For how can we know that the thoughts revealed to us by such procedures are in fact the thoughts the person has actually suppressed except from the testimony of the person himself? If the person has the final word on this matter, then is this not the meaning of saying that a person's silent thoughts are necessarily private to him, that is that we cannot know that he has them except by his telling us so?

From the above discussion it should be clear that Ryle's attempts to deny the privacy of mental phenomena such as sensations, images, and thoughts are not successful.

II

In chapter II, I have considered and replied to Ryle's criticisms of the traditional theory of introspection and self-awareness; and so I shall not repeat them here. However, it may be worthwhile to note here a series of objections which Ryle raises against the traditional theory that we know our sensations by means of a kind of "internal" observation which is accessible only to us. His criticisms to this theory consist in showing that what can usually be said about observation of external objects cannot be said about observation of sensations and so on, and
hence such an "internal observation" could not properly be called ob-
servation. For example, we do not know what it is to have sensations
under observation or have others as witnesses to them (CM, 205); to have
observational aids, handicaps or obstructions with respect to observation
of sensations (CM, 205-6); to have instruments to observe sensations
(CM, 206); to have sensations of them (CM, 207); to be able to ask
whether one has a good or poor view of them, or if one has watched them
carefully (CM, 207). Similarly we do not know what it is for sensations
to have to be in something, or to be hidden from view; but we do know what
it is to ask questions of this sort concerning sense objects (CM, 208).

* * * * *

Ryle's above criticisms are based on the assumption that what
can be said of the observation of external objects must also be capable
of being said of "internal observation". However, it is not true that none
of the above can be said of observation of sensations. For example it is
possible to keep a sensation constantly under observation, and watch
whether it is growing or decreasing in intensity. Ryle himself would
admit that it is possible to pay extraordinary heed to some sen-
sations and. exaggerate their intensity, or to ignore them by not paying
heed to them, especially when they are of a low or moderate intensity (CM,
157-8). In this sense it is possible, as Ryle would agree, to make errors
about them, and have good views or poor views of them. One of the rea-
sons why we make mistakes about sensations is the attitudes we take
toward them, namely, that we should avoid them, that they are not worth
noticing, or that they would be better tolerated by being ignored. Such attitudes hinder our accurate observation of them. Similarly, we could train ourselves to become more sensitive to our minute sensations and feelings by comparing them with one another and by studying them more closely. In this sense we could become a careful observer of them. Novelists and poets are valued for such careful study and reporting of their sensations and feelings. It is possible to ascribe positions to sensations in our body, and it is also possible to make mistakes in such attributions. We could correct these mistakes, say, as to where our stomach pain is located, especially with the help of a physician.

Furthermore, even if it is true that none of the things which can be said about the observation of external objects can equally be said about the observation of sensations, it does not follow that the "observation " of sensations is not a means of knowledge.

III

Ryle needs the concept of heed to replace the traditional concepts of "internal observation" or introspection of phenomena such as sensations in order to explain how we are able to make avowals about them, and about what we are doing, thinking or feeling at the present moment. Traditional theories of heed, according to Ryle, require that two independent and concurrent processes go on simultaneously whenever we take heed of any activity we perform: one, a muscular activity (needed in activities like driving or reading a book); and two, an "internal" or "theoretical" and non-muscular activity of contemplating or inspecting what one is doing (CM, 136).
Ryle objects to this theory by saying that to watch something carefully does not mean also to metaphorically "watch" the watching. He says that if doing something consists in a double activity—one, a muscular performance, and another, a theoretical performance of scrutinizing—then heeding would involve doing an infinite number of activities with heed. For one could ask himself whether he has been a careful or a careless spectator of his performance. In answer to this question he would be forced to postulate another activity done with heed, such as scrutinizing. And one could again ask himself whether he has been scrutinizing the activity carefully or carelessly, in answer to which he is forced to postulate still another activity, namely the scrutinizing of the scrutinizing, and so on ad infinitum (CM, 136-7).

* * *

If doing something carefully is defined as doing something while paying attention to what one is doing (and not to the fact of one's doing, for that would interfere with performing the activity). I don't see how this traditional view involves an infinite regress. One could of course ask himself whether he is paying full attention to his activity or only partial attention, but it does not make any sense to ask—and here I agree with Ryle—whether he is paying attention to something carefully. One discovers the fact that he has been paying attention by reflecting on whether his attention has been completely on his activity. This reflection is a further act of attention. If by such reflection one finds that he has been paying complete attention to what he has been doing, then it follows that
he has been doing the initial activity carefully. Whether this reflective attention itself is partial or total does not make any difference to the question of whether the person has been paying complete attention to his original activity; hence further questions about the reflective attention being total or partial are irrelevant to the question of whether the original activity was done carefully or carelessly. Thus in this context the infinite regress Ryle mentions cannot be generated.

2. Ryle also argues that the traditional theory does not really explain cases such as a person's driving a car with care. It could not be that there are two simultaneous activities occurring, Ryle contends, for then it should be possible for one of them to occur without the other. For example, it should be possible for the person who is driving a car, to stop driving it and still attend to his driving. However, it is only possible for a person to continue to drive although he is not attending to his driving (CM, 138).

* * * *

This objection of Ryle does not take into consideration the absurdity in requiring that it should be possible for a person to attend to his driving a car without his actually driving it. It is not possible to do so because acts such as paying attention are intentional actions. Hence, it does not make any sense to say that acts such as paying attention take place without there being something to attend to. This is much like arguing that reporting is not an independent activity because there must be something which one reports. Moreover, although paying attention
presupposes something to which one pays attention, the object of attention need not be an activity; it could be any object in the field of one's awareness. In fact, Ryle himself would admit that we pay heed to our sensations and so on, which are not activities (CM, 157-8). To be sure, attention is not a muscular activity, distinguishable from other muscular activities; but from these facts it does not follow that paying attention is not an activity.

IV

According to Ryle, to describe someone as doing something with heed or minding what he is doing is 1) to make a categorical statement which states that the person is doing something, and 2) to make a hypothetical or dispositional statement which says how the individual would or could behave if certain circumstances were to arise (CM, 138ff). Such heed statements are called by Ryle "mongrel categorical" statements. For example, to say that someone is noticing what he is reading is to say that he is reading something, and that if asked, he would or could give us the gist of what he has been reading, expresses no surprise at the mention of the contents of what he has been reading and so forth. Thus heeding for Ryle is not an independent, activity but the way in which an activity is performed.

Ryle's use of "heeding" includes not only the heed with which we perform activities, but also the notice we take of our own unstudied utterances, whether they are spoken aloud or only "in our heads" (CM, 184), and the heed we pay to our own organic sensations (CM, 157-8). To
indicate the former use, Ryle employs concepts such as "eavesdropping on one's own activities" (CM, 184), "being alive to what one is doing" (CM, 177), and "catching oneself doing so and so" (CM, 166). It is not clear with what justification Ryle uses the term "heed" to convey both performing an activity needfully, and paying heed to one's sensations and voiced or unvoiced utterances. But it is clear that he does not make any distinction (as regards their status as objects of knowledge), between voiced or outspoken utterances and what he calls "silent soliloquies"—for we can pay heed, in his view, equally to both of them.

Heeding, for Ryle, is neither an activity, nor is it internal; hence, it does not give us any privileged access to the so-called "internal" phenomena. Heed verbs like "noticing" and "knowing" are achievement verbs (CM, 149-53). Heeding must, however, be distinguished from watching, which is an activity, and can be done with or without heed. Thus Ryle would consider watching as a means of knowledge, but would not consider heeding as one (CM, 207). He would presumably prohibit the use of "watching" to apply to the notice we take of our sensations or silent soliloquies.

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i) The burden of Ryle's thesis that heeding does not consist in an activity which is internal is to say that heeding can be redescribed as a disposition (although complex) which can be tested by observable evidence. Ryle thinks that by doing this he is not denying heeding as a fact, but only denying a certain description of it, namely, that it is a
private internal activity. But Ryle's theory confuses what heeding consists in with the way in which it is tested. The concept of heeding is one of an actual present occurrence, whereas heeding is tested in terms of an indefinite number of dispositions to behave in certain ways, such as by answering questions or responding to situations in expected ways. This truth is borne out by the following facts: 1) There are circumstances in which if the tests we apply are not answered, it does not follow that the mental concept does not apply to the individual. For example, a person's inability to answer the tests may be due to the fact that the person lacks the verbal skills to report what he is noticing. 2) The fact that the person has answered all the tests does not necessarily mean that he has been heeding his activity—it may just mean that the particular activity is habitual for the person.

ii) Furthermore, Ryle claims that heeding is an achievement concept. However, our ordinary notion of achievement is one of doing an activity successfully, or achieving a result through a certain activity. But what sort of activity exists when we notice our sensations or thoughts? Similarly, when we suddenly notice something which has been already there in the field of vision or hearing what sort of activity are we heeding?

iii) Ryle would admit that we make avowals concerning our own private sensations and silent thoughts. And our avowals concerning our sensations or silent thoughts do express our knowledge of them. But it is not clear how in Ryle's view we make such avowals. He also admits
that we do pay heed to our sensations or silent thoughts. Is heeding, then, a necessary condition for knowing that we have a sensation or a silent thought? Let us for a moment suppose that it is. Both heeding and knowing, however, are achievement concepts for Ryle. Then it is not clear in what sense heeding is a necessary condition for knowing, especially when nothing else is needed in order to know about our sensations and silent thoughts. Thus it seems tautological to say that heeding is a necessary condition for knowing that we have a sensation or a silent thought.

Suppose it is not heeding by which we know that we have a sensation or a silent thought. Then Ryle would have to say either that we just know them without any means at all, or that we know them by noticing, or that we know them through retrospection. In the first case, Ryle would have to explain how it is that we do not always know our sensations and silent thoughts to exist whenever we have them, if having them, is the only condition necessary for knowing them. In the second case I consider noticing to be equivalent to heeding. If noticing, like heeding, is not an activity, then the argument which Ryle raised against the traditional theory of heeding can also be raised against his own theory of heeding or noticing: for example, how does one know that one notices his organic sensations or silent thoughts except by noticing his noticing, and how does one know that he notices this noticing except by a third noticing, and so on ad infinitum? A similar objection can be raised even if the answer to how one knows that he has a sensation or a silent thought is that he
knows them through retrospection as exemplified by the following passage from Ryle:

It is certainly true that when I do, feel or witness something, I usually could and frequently do pay swift retrospective heed to what I have just done, felt or witnessed, I keep, much of the time, some sort of log or score of what occupies me, in such a way that, if asked what I had just been hearing or picturing or saying, I could usually give a correct answer. . . . This does not exclude the possibility that I might sometimes give a mis-report, for even short-term reminiscence is not exempt from carelessness or bias (CM, 159-60).

I have already challenged Ryle's thesis that sensations and silent thoughts are not private objects (see above, pp. 119-20, 122-25). Ryle allows that mistakes are possible in our reports about these. If it is granted that sensations and silent thoughts are private objects, if these are known through retrospection, and if errors are possible in our reports concerning these, then it could be asked whether each time we have retrospected we have done so carefully or carelessly. This question can be answered only by postulating another retrospection. And a similar question can be asked concerning this retrospection, and so on ad infinitum.

Furthermore, as I argued in chapter II, (p. 35; See also Pp. 140-41 below). Ryle does not explain how retrospection of something we have done or felt is possible, if retrospection is to be construed as a form of memory. For remembering something requires that we have already known before what we remember now. But it is not the case that whenever we feel or do something we always know that we do, for the simple reason that we are completely absorbed in our feeling or activity when it occurs.
Thus it seems to me that Ryle's own account of heeding fails to satisfy us when we apply it to our knowledge of organic sensations and silent thoughts, because the account is subject to the same soil of objections which he raises against the traditional theory of heeding, and in that sense it is on no better footing.

V

According to Ryle, the way I obtain knowledge about myself is not basically different from the way I obtain knowledge of what another person is doing, thinking or feeling, or of his capacities, propensities and motives. I know myself by observing what I do, say to myself, or how I perform in different situations, and by comparing this with my own past performances and the performances of others (CM, 155-169). And this is also the way I know about others. However, I am often in a better position to obtain information about myself than another person is. That is, frequently it so happens that another person may not be able to proceed with a certain inquiry about me because he lacks the opportunity to do so, and his knowledge of me may therefore remain perforce a mere conjecture. But there is nothing proprietary about my knowledge of myself. The other person knows what tests would give him the answers to his questions about me, provided he is able to apply them (CM, 170).

The question of self-knowledge for Ryle is one of establishing certain law-like propositions about the overt and covert behavior of persons. It is not a general question of how I discover that I have a mind, but a
range of specific questions about my personal characteristics, traits, abilities, as well as particular questions such as what I am at this moment saying, doing, thinking or undergoing (CM, 169ff). Thus there are two kinds of self-knowledge: knowledge of my own long-range characteristics, and knowledge of what I am at this moment saying, doing, thinking or feeling.

Concerning the first sort of self-knowledge, Ryle says that my motives and abilities are discovered in much the same way as another person's motives and abilities are discovered. The difference is that if we know that someone is putting us through some tests, we would have a motive to respond to them in a special way. For example, I discover the motives of a person by observing his actions and reactions in different situations and comparing them with one another and with those of another person in similar situations. I discover, for example, that a person is 'vain by finding out that whenever he has an opportunity he is boastful, and, while reluctant to admit good qualities in others, he is eager to point out their defects and so forth. The way we ascertain our own mental capacities and propensities as well as those of others is by induction, an induction to "law-like propositions from observed actions and reactions" (CM, 171). Such procedures are more or less adequate depending on the judge's experience, sympathy and understanding of the subject.

Simulation of personality characteristics, that is, shamming, pretending or play-acting, is not a difficult problem, and can be exposed by inductive procedures. We need only to submit the subject, if possible,
to a "crucial experiment" situation and apply the tests known to us in order to differentiate between an honest person and one who is pretending. For example, you listened to a philosophy lecture and said you understood it perfectly. You might be deceiving me or yourself in this matter. Since I did not meet you for some days I had no opportunity to find out whether you had understood the lecture. But I know what tests will settle the question, as for instance, asking you to explain the lecture to me in your own words, or to give a resume of it and to raise objections to it where they are relevant. The same tests would also show that I understood the lecture. So far, the two kinds of knowledge are similar. The difference is that I would not have voiced my own thinking, explanation and so on, but would have "told them to myself more perfunctorily in silent soliloquy" (CM, 170). Even if you claimed that you had felt a flash or click of insight during the lecture and thus thought you had understood it, you would withdraw your claim of understanding if you failed to pass the above tests. The clicks and flashes therefore are neither necessary nor sufficient to say that I or someone else have actually understood something. Though we cannot give a complete list of all the tests which would establish the characteristic in question in all cases, in any particular case a few of these tests would be sufficient to say with reasonable certainty that the person has actually understood what he claimed to understand.

The second kind of self-knowledge in Ryle's theory consists in a person's knowing what he is doing, thinking, feeling or saying at the present...
moment (CM, 169, 174ff). The acquisition of this sort of knowledge cannot be explained by saying that, for example, I was thinking about something, and it suddenly flashed on me that I was thinking about it. For we do not ordinarily recall any such flashes even when we know for certain that we are thinking about something while we are thinking (CM, 175). Furthermore, there would be the question of whether I knew that such flashes were taking place. If the answer is that I knew because I had a flash that I had these flashes, we become involved in an infinite regress, because we can ask again whether I knew the flash that I had flashes by having Q third flash, and so on ad infinitum.

Ryle's answer to the question of how we know what we are at the present moment doing, feeling, saying or thinking—lies in either embedding the knowledge of such particular occurrences in what he calls the non-sudden serial order performances, or considering these occurrences as sudden performances (CM, 174, 178). Serial order performances require continuous application, and to be able to do the second step in the series requires having done the first. The steps may be related to each other either in terms of means and ends or of earlier and later. An intelligent serial order performance requires that one is "alive" to whatever one is doing all the time one is doing it, though he need not announce this to himself or to others, "Being alive" is defined in terms of certain readinesses and preparednesses: namely, the person is prepared to perform the later step after the present step is completed; he is ready to tell either himself or the world what he would have done, if he were not
prevented from doing it; and he is prepared for what does or should follow, and when it does follow, he is not surprised. The person might also be consulting a plan or a program from time to time, (but not continuously, for that would interrupt his performance forever).

In sudden performances when a person says or does something un-premeditatedly, then he is surprised to find himself saying or doing what he has said or done. In such a case, it would be appropriate to say that the person did not know what he was going to say or do before he actually did it, as for example, when a joke comes to his mind. Though the person surprised himself in this respect, he has all along also been alive to the fact that he has been conversing with someone and that the joke happened in the middle of the conversation (CM, 177).

What Ryle calls "unstudied talk" supplies, according to him, our primary evidence for self-knowledge (CM, 181ff). This talk is contrasted with the talk of professional people, their considered judgments, pronouncements, deliverances and so forth. In "unstudied talk" we say whatever we are at the moment interested in or occupied with, whether aloud or in our own heads. One very basic way of knowing ourselves is by paying heed to or noticing our own unstudied talk or unrehearsed performances. This is at least one of the meanings of the term "self-consciousness" (CM, 184).

* * * *
Ryle's theory of self-knowledge does not seem adequate to show that there is essentially no difference between self-knowledge and knowledge of other persons. In particular, his explanations of how we acquire the two sorts of self-knowledge he mentions are insufficient.

Even supposing that we do know our own long range characteristics by induction, the way we apply induction to ourselves seems to me essentially different from the way other people apply induction to establish certain law-like propositions about me. Ryle's theory that we establish law-like propositions about ourselves through induction is probably based on the belief that we compare in our memory many of the instances of our actions, thoughts or feelings, and draw certain generalizations from them through induction. Such induction, however, cannot be made by merely observing myself in the present, for all the past instances of action are not present at the time of observation. But if we remember these instances, such a memory presupposes (at least according to current epistemological belief) that we should have known them sometime before. However, it is not always the case that we have knowledge of ourselves thinking, feeling or acting when such thinking, feeling or acting occurs. It cannot be that they are known sometime between their occurrence and their being remembered, for then the question arises how something can be known first-hand when it has ceased to exist. For example, when I am thinking about something, I know at that moment what my thinking is about, but I might not always, and do not usually, know that I am thinking, unless there is an instantaneous reflection
on the fact of my thinking. To be sure, there is no absurdity in remembering later what I was thinking about earlier, but it does seem strange that I can also remember, as Ryle would say, that I had been thinking, if I did not know that fact before. Perhaps Ryle would wish to say that whenever we are thinking, feeling, imagining or acting, we automatically know at the same time that we are doing so. This view may appear plausible because, for example, in answer to a question as to what I am thinking now, I can either say that I am not thinking at all, meaning I am doing something else, or say that I am thinking about something. But this view is subject to the infinite regress objection which Ryle raised against automatic self-awareness (see chapter II. p. 40). Moreover, this view is not borne out by our experience. We know in our own experiences that many times we daydream, or that we are overwhelmed by a certain emotion, and we know that we did not at the time know that we were daydreaming or carried away by an emotion. So, when we make a sincere statement about what we have been doing in order to answer a question, it must be that we instantaneously reflect and hence know that we have been either thinking about something or feeling an emotion, and so forth. Thus it seems that it is not merely by memory that we can compare our many instances of action, thoughts or feelings. Memory presupposes what I have called reflection, whether it happens instantaneously or sometime later; whereas memory preceded by prior observation seems to be sufficient to compare other persons' actions or feelings. Thus there does seem to be a significant difference between the way we obtain
knowledge of ourselves, and the way we obtain knowledge of others.

ii) Ryle’s theory is even less adequate when it comes to the explanation of our knowledge of what we are doing or undergoing at the present moment; at least in cases of our understanding something comparatively simple, such as what someone is saying, the way we know that we understand seems entirely different from the way another person knows that we do. A mere reflection on the intelligibility of what someone else is saying seems adequate for us to know that we understand what he is saying. But another person can know that we understand only by subjecting us to some tests; for instance, by asking us to translate what is said into our own words. Even in complex cases, a mere flash or click happening in our mind when we are trying to understand, say, a mathematical problem, is enough to indicate to ourselves that we have found a clue to the solution of the problem. This flash usually occurs when we, "see our way through to the solution of the problem." Another person would know that we have understood a mathematical problem, or that we have found a solution to it only by applying certain tests to us. It may very well be that we may have to withdraw our knowledge claim if we fail to respond satisfactorily to these tests. But it cannot be said that in most cases of our knowledge that we must use these tests on ourselves in order to justifiably make a knowledge claim. We do not use these tests on ourselves unless we feel there is an occasion for doubt. Thus our response to these tests cannot be the way we know that we understand something. It may very well be that these flashes and clicks are
neither necessary nor sufficient for us to say that we or another person
understand something, if saying means making a judgment and justifying
it to another person, but they are sufficient, when they occur, for us, to
know and to be justified, in asserting that we understand something.

iii) Ryle's theory that we know about our own silent thoughts by
eavesdropping on them also seems questionable. The meaning of such
metaphorical expressions such as eavesdropping" or "being alive to
what one is doing" is not clear, for these expressions do not explain how
it is possible to know our "suppressed speech" or "hypothetical behav-
ior" (as in the case of our imagining something), or "abstentions from
doing something" (again in the case of our imagining). Words such as
"suppressed" and "hidden" are terms whose physical meaning we know.
We know, for instance, what it means to hide something in a closet. But
what does it mean to hide a thought or to suppress it? Abstentions and
hypothesicals suggest to us that nothing actually is occurring at the time.
How is it possible to know what is not actually taking place now by
eavesdropping on it? It makes sense to talk about paying heed to some-
thing which we are observing or listening to now, but what sense does
it make to say that we pay heed to a silent thought?

I have also argued above (see pp. 122-25 above) against
Ryle’s view that silent thoughts are not private. In the case of hidden
or suppressed physical objects we can always prove the identity of the
revealed or manifest object with the hidden or suppressed object; where-
as in the case of the "suppressed" or silent thoughts, nothing except the
speaker's word can guarantee that the expressed thought is the same as the original hidden or suppressed thought. And this is precisely what is meant by calling them private. It is for this reason that even if "eavesdropping" makes sense, it is no more adequate in any way as an alternative to introspection or self-awareness as an explanation of our knowledge of our silent thoughts, for we could always ask the question how does one know that he is eavesdropping on his silent thoughts? If the answer is that one knows this by eavesdropping on one's eavesdropping, then we are caught in an infinite regress, for we could again ask the question, how does one know that one is eavesdropping on one's eavesdropping, and so forth, ad infinitum.

Thus, it seems to the that Ryle has to accept that silent thoughts are private and that eavesdropping is an internal process which is private to the speaker. If he accepts these two, then it seems to me that he is forced to admit that self-knowledge is essentially different from knowledge of other persons.
CHAPTER VI
Consciousness and Self-Knowledge
(Sartre's Theory of Self-Knowledge)

Sartre recognizes reflection as a valid means of self-knowledge. Without reflection, especially what Sartre calls pure reflection, we do not know the basis for all our choices and behavior patterns (i.e., the original choice), which knowledge constitutes for him genuine, self-knowledge. Nor are we, without pure reflection, clearly aware of the free and spontaneous nature of consciousness as the only source of our choices, and the fact of our whole life being a continuous escape from our basic emptiness by trying, in a futile fashion, to become something other than ourselves.

In this chapter, I shall present and criticize Sartre's theory of self-knowledge. I argue that his theory that consciousness is a 'nothingness' does not adequately explain why we have self-knowledge only in a few rare moments of pure reflection, if at all. I claim this lack of self-knowledge can be explained only by assuming that consciousness, at least sometimes, is identified with something other than itself.

Before presenting Sartre's views about self-knowledge I shall present in section I of this chapter the essentials of his theory of consciousness, especially those elements of it that have to do with the nothingness and spontaneity of consciousness, the ego, 'impure and pure reflection, "bad faith" and "original choice." The second section contains my
criticism of Sartre's theory of self-knowledge.

1. Sartre's theory of consciousness is based on a dichotomy between consciousness and its object: in Sartre's terms, being-for-itself (consciousness), and being-in-itself (the object of awareness). Consciousness, for Sartre, is in a perpetual quest to be an object for itself (to found itself, in Sartre's terms), while remaining itself; that is, to become an "in-itself-for-itself."

Sartre is opposed to any theory of consciousness which allows anything outside of consciousness to determine it. For him, consciousness is pure spontaneity and pure self-creation. It is constantly active and determines itself from moment to moment. There is no continuity in consciousness; that is, its past cannot determine its present. Consciousness is a nothingness, not an absolute or general nothingness, but a relative* nothingness in the sense that it is not its object of attention.

*I shall question below (pp. 173-74) whether Sartre's theory does not involve consciousness being a substantive nothingness as well.

Sartre's theory of consciousness is based on two principles: the principle of intentionality, borrowed uncritically from Husserl, which states that consciousness is always a consciousness of something; and the principle of the pre-reflective cogito, which asserts that all consciousness of an object is at the same time, and in the same act of consciousness, a consciousness of itself as being conscious of that object. This pre-reflective cogito is not a positional or thetic consciousness: that is, it does not posit the consciousness which it is aware of as an object;
it is an implicit, non-positional or non-thetic consciousness. If there were no such awareness of the consciousness of an object. Sartre believes, consciousness would be unconscious of itself, which for him is a contradiction in terms (BN, lxi). If, on the other hand, the pre-reflective cogito a positional act, separate from the original act, it would mean that each consciousness implies an infinite regress of self-consciousnesses. The pre-reflective cogito explains how we can later reflect on and remember what we have unreflectively experienced but did not notice at the time it occurred.

2. Sartre uses these assumptions to show that consciousness is a nothingness in the following kinds of arguments:

i) All consciousness is a consciousness of something. It is also simultaneously non-thetically conscious of itself as not being the object of its attention. This self-consciousness shows that all consciousness is a lack of its object or relatively a nothingness. The being of consciousness (being-tor-itself), therefore, is its (way of) not being its object. Consciousness is also at the same time consciousness of itself as not being its object (being-in-it self). This shows that consciousness is not what it is, since in its (non-thetical) awareness of itself it cannot be identical with itself. Combining the above two results, we obtain one of the meanings of the famous Sartrean tenet: consciousness is what it is not and it is not what it is.

ii) a) That consciousness is a nothingness can also be shown, according to Sartre, by considering instances of human conduct. For
example, questions and negative judgments like "Pierre is not in the café" are possible only because consciousness can negate the café as not being itself and negate Pierre as not being in the café (BN, liff). For "negate" Sartre also uses the term "nihilate" which means to make nothingness or to cause it to happen (BN, 744). Negative judgments are the result of an intuitive apprehension of this double nihilation. If such a nihilation is to be possible, the relation of non-being between consciousness and its objects cannot be purely an external relation of non-being as between two in-itselfs, such as between an inkwell and a table. If the relation were such, consciousness cannot separate itself actively from its objects; it would be a pure passivity, like an inkwell. Only when the relation is internal such that when it is conscious of its object, and is not it, it is also conscious of itself not being the object; i.e., it nihilates itself from its object:

It would be inconceivable that a Being which is full positivity should maintain and create outside itself a Nothingness or transcendent being, for there would be nothing in Being by which Being could surpass itself toward Non-Being (BN, 29).

Thus negative judgments are made possible by the fact that consciousness is a nothingness, and it is through consciousness that nothingness comes into the world.

b) Conversely, if consciousness were something, Sartre argues, it would have to be conscious of itself as that something. But it is not given in our experience that consciousness is something (W. 29f). Claiming to be something or to be determined by something is an attitude of psychological determinism which is an attitude of excuse (BN, 48).
iii) There is also phenomenological evidence for Sartre to assert that consciousness is a nothingness: freedom for him is the permanent possibility of nihilating what we are in terms of "having been" or "having yet to be" (BN. 30ff). We are conscious of such a freedom in moments of anguish. Or rather, anguish is our awareness of our freedom. Anguish is defined as a certain mode of being in the presence of our past or future as being that past or that future, and at the same time not being it (BN. 35). We are aware of our past (say of a past decision not to gamble) as "having been" it, but we are aware that nothing prevents us from not being it (when confronted with the temptation to gamble). Or we are aware of our future possibilities as our not yet being them, but we are also aware that nothing forces us to choose one as opposed to another possibility. This awareness of our separation by a nothingness from our essence (self) or our future possibilities is evidence for Sartre that consciousness is aware of its own nothingness.

3. It is the essential nature of consciousness to be free choice. This follows from its nihilating nature. Neither causes nor motives can determine consciousness, because if they do determine it, consciousness must be aware of them as so determining it; and this awareness nihilates these causes and motives as "having been" or "having yet to be". Essence is what consciousness constantly makes itself be, without ever in fact being it. The existence of consciousness precedes its essence. Moreover, consciousness is pure choice. The mere fact that consciousness is selective in what it is aware of shows that consciousness has already
chosen its object and attributed a meaning to it. Every act of consciousness invests meaning in the object of which it is conscious. The meanings are ordered in terms of a hierarchy at the basis of which we have the most fundamental project or original choice of consciousness, which is the way consciousness has chosen to make itself an in-itself-for-itself.

4. In the pre-reflective cogito consciousness is aware of itself as consciousness of an object. But this cogito is not a separate act, and is not the same as reflection which makes the previous consciousness of an object the object of a judgment. The pre-reflective cogito suggests that consciousness is not identical with itself (BN, 90), because it is at the same time, and in the same act of consciousness, a non-positional consciousness of itself, the pre-reflective cogito thus implies that consciousness, even at the pre-reflective stage, has a necessity to be present to itself. "The law of being of the for-itself, as the ontological foundation of consciousness, is to be itself in the presence to itself" (BN, 94). This necessity for consciousness to be in the presence of itself and yet be itself is furthered by the act of reflection. In order to escape from its nothingness consciousness in reflection projects itself into the in-itself and falls under the illusion that it is an ego with states and qualities, whereas in reality, the ego and its states and qualities are pure creations.

The ego does not occur at the level of the unreflective consciousness, but is a product of reflection. This can be shown, according to Sartre, by what he calls the "non-thetic memory".
...every unreflected consciousness, being non-thetic consciousness itself leaves a non-thetic memory that one can consult. To do so it suffices to try to reconstitute the complete moment in which this unreflected consciousness appeared (which by definition is always possible). For example, I was absorbed just now in my reading. I was going to try to remember the circumstances of my fading, my attitude, the lines I was reading. I am thus going to revive not only these external details but a certain depth unreflected consciousness, since the objects could only have been perceived by that consciousness and since they remain relative to it. That consciousness must not be posited as object of a reflect on On the contrary, I must direct my attention to the revived objects, but without losing sight of the unreflected consciousness, by joining in a sort of conspiracy with it and by drawing up an inventory of its content in a non-positional manner. There is no doubt about the result: while I was reading, there was consciousness of the book, of the heroes of the novel, but the! was not inhabiting this consciousness (TE, 46).

For Sartre, the ego is given in our reflection as an indirect object which we are aware of In the background when we reflect on our immediately past experiences. The ego is a transcendent psychic object, i.e., it is not given as a complete entity at any single moment. It is given as extended in time, and as the source of our states, qualities and acts, which in turn are presented to us in our experience as transcendent unities or syntheses of our particular experiences (erlebnisse), and as causing them. The particular anger I feel toward Peter is, for example, an erlebnis, but to say that I hate Peter is to say more than that I experience a momentary repugnance for him. Hatred is an example of a 'state. 'Qualities' are personality traits such as moral characteristics, intelligence and other dispositional properties. An 'action' is whatever we are doing at the moment, 'such as reading and driving a car. The ego and its states and qualities, though they are passive creations, are given in our
experience as if they were spontaneous or capable of causing from a distance our particular experiences. The ego is given to us in turn as a unity of an infinite number of states, qualities and actions. Since it is also a transcendent object, it transcends the bounds of immediate experience. What we assert of it is always capable of being contradicted by later experiences. Thus the ego asserts more than what is given.

The ego with its states and qualities is an illusory and irrational synthesis. It is illusory because it attributes to itself qualities which do not in fact belong to it (e.g., spontaneity), and irrational because it combines in itself both the qualities of passivity and spontaneity.

Sartre explains why the ego is given as the creator of its states and qualities, and why particular experiences are given as emanating from these states and qualities: consciousness "imprisons itself in the world in order to flee from itself" (TE, 81). Consciousness escapes from itself by projecting itself into the me and becomes absorbed in it. The ego is somehow a result of this effort of consciousness to escape from its dread of itself (TE, 102, 103).

5. There are two sorts of reflection, pure and impure. At the unreflective level, consciousness looks at the world as having potencies and causal properties, and thus implicitly supposes that the objects in the world are the causes of its responses and particular experiences, as for example, emotions. At the level of impure reflection, consciousness regards its particular experiences as being caused by or as emanations from its states and qualities which are in turn caused by the ego.
We think, for example, that our anger toward a person is an effect of our hatred for him. In pure reflection, we become aware of the illusoriness of the ego and its states and qualities, as well as of the true nature of our consciousness. We become aware that the ego and its states and qualities are mere creations and illusions, that our experiences, including emotions, are spontaneous behavior which we envisage in order to achieve certain freely chosen ends in the world, and that our consciousness is basically a nothingness and a free choice of being. "Only a pure reflective consciousness can discover the For-itself reflected-on in its reality" (BN, 198). In such reflection we realize that we have been a nothingness and a free choice of being all along. This realization causes anguish in us.

Pure reflection is implied in impure reflection. Impure reflection includes pure reflection, but goes beyond it and makes wider claims in order to escape from the anguish revealed in pure reflection. Pure reflection, on the other hand, adheres to the strictly given. In order to achieve pure reflection we must undergo what Sartre calls *katharsis,* that is, purification from all motive. Sartre, however, does not explain exactly what this *katharsis* consists in or how we can achieve it.

6. For Sartre, we are always non-thetically aware of our nothingness at the unreflective level and attempt to transcend it by trying to become a possibility which is an in-itself, and which we posit to ourselves in reflection. At the unreflective level consciousness is aware of objects in the world as having potentialities and properties such as looking
attractive or repulsive. Sartre tells us how we constitute the objects in the world as having such qualities:

What I seek in the face of the world is the coincidence with a for-itself which I am and which is consciousness of the world. But this possible...is not present as an object of a positional consciousness, for in that case it would be reflected-on. The satisfied thirst which haunts my actual thirst is not consciousness (of) thirst as a satisfied thirst; it is a thetic consciousness of itself-drinking-from-a-glass, and a non-positional self-consciousness; It then causes itself to be transcended toward the glass of which it is conscious; and as a correlate of his possible non-thetic consciousness, the glass-drunk-from haunts the full glass as its possible and constitutes it as a glass to be drunk from. Thus the world by nature is mine in so far as it is the correlative in-itself of nothingness; that is, of the necessary obstacle beyond which I find myself as that which I am in the form "of having to be it." Without the world there is no selfness, no person; without selfness, without the person there is no world. But the world's belonging to the person is never posited on the level of the pre-reflective cogito (BN, 127-8).

Thus it looks as if we need two separate acts to constitute, for example, a full glass as something to be drunk from. First the need to positionally envisage ourselves as drinking from a glass, and presumably this happens sometime before we constitute the glass as having to be drunk from, and then we are positionally aware of a full glass with the background of the glass-drunk-from, and thus constitute it as a glass-to-be-drunk-from.

7. The escape from our anguish by taking shelter in impure reflection is in bad faith, because in order to escape from our anguish we must first be aware of ourselves as being in a state of anguish. We cannot however, really overcome our anguish because our very nature is anguish. Bad faith occurs when we both want to be and not to be something other than ourselves at the same time. Bad faith causes us to be what we are, in the mode of "not-being what one is." or not to be what we are in the
mode of "being what one is" (BN, 80). "This means that anguish, the
intentional aim of anguish (i.e., to flee from itself), and a flight from
anguish toward reassuring myths must all be given in the unity of this
same consciousness" (BN, 53). Bad faith, which is a form of self-de-
ception, is thus a spontaneous attempt on the part of consciousness to
veil from itself its own true nature, i.e., its anguish.

There are strong suggestions in Sartre to the effect that bad faith
occurs even at the unreflective level of consciousness:

> All this does not take place as a "reflective voluntary decision,
but as a spontaneous determination of our being. One puts oneself
in bad faith as one goes to sleep and one is in bad faith as
one dreams. Once this mode of being has been realized, it is as
difficult to get out of it as to wake oneself up; bad faith is a
type of being in the world, like waking or dreaming, which by
itself tends to perpetuate itself, although its structure is of the
metastable type (BN, 82).

The project of bad faith, Sartre argues, is itself in bad faith, and
is rooted in the nature of human consciousness: for even at the unreflec-
tive level consciousness is constantly trying to become itself in the
form of the in-itself which it lacks and which it is pre-reflectively aware
of as lacking. This is a futile attempt because consciousness cannot be
the in-itself for it would then be pre-reflectively conscious of itself as
being so and thus would not be itself (that consciousness which is the in-
itself); "The condition of the possibility of bad faith is that human real-
ity, in its most immediate being, in the infra-structure of the pre-reflect-
tive cogito, must be what it is not, and not be what it is" (BN, 82).

What exactly is the meaning of this paradox? How can conscious-
ness be what it is not, namely the in-itself? Sartre's answer to this
question is that, since the relation of lacking is an internal relation, when consciousness nihilates itself as not being the in-itself, it also nihilates itself (from itself) in the form of the in-itself. It is in this sense consciousness is what it is not. And consciousness is not what it is because it is pre-reflectively aware of itself.

Bad faith is Sartre’s substitute to Freud’s notions of the Unconscious, repression and the Complex. It explains how repression and other such phenomena occur at a conscious level without our explicitly knowing that they do. The whole project of bad faith takes place at a conscious level, "...but bad faith is conscious of its structure... " (BN.82).

8. Sartre forbids explanation of human behavior in terms of "givens"—i.e., either the so-called unconscious complexes or certain desires and propensities. Such explanations do not carry the analysis far enough, for we can always ask how a complex affects our behavior without our knowing it, or why we desire what we desire. If we carry out this analysis far enough, we will reach the original choice of consciousness. We cannot ask for the reasons for this original choice. It is the source for all reasons; it itself has no reason. The original choice is absurd (BN, 586). The original choice is also self-contradictory because consciousness cannot be both for-itself and in-itself at the same time. The original choice is made in bad faith—being an attempt of consciousness to flee itself; and all choices following from it are made in bad faith also.

The original choice determines all particular choices and projects. In turn, each of our choices derives its meaning from the original choice.
We are always pre-reflectively conscious of our original choice, and in each project which we choose we reaffirm and renew it. By choosing the world, that is, by giving it a distribution of significances in terms of our possibilities from which we read off our self-image, we also choose the image which we shall be, and this image is our self. It is the original choice which not only creates all causes and motives, but "it is this which arranges the world with its meaning, its instrument-complexes, and its coefficient of adversity" (BN, 568-69). That we are always pre-reflectively aware of our original choice does not mean that we know what it is. We can make choices which are contrary to our fundamental project. Then, either we do not succeed in our attempt to make contrary choices at all, or if we do, the fundamental project reasserts itself in another circumstance (BN, 576-77).

9. The aim of existential psychoanalysis is to determine an individual's fundamental project or original choice (BN, 698), and not necessarily to do therapy. The subject can undertake a psychoanalytic investigation of himself, the result of which we can call self-knowledge. It is not quite clear why we have to know our original choice at all unless it is for therapeutic purposes, but Sartre does place a higher value on activities performed with a consciousness "of their ideal goal", i.e., the attempt to become the in-itself-for-itself, than on activities performed without such a consciousness (BN, 767). The ultimate aim of self-knowledge, just as that of psychoanalysis, also appears to be the knowledge of our fundamental project.
Although pure reflection can give us an awareness of our original choice, it does not necessarily give us a knowledge of it, for we may lack the intellectual tools for the conceptualization and analysis of our behavior in terms of it. In order to do our own psychoanalysis we must eschew any privilege of being in our peculiar position in regard to ourselves and question ourselves as another person would question us. To obtain genuine self-knowledge we must investigate empirically our particular patterns of behavior, compare these patterns with one another, with an *a priori* hypothesis as to what our original project is, just as a psychoanalyst does when he analyzes us. Then we must interpret these patterns of behavior in terms of their being symbolic expressions of our original choice. When we have succeeded in interpreting most of the instances of our behavior according to this hypothesis, and see how the original choice manifests itself in each of these instances, we can claim to have genuine self-knowledge. Then we know what we have always been implicitly aware of, viz., our original choice.

What happens to us as a result of such self-knowledge is, however, not very clear. We probably will never be free from our anguish, because anguish is our original nature. We will also probably still be condemned to choose the impossible goal of being the in-itself-for-itself. At any rate, every moment we are choosing we will be aware of the meaning-giving activity of our choice, and we will also be aware that all the goals which we choose derive their meaning from us. We will probably "refrain from appropriating things for their own sake and try to realize
the symbolic appropriation of their being-in-itself” (BN, 757). When we are thus liberated through self-knowledge, do we make freedom itself into a value, or do we remain free from seeking it also as a value? Will consciousness still be forced to make particular choices in concrete situations, or will it seek to escape from all situations because it has seen the futility of all choice? Sartre leaves the answers to such questions to a future work (BN, 768).

II

1. According to Sartre, one reason we do not always have self-knowledge even though we may be aware of our original choice (in pure reflection explicitly, and all the time pre-reflectively) is that we do not have the proper tools of conceptualization and analysis; and hence we do not know the significance of the original choice we are explicitly aware of. But this cannot be the only reason, for it is rare that we have pure reflection. Most of the time we remain at the unreflective level with sporadic impure reflection. When we do attain pure reflection we become aware of our anguish, and try to escape from it through bad faith, which results in impure reflection. I am assuming here that being in anguish and our awareness of it both coincide with pure reflection, or that they are at least the beginnings of it. Two questions arise here: why does consciousness remain in bad faith and impure reflection, and how does consciousness ever become free from this bad faith?

The answer which Sartre gives to the first question is that consciousness has decided spontaneously to veil from itself its own true nature—
to put itself to sleep—and not to be persuaded by the evidence of its own nothingness and freedom. It is as difficult for consciousness to escape from this state of bad faith as it is for a sleeping man to awake himself, for the bad faith tends to be self-perpetuating. This presupposes that consciousness is aware of its own anguish, but it is not clear whether this awareness is positional or non-positional. It looks as if it must be a positional awareness, for if consciousness veils from itself its own true nature, it must already know that its nature is anguish, and such knowledge is possible only when there is an explicit awareness of anguish. In pure reflection, consciousness is aware of itself as anguish, and as a reaction to this awareness, it pre-reflectively, but consciously, veils its own true nature from itself by taking flight in a reassuring myth—namely, that the anguish itself is only the effect of its past, its essence, or is the result of its motives. This, in effect, creates a false belief in psychological determinism. This determinism, however, is in bad faith; because consciousness must recognize its actual nature before it can veil it from itself and believe it is something that it is not. Why this bad faith should perpetuate itself we do not quite know.

If we ask why we are ever disturbed from this sleep, or why we ever return to pure reflection, Sartre would reply that the ontological structure of bad faith is such that it is "metastable." This means that bad faith is unstable because the structure of bad faith is a negation of itself. If, for example, when we are in a state of bad faith we believe that our anguish is a result of our passions, we are at the same time
aware of our believing this, and to the extent that we are so aware we are not the believing.

The two statements 1) that we do succeed in being ensnared in bad faith, and 2) that on some rare occasions we do succeed in getting out of bad faith, seem to contradict each other. It seems that Sartre must choose between the two such that either he can say 1) we believe in a reassuring myth and so we are the believing, in a way that even if we are conscious of our believing, our consciousness does not imply that we are not the believing—that is, if the veiling is to be successful; or he can say 2) we are conscious of our believing but we are not the believing to the extent that our bad faith itself is unsuccessful. He cannot say that to the degree that we are conscious of our own believing we are not the believing, for he does not allow for degrees of being or not being something (BN, 81). Sartre seems to want the pre-reflective consciousness both to be and not to be its object; and both to be a consciousness and a knowledge at the same time—hence the above paradox.

Sartre is to some degree aware of this dilemma, but he does not clearly explain a way out of it:

To believe is to know that one believes, and to know that one believes is no longer to believe. Thus to believe is not to believe any longer because that is only to believe—this in the unity of one and the same non-thetic self-consciousness. To be sure, we have here forced the description of the phenomenon by designating it with the word *to know*; non-thetic consciousness is not to *know*. But it is in its very translucency at the origin of all knowing*. Thus the non-thetic consciousness (of) believing is destructive of belief (BN, 84).

Sartre supposes that in order for bad faith to be successful it is sufficient to believe in reassuring myths, even though there is a pre-
reflective consciousness of that belief; and, in order for bad faith to be metastable, that is, to be a negation of itself, the pre-reflective consciousness of believing must be sufficient for not being it, and thus be responsible for its failure. Sartre wants both results and hence the seeming contradiction: consciousness is what it is no: and it is not what it is. In other words, Sartre requires that consciousness both be and not be the believing. Yet Sartre believes that it is possible for a person to escape radically from his bad faith (BN, 86). If bad faith is so deeply rooted in the very nature of human consciousness, I do not see how Sartre in his system can allow the possibility for such an escape. Man for him is in this perpetual contradiction of having to be what he is not and not being able to be what he is. If this is the basic nature of man, Sartre cannot explain how we ever could succeed in believing that we are something, nor can he explain why we break away from the belief that we are something only on certain rare occasions.

2. The above contradiction that occurs in bad faith stems from Sartre's notion of consciousness. There are two basic characteristics of consciousness, according to Sartre, which guarantee its contradictory nature. Sartre holds 1) that consciousness is always spontaneous; that is, even when it appears passive, as when it is in bad faith and believes that it is determined by something outside itself, it spontaneously makes itself passive; and 2) that the pre-reflective cogito is sufficient to assure the non-being of what one is conscious of. We should ask whether either of these principles is totally true, and whether Sartre has shown them to be so.
Sartre believes that consciousness is by its very nature a spontaneous choice; this seems to follow from the fact that consciousness is intentional. Consciousness in its awareness of its object actively nihilates itself from the object. It is not a passive in-itself which is a mere non-being of other in-itselfs. That is, it nihilates itself from the in-itself which it is aware of. The fact that consciousness is selective in its attention seems to imply that it is a pure spontaneity, for such a selection presupposes that a meaning has been given before by consciousness to the object of choice (BN, 564-65). We become positionally aware of the choosing activity when we are in anguish or when we are aware of our responsibility (BN, 567).

These considerations do not, however, conclusively establish that consciousness is a pure spontaneity. It seems that the experiences in which we actively negate ourselves as not being what we are aware of do not always occur. Such active separation of ourselves from objects seems to be restricted to reflective awareness. The pre-reflective cogito seems incapable of performing such an act. For, if it could, how could it seriously be distinguished from the positional or reflective awareness of itself? What is the distinction between our pre-reflectively separating ourselves from the object which we are aware of, and explicitly judging ourselves as not being it? For such an explicit judging is the criterion in Sartre's theory for positional awareness (BN, lxii).

There is a passive awareness of the consciousness of an object at the pre-reflective level, but it seems to me that this awareness is not
adequate to separate itself from the object. Similarly, it seems to me
valid to maintain that a positional consciousness of an object implies
that consciousness is not the object that it is conscious of; and a pre-
reflective awareness of our own awareness does not seem to involve such
a non-being. Of course, there is no better evidence for these statements
than our own experience.

It also seems to me that before consciousness can explicitly
choose what it is aware of it must first be aware of what it is that it has
to choose among. Sartre himself admits this (BN, 565), but also says
that in order to be conscious we must choose. Consciousness and choice
are for him one and the same. But in our experience this seems false.
Even the selective attention to objects as meaningful seems to presup-
pose bringing our past experience to bear upon what we are aware of non-
selectively in the first place.

Moreover, it seems false that our freedom is given in our anguish.
For example, Sartre argues that we are in anguish when, for example, we
are tempted to gamble, because our previous decision to gamble seems to
melt away in the face of our temptation. This, however, does not always
necessarily show that we are free to choose either to gamble or not to
gamble, as much as that there is the uncertainty that our past decision
not to gamble, with which we are still identified, may fail in the face of
our present temptation to gamble. Even if we feel we are free to choose
between these two alternatives, this does not mean that we in fact are,
free to do so; for is it not possible that we resolve not to gamble, thereby
re-making our past decision not to gamble, and yet end up gambling any-
way, contrary to our resolve? In these contexts, Sartre seems to con-
fuse the feeling of free choice with the feeling of uncertainty. We may
be aware of ourselves slipping back into the idea of gambling, but are
we for that reason freely choosing to gamble? In order for this consci-
ousness of the possibility of gambling to be free choice, must we not
first be free from the temptation to gamble? And does this not require
a sufficient degree of awareness and reflection as to the consequences
of our gambling and the reasons for the temptation to gamble? Sartre is
right in saying that success is not important to freedom, but rather that
freedom consists in being able "by oneself to determine oneself to wish"
(BN, 591). In other words, success in obtaining what we wish (i.e.,
achieving things in the world) is not important to freedom (freely deter-
mining one's wishes). Even though I am not concerned with such a suc-
cess either, it seems that freedom does succeed in being able in fact not
to gamble as well as determining oneself not to wish to gamble.

To gamble is here not merely a possibility, for we are identified
with gambling in such a way that for the moment we are the temptation to
gamble. This is what prevents our resolve not to gamble from actually
succeeding. But we are also at the same time identified with the decision
not to gamble; hence the uncertainty when this decision is shaken in the
face of the temptation to gamble. As long as we are identified with the
desire to gamble, and as long as this identification is stronger than our
previous decision not to gamble, no matter how much we choose to carry
out our past decision we cannot do so; and even if we do we will not succeed in carrying it out for long. In fact there would be no reason why there should be any anguish at all when we try to choose between two possibilities, unless we were predisposed to both of them. Thus it seems to me that Sartre has included anguish already as part of the meaning of his notion of a possibility being our possibility.

Sartre might also say that we do not succeed in our particular choices, not because we do not choose, but because the choices go against our fundamental project (BN. 577), which itself we have freely chosen. But the notion of fundamental project itself needs justification. Although Sartre exhorts us to analyze further our explanation of human behavior in terms of propensities and desires, he offers the original choice as the ultimate irreducible factor that chains all other choices. He believes that the original choice itself has no explanation; there is no reason why we choose this fundamental project, we just choose it (BN, 586).

The choice of our being, even the original choice, is made for Sartre at the unreflective level. Sartre provides several examples of people actually making their original choices: Flaubert chose inferiority; Genet, who was caught stealing as a child, decided to adopt the role of a thief; and Baudelaire, abandoned by his mother at an early age, chose to be a "dandy" who acts as if he were always in front of a mirror. The above "choices" are commonly explained as due to certain hereditary factors, temperamental characteristics or the pressures of the circumstance
in which the choice was made. But for Sartre none of these would be the true explanation. According to Sartre, when someone calls us a thief, as in the case of Genet, we are pre-reflectively aware of ourselves not being a thief, and in the unity of the same act we constitute ourselves as a thief, which we are not, but which we choose to be. But how can we call this a choice if we do not know what other possibilities exist? Our ordinary notion of choice is choice between alternatives; but Sartre's notion equates choice with consciousness.

Sartre gives no answers to problems such as: why we choose one particular way of being as the fundamental project and not any other; why, although we are choosing all the time, we do not continually remake (change) our original choice; and, why we let our previous original choice determine all our subsequent choices, although such continual choosing would in no way contradict Sartre's fundamental tenets. In fact, the original choice seems a post facto explanation of how we seem to be able to exclude many possibilities as our possibilities and how it is that our behavior seems to be determined by some experiences or desires which we have formed early in our childhood, and at the same time maintain the total freedom and spontaneity that Sartre's system requires of consciousness.

The reason why Sartre wants to maintain choice as synonymous with consciousness is because the only philosophical alternatives he sees as possible are either one of being completely determined or one of being completely free. He does not regard consciousness as ever being passive.
or determined by external circumstances or forces, heredity or tempera-
ment, or by one's own past decisions and identifications. There is only
one reason why he would refuse to recognize such predispositions of the
individual or the pressures of the given situation as determining our
choice: that is his belief that consciousness cannot be anything, or be
determined by anything outside of itself.

3. Consciousness for Sartre must be completely free and un-
dertermined because it is always a nothingness. It seems, however, that
it is possible to grant that consciousness is a nothingness in relation to
the objects it is aware of without excluding the possibility that it is it-
self something at the same time. Sartre argues for the nothingness of
consciousness in three ways. I shall attempt to show that his argu-
ments are not sufficient to prove that consciousness is never anything,
in the sense of never being identified with an object.

Sartre's first argument says that consciousness is what it is not,
in the sense that consciousness can only be defined in terms of what it
is conscious of, that is, what it is not; and it is not what it is (consci-
ousness of an object), because it is (pre-reflectively) conscious of itself
as such. This argument only shows that conscious is not its object. It
does not show that consciousness might not itself be something else at
the same time, which it is not aware of.

There is a further explanation of "We are what we are not," namely,
we are our past, our essence, in the mode of not being it any more, and
we are our future possibilities in the mode of not being them yet. If
consciousness cannot be anything, then it is not clear how it can be something even in the mode of not being it. This seems to be a contradiction. If consciousness is conscious of itself, must flits imply that it is not itself? To answer this it seems Sartre would have to introduce the notion of degrees, and say that to the degree that we are conscious of ourselves we are not ourselves, and conversely, to the degree that we are not conscious of ourselves we are ourselves (either in the form of our past, or our future possibilities). However, this seems to go against his principle that consciousness is a nothingness.

Suppose we are conscious of ourselves, even at the pre-reflective level, and thus we are not what we are conscious of (i.e., ourselves). In this latter case, we have a consciousness which is separate from itself. If this were so, we can ask the further question whether this separation is not equivalent to consciousness positing itself as an object; and hence, we would be forced to maintain another pre-reflective cogito which is aware of this separation and a third which is aware of the separation in the second, and so on ad infinitum. It seems, however, possible, though Sartre does not acknowledge it, that explicit consciousness of something does involve its not being it, and an implicit awareness of such non-being, but this would not imply that consciousness at that moment is itself not something else, that is, not identified with something other than the object it is aware of-as, for example, a viewpoint from which it regards its object. By assuming that only explicit consciousness (i.e., positional consciousness) of an object involves
not-being the object, we can preserve what is true in Sartre's system and still account for its limitations.

Even supposing that we are explicitly aware of ourselves as being separate from what we are conscious of, how does it follow from this that we are independent of the object? It seems to me that here Sartre, is confusing awareness of something as separate from consciousness with consciousness being independent of it (i.e., not determined by it). There is no reason to equate these two except on the a priori assumption that consciousness cannot ever be influenced by anything outside of itself, which is precisely what Sartre needs to prove, independent of his thesis that consciousness is not its object.

Sartre's second argument for showing that consciousness is a nothingness is that in order for negative judgments and questions to be possible, consciousness must actively negate its object. This nihilation or producing nothingness, he argues, is possible only if consciousness itself is a nothingness and nihilates itself. Sartre claims that if consciousness were a something, it would not nihilate itself from the things which it is not; however, it is not clear why consciousness must be a nothingness in order to nihilate itself from its objects. A possible reason why Sartre believes so seems to be that if consciousness were a something, then when it is conscious of itself being conscious of something, as it is in the pre-reflective cogito, it must project itself outside of itself, and not be itself. This argument presupposes that there is such a separation or non-being of consciousness within itself. If this
assumption is true, then in every act of consciousness we have three entities, namely, the object which we are aware of, the consciousness which is conscious of the object and the consciousness which is conscious of this consciousness; thus consciousness is not its object and is also not itself. Aside from the absurdity in supposing that consciousness is not itself, this separation of consciousness would necessitate another pre-reflective cogito, and the latter a third and so on ad infinitum. Once again, the way out of this difficulty is to assume that even though consciousness is conscious of itself in the pre-reflective cogito, it does not involve its not being itself.

Supposing that consciousness can be something does not imply, as Sartre would have us believe, that consciousness is a material object; for there is no reason, but for Sartre's dichotomy of being-for-itself and being-in-itself, why consciousness cannot be identified with something, as a point of view through which it regards an object for example, and yet still be capable of negating itself as not being the object which it regards. There is also no reason why consciousness could not be something without being aware of itself as being something. I do not see any absurdity in the notion that consciousness is unconscious of its own identifications. If consciousness were not something, in the sense of its being identified with something at least sometimes, it would be hard to explain why, when our beliefs or attitudes are attacked, we feel we are attacked, or why when our desires conflict we feel we are in conflict. The fact that we are aware of our identifications only later
in pure reflection does not imply that we were not identified with something earlier. However, Sartre's phenomenological method does not allow us to infer from the evidence of such pure reflection that consciousness in fact was identified with something at the previous time. But there is no reason why the method should not allow such evidence but for Sartre's tenet that consciousness cannot ever be anything or be determined by anything.

The third argument that Sartre has for saying that consciousness is a nothingness is that in moments of anguish and pure reflection we are aware that we are as nothing, that we have always been a nothing, and that our essential nature is that we are a nothingness. Anguish is the awareness of ourselves as such a freedom and as a nihilating consciousness.

It seems to me that if we take pure reflection as a basis for saying that consciousness is a nothingness, we are going beyond the strictly given evidence, (that is, if we were to take Sartre's phenomenological method seriously), for pure reflection (or any experience) for Sartre can only make claims about what is given at the moment of that reflection, namely, that we are pure freedom at the moment, and not that we have always been free. If Sartre replies to this objection by saying that our awareness is that our essential nature is freedom, we can then ask him why it is just pure reflection which reveals our true nature and not any other kind of reflection. Why should the descriptions of pure reflection be given priority over other sorts of descriptions, except for
the preference Sartre has for the descriptions of pure reflection over the others? If the phenomenological method allows pure reflection to make claims about our past, then it should equally allow us to say that consciousness was something (viz., an ego) in the unreflective experience, because in reflection it becomes aware of itself as having been an ego in the past. This would have the consequence of forcing us to maintain that the self or the ego exists at the unreflective level, although we are aware of it only in reflection. Sartre's theory does not allow for the ego to exist at the unreflective level because, according to him, we have no right phenomenologically to attribute existence to the ego when we are not aware of it.

Furthermore, Sartre seems to equate our pure freedom and nothingness with anguish. However, anguish would only occur if we are aware of ourselves as the lack of our possibilities, or not being our essence any longer, that is, an awareness of ourselves as a relative nothingness. In Sartre's first argument he says that consciousness is not its object, and is therefore a relative nothingness; but he also needs to argue that consciousness is a substantive nothingness because he allows for an awareness of the "Transcendental Field of Consciousness" in pure reflection (TE, 93), and because in his second argument he says that in order for consciousness to be able to negate itself from its object it must itself be nothingness. He nowhere explicitly distinguishes these two senses of nothingness (relative and substantive), and indeed seems to confuse them, especially in his second and third arguments: for, if
consciousness is a substantive nothingness and use choice, there is
no reason for it to be in anguish when it becomes aware of this in pure
reflection. Anguish, as I argued above, arises only when we are aware
of ourselves as a lack of relation to a possibility or essence with which
we were already identified. There is no reason why we could not ques-
tion this anguish in pure reflection and become free from it as a result
of being unidentified with our possibilities or our essence. Then con-
sciousness becomes free from its perpetual flight from itself, surrenders,
as it were, to being a pure field of awareness, a substantive nothing-
ness that is itself, and becomes aware of itself being so.

Thus it seems to me that Sartre's arguments do not show that
consciousness is essentially a nothingness, a pure spontaneity, which
freely chooses what it does. Even if he could show this, his theory
would still have no adequate explanation as to why we sometimes are
successfully imprisoned by our own bad faith which results in impure re-
fection, and why at other times we break loose from it and attain pure
reflection. But if it is admitted that it is possible for consciousness to
be identified with something, then it needs to be explained how it is
given in our experience that consciousness is so identified, and how
this fact can explain that we do not attain pure reflection whenever we
do reflect, instead of being limited to impure reflection. I shall attempt
such explanations in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VII

Identification and Self-Knowledge

Introduction

It seems as if knowing oneself should be easier than knowing the world around one and other persons, for one has all the information he needs to know himself with him all the time, if he can only remember or reflect on that information. However, even if he does remember or reflect on the information, or if someone presents him with it, he often fails to recognize its bearing upon himself or distorts it to suit his own prejudices, interests and prestige. I shall try to show in this chapter how "absorption", which is the process through which "identification" takes place, and the resulting "identification" are responsible for a person not knowing himself and for distorting information about himself through impure reflection.

'Absorption' is the process in which one loses his sense of distinctness from the object which he is absorbed in, and becomes "identified" with it (or "conditioned" to it). When a person is involved in the experience of absorption he is unaware of himself, and only implicitly aware of his experience. 'Identification' is the coloring of one's consciousness--by his past experience of absorption through which he looks at the world and himself, and which causes him to respond to them positively or negatively. In short, identification is the point of
comparison or frame of reference from which consciousness perceives its objects. When one regards the world through an identification, he does not recognize the differences that might exist between the present object of his thinking or perception and the object of his past experience of absorption (or between the occurrence of an object in absorption and another subsequent occurrence of it). One could be identified with or absorbed in objects, persons and their behavioral patterns, experiences, feelings, emotions, beliefs, ideals or attitudes, all of which are hereafter referred to as 'objects'.

Identification, among other things, is also responsible for a person's illusory conception of himself as a permanent, continuing and substantive entity to which he attributes experiences, qualities and states. In impure reflection one distorts information concerning oneself which is not consistent with his illusory conception of himself, i.e. his self-image or ego. In impure reflection one also distorts what one is aware of in oneself by exaggerating, resisting or trying to suppress it.

I

Absorption

1. The world a person responds to is a world which is selected for his attention and response by him according to the values and concerns he has acquired in his past. He ignores or is not interested in objects which do not have a place in his scheme of things (have not impressed him in the past), and is either attracted or repelled to objects
which do relate to his background. The fact that one desires or
certain objects presupposes that he must have found them in an earlier
experience to be pleasant, satisfying and in general agreeable with his
background, or, painful, threatening and conflicting with his values and
past background. This reaction to objects presupposes an experience
of them in which no judgments are made about them—an experience in
which they are merely experienced. This occurs in absorption. Absorp-
tion is the process of assimilating or appropriating the world as our
world; that is, we acquire the colorings (identifications) that make us
look at and respond to the world as we in fact do.

A simple and pure case of absorption is fascination: when some-
thing extraordinary and unexpected happens to a person, such as a
child's involvement with a new toy, or a boy's first experience in the
snow, or when a person who has never watched a television is given the
opportunity to view one. In each of these cases there is a strange new
experience that envelops the person so that he loses sight of himself
and other objects that surround him. There is nothing in his past ex-
perience with which to judge the object; and he forgets for the moment
the time of the day and other things he had planned to do. In the sense
that he experiences the object without being aware of himself as dis-
inct from it. it is as if he is the object for the moment. To varying de-
rees he is implicitly aware of the experience of absorption and the
quality of the experience—whether it is pleasant or unpleasant.
There are three essential features for any case of absorption: the object is in the field of awareness; there is no explicit positing or judging of the object as such; and there is no awareness of oneself as distinct from the object of absorption. The following features may be obtained only in some cases of absorption and not in others (see below pp. 180-81): 1) "no awareness of the distinctions of time and space; 2) no awareness of the distinctions between what is real and what is only possible; 3) only an implicit awareness of the experience of absorption. The experience of absorption varies in degrees. The degree of absorption is defined in terms of the degree of lack of distractions. The quality of the experience of absorption, i.e., its being pleasant or unpleasant also varies in degrees. There is no response to the object of absorption even though one is drawn to an object or repelled by it. A response occurs only when he regards an object through an identification and explicitly judges it.

2. Although Sartre recognizes experiences of absorption, he misinterprets their features to make them consistent with his system:

   In fascination, which represents the immediate fact of knowing, the knower is absolutely nothing but a pure negation; he does not find or recover himself anywhere—he is not. The only qualification which he can support is that he is not precisely this particular fascinating object. In fascination there is nothing more than a gigantic object in a desert world. Yet the fascinated intuition is in no way a fusion with the object. In fact the condition necessary for the existence of fascination is that the object be raised in absolute relief on a background of emptiness; that, I am precisely the immediate negation of the object and nothing but that (BN, 216).

From this account it is, however, not clear how fascination is different from any other intentional awareness of an object. Sartre's description
of fascination comes close to mine, except that he asserts that in it there is an intentional awareness of the object, which judges the object as such, and an implicit awareness of oneself as a knower and as not being the object. There would not be any difference between the two accounts but for Sartre's insistence on the universal applicability of the principle of intent tonality which I deny occurs in absorption, as exemplified in fascination, I contend that in absorption we have a non-positional awareness of the object and that we do not have even an implicit awareness of ourselves as distinct from (as not being) the object of awareness.

My account of absorption also denies Sartre's functional notion of consciousness and asserts that consciousness is also substantive, especially when it is colored, in the sense that it responds to the world and itself through its identifications or background.* Such a consciousness is unaware of its background as the filter or conditioning through which it views the world, at least at the time when the filter is in operation.

Sartre might object to this notion of consciousness by saying that a consciousness which is not conscious of itself as being something is

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*Strictly speaking, Sartre requires both a functional and a substantive notion of consciousness, for, in his theory, consciousness is not merely an awareness of objects, but also itself a nothingness which negates itself as not being its object, that is, a nothingness which is capable of doing something. Sartre requires such a notion because he argues that consciousness is not capable of negating itself as not being its object without itself being a nothingness (see above pp. 146-48, 173-74).
an absurdity, because it would then be unconscious of itself (BN, lxi).
I, however, see no absurdity in this, because there is no reason why consciousness should not be aware of only its own activities and responses, but not be aware of the background through which it responds, especially at the time when it sees through its coloring,

3. Most cases of what appears to be absorption are not pure and simple, but mixtures of absorption and identification(s). I shall call these 'mixed absorptions'. Some common examples of mixed absorption are "imitative behavior" and daydreaming. An example of imitative behavior might be a person watching a play. The person is involved or absorbed in the life of the play, not distinguishing it from the actual time of the day and events occurring outside of the play. Within this absorption he most often identifies with one of the characters in the play; that is, he does not see himself as distinct from that character, but reacts to events and other characters in the play as he believes that character does. In other words, within the broad absorption of the play, there is first an absorption with one of the characters of the play, and consequently an identification with him. A more common example is that of a passenger in the front seat of a car who presses his foot to the floor to stop the car for the coming red light. Here the passenger is absorbed in the experience of driving and identified with the driver.

Another case of mixed absorption is daydreaming, which can include reminiscing on one's past experience (also aptly described as "reliving"), A person could daydream about a possible future situation
which he acts out as if it is happening now and be either pleased or unh- 
happy. The person is absorbed in the daydream; i.e., he is not ex-
plicitly aware of himself and other objects outside of the daydream. With-
in this absorption, however, there is an implicit awareness of himself, 
but, as the person he sees himself as in the future situation. This im-
lict self-awareness which occurs in most cases of mixed absorption 
is an awareness of oneself as identified with an object.

4. One might ask here why consciousness is absorbed in any 
object at all: whenever consciousness is aware of itself in reflection 
as a lack or emptiness (though the lack is only in relation to something) 
or is uncertain or anxious, it "looks outward" and "gets lost in" or "flies 
away toward" an object, and becomes absorbed in it, whether this be 
in fact or in thought. Absorption results from the attempt of conscious-
ness to escape its initially painful experience of emptiness by trying 
to become something. As Sartre would say in another context, conscious-
ness is a quest to be or become an in-itself while at the same time being 
 itself; that is, consciousness is a quest to be an in-itself-for-itself. 
Although this is generally true, it is not necessary that consciousness 
be such. It can be freed, through pure reflection, from this need to es-
cape from itself (see chapter VIII).

Given the above nature of consciousness, one can further ask 
why consciousness is absorbed in one particular object rather than an-
other. Consciousness never explicitly and without grounds chooses or 
selects an object for absorption. Some objects have inherent characteristics

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which compel the attention of consciousness (e.g., a fire, snake, waterfall, or a sunset—either by drawing it toward them or by threatening it. Other determining factors depend on a person's predisposition, i.e., both his actual physiological and temperamental condition and his past conditioning (identifications), including what he considers to be his present physiological and psychological needs. These same factors also determine the degree of absorption, i.e., the condition of whether there are other conflicting identifications distracting a person's mind.

Even though a person's past conditioning selects an object for absorption, consciousness is passive during absorption; i.e., its past identifications do not explicitly judge the object as such. It becomes active only when past identifications operate on and judge a given object. Before it becomes absorbed in an object, its past identifications and present predisposition can tentatively select an object for absorption, although consciousness does not know the true nature of the object of absorption until it later judges it explicitly as such.

II

Identification

1. The process of absorption results not only in our positively or negatively responding* to objects, but also in our being identified with

* Hereafter I shall employ 'desire' and 'fear' as paradigms of positive and negative response.

the objects in the sense that our experience of them in absorption acts as the filter or conditioning through which we subsequently view present
objects and experiences, if we reflect on ourselves looking at things with various attitudes, beliefs, desires and fears, we have no awareness of ourselves as distinct from these attitudes. It is as if we were these attitudes, beliefs, fears and desires. If it were not for the fact that we were in some sense these attitudes (filters) there is no reason why when some of these strongly cherished beliefs or attitudes are attacked or questioned, or when our desires are frustrated, we should feel that we are attacked, that we are frustrated, or that we are questioned. Similarly, in circumstances of a conflict between our identifications we do not merely say that our ideals are in conflict, but that we are in conflict. It is in this sense that we are our objects of our desire after the process of absorption. Or else it is hard to explain why after the process of absorption we should still be attached to the object which has given us satisfaction before. Similarly, there is no reason, after the initial process of absorption, why we should still be afraid of an object which threatened us earlier. In part, self-knowledge is of our identifications and how they determine our responses.

2. In a very basic sense, at any time a person is the identification or identifications through which he views and responds to himself and the world around him. In this sense, each of a person's identifications might be said to be his ego. But, since a person views the world through different identifications at different times, and since these identifications are organized in the form of a hierarchy around one or more basic identifications, and also since we regard a person as unitary,
it is more appropriate to consider the person's self as the system of identifications which influence his perception of and response to objects. The system of identifications determines not only what sort of object one will become absorbed in and later desire or fear, but whether that response will be one of desire or fear. The system of identifications is a hierarchy consisting of one or more absolutely basic identifications around which more superficial identifications are organized into sub-systems (or one system, if there is only one basic identification). The superficial identifications are connected with each other and with the basic identifications in terms of their agreeing or conflicting with each other, and in terms of the more basic identifications "determining" the more superficial ones, as I shall presently explain below.

Identifications "agree" with one another if they, as objects of desire, can be realized simultaneously, or, if achieving one of them supports the achievement of the other, either by being the means or a reason or an additional reason for the other. For example, my patriotism to my country is enhanced in strength if I see that some of my patriotic actions could also increase my wealth, and, my desire to gain wealth is strengthened if I construe my being wealthy as a result of my being patriotic. Conversely, identifications 'conflict' if they do not support each other (in the sense described above), and cannot be achieved simultaneously.

An identification is more 'basic' than another if 1) it, as an object of desire, happens to be the reason in the person's mind for the
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other, which he also desires; 2) the other is seen as a means to it;
3) it is stronger than the other because it is preferred over the other;
4) or it is, in the person's mind, prior to the other for other reasons
such as immediacy. It is thus that the more basic identifications
'determine' the more superficial identifications. An identification which
is more basic in one context may become less basic in another unless
it is an absolutely basic identification, which I shall call 'fundamental'
identification.

In the hierarchical system of a person's identifications there
are usually one or more fundamental identifications which determine
the rest of his identifications. Some of these are common to a whole
culture, while others differ from one individual to another even in the
same culture. There are perhaps also a few common to the whole of
humanity. Examples of some fundamental identifications are: to main-
tain an image of oneself as a "good person" in one's own eyes and in
the eyes of those whose judgment he cares for; to possess things and
persons (assert one's physical or mental dominion over them); to be
needed by others; i.e., to feel that one is useful to them; and to lead
what is considered the "good life" -ranging from playing poker, taking
drugs, drinking alcohol, eating good food, or having a good sex life
to engaging in artistic, scientific, metaphysical or social pursuits.

A person's system of identifications is integrated if the various
superficial identifications are connected in the person's mind with the
fundamental ones; any conflicts between superficial identifications
have been resolved by relating them to his fundamental identifications; the conflicts which have occurred so far between his fundamental identifications have been resolved (by being placed in a hierarchy), and he is somewhat consistent in such resolutions; and, if he would not have any great difficulty in resolving future conflicts within his system. Integration is a matter of degree ranging from the most perfectly integrated individual to the least integrated child who moves as it were "from moment to moment," Between these two extremes, we have more or less "dissociated" individuals with fairly integrated subsystems which, however, as in split personalities, are not integrated with each other.

3. From this theory of systematized identifications it can be shown that what is considered to be a person's "free choice" between different equally attractive objects, goals or courses of action is not without basis. The choice is often made by calculating the consequences of preferring one object over the other, i.e., by determining whether the objects agree with his more basic (or fundamental) identifications.

A person is in a dilemma when after his calculations he cannot find at the moment a deciding factor. The problem of choosing may also reach the level of fundamental identifications. Although a person may temporarily change the priorities of fundamental identifications, it is rare that one relinquishes them except in pure reflection.

The notion of fundamental identification mentioned above is similar to Sartre's notion of original choice. Both notions provide a basis on which all of a person's particular choices are made; but
original choice is made without basis or reason, while fundamental identification is acquired through absorption, Sartre believes that nothing outside of consciousness can determine its choice, but I have tried to show how it is that consciousness is determined in absorption by various hereditary and environmental influences. To this degree even a person’s original choice is made on the basis of these influences, and hence is not entirely free.

4. A person’s system of identifications forms his ego. In actuality, there may or may not be anything in common between the different fundamental identifications except the unity of consciousness which they color. However, our common sense conception of the ego (formed only in impure reflection) is that of a substantive, permanent entity, a psychological center of experiences, continuing through time, accumulating experiences on its way, causing its states and qualities (in the sense of Sartre, see above, pp. 151-52). This misconception is formed and perpetrated not only by the continuous implicit awareness we have of our body, and our awareness of the similarity and constancy of the responses (caused by our strongly held identifications) that we make to objects on different occasions, but also by our awareness in impure reflection (defined on p. 196 below) of ourselves (our ego) as that which makes the responses. The fact that each of the fundamental or more basic identifications tends to perpetuate itself and gather experiences and identifications agreeable to it, and resist contrary or opposing experiences and identifications is interpreted by us in reflection as the
prestige of the ego, its craving for permanence and continuity through time, and self-preservation. Furthermore, the awareness of the constancy and similarity of our responses also causes us to assume that there are some states and qualities which produced such responses.

The common sense conception of "self" is that it has a past, a present and a future. This self-image is a constant tension between what a person considers to be his past, his present and his future. He is aware of his past achievements or failures, experiences, feelings and so on in impure reflection (through his identifications); and if they agree with or reinforce his identifications he attributes them to his "self" as being due to his states, attributes or potencies. In his very reflecting he finds that he is no longer his achievements, since he is aware of himself as having been them. Thus he desires to perpetuate, reproduce or enhance them in the future (or avoid them if they are failures). The future then means to him all the things he must maintain, new achievements he wants to make, and failures from his past that he wishes to make up for or avoid. He considers the present only in relation to his past, as himself no longer being it (and thus missing the pleasing elements and feeling relieved at the passing away of the painful elements in it), or, in relation to his future, as not being it yet, as a lack of its possibilities.

The common sense conception of the ego is real to the extent that it recognizes the constancy, similarity and repetition of responses caused by one's strongly held identifications as part of the notion of "self." It is illusory in that the ego one is indirectly aware of in impure, reflection is
interpreted not merely as *that which* causes the responses or has the experiences one is aware of, but as a unitary psychological center for all of one's responses,, as the cause of all of one's states, qualities and experiences; in short, as a substance. In reality the ego is the system of identifications which a person is identified with. The error of not distinguishing the object of one's absorption in the form of one's coloring with another occurrence of the same object (it is an error because the object might have changed between the two occurrences) or a different object of the same sort, which one responds to later, has already taken place when one is identified with an object. One's assumption that his particular feelings, actions, thoughts and experiences are the result of his permanent states and qualities, which are in turn caused by a substantive ego, is only a consequence of such an error.

5. It is appropriate here to mention briefly what it is for a person to become less identified or to be unidentified with an object. If an object of absorption, even when later perceived through an identification with it, is not positively or negatively reinforcing (i.e., rewarding or painful) on repeated occurrences, whether in fact or in thought, or if it is overshadowed by other objects which are more strongly reinforcing at the same time, then we become less strongly identified with it, at least temporarily, or become unidentified with it. We are unidentified with an object if we can look at it non-selectively, and passively, that is, without selecting certain features of it to become absorbed in and subsequently respond to either positively or negatively through an identification.
with itself or another object. That is, when we are unidentified with an object, we have no positive or negative, attitude to it, we can consider it as not making any difference to us. If the object is a belief or attitude, we can freely and unbiasedly consider it for its own merit. If it is our own responses or previous identifications we can observe them dispassionately and learn their nature and relationship to the identification which caused them or other identifications. As a general rule, one becomes unidentified with objects in the process of pure reflection.

IV

Responses

1. Identification with objects not only affects our perception of the world and ourselves, but also causes us to respond to them positively or negatively. In the following I shall use 'desire' and 'fear' as paradigms of positive and negative responses. A positive response is in general a pro-attitude we take to objects, such as approaching, desiring and approving. A negative response is generally a con-attitude such as fearing, avoiding, and condemning.

Consciousness actively selects those objects from the environment which accord with its past identifications, judges them as attractive and responds to them with a positive attitude; or it selects those objects which conflict with its past identifications or threatens them, judges them as repulsive and attempts to avoid them; or if the objects have no bearing on its past identifications, it pays no attention to them
at all, or actively ignores them by judging them us being of no conse-
quence.

To regard a new object of the same kind as the object of absorp-
tion or a new occurrence of the latter from the point of view of its pre-
vious experience of absorption is to constitute it as attractive or repul-
sive. Undoubtedly the quality of the experience of absorption, viz. ,
whether it was pleasant or unpleasant determines if we respond to the-
new object positively or negatively. We may not, however, be explicitly
aware of, through reflection, the quality of our past experience, although
this does at times occur. We are only aware of the new objects as attrac-
tive or repulsive, as desirable or something to be avoided.

2. When we desire or fear objects, we are identified with the
coloring through which we regard and respond to them, and are not, at
least at that moment, even implicitly aware of the coloring itself. We are
explicitly aware of the objects and judge them as such. We have an im-
plicit awareness of ourselves as a lack (in the case of desire) of the
objects, or as being threatened by them (in the case of fear). There is,
however, no awareness of oneself as distinct from our desire or fear,
because we are absorbed in them and have only an implicit awareness
of our desire or fear.

3. Although the object of absorption is unique, our later positive
or negative response is to objects as members of a class of which the ob-
ject of absorption is also a member. We desire or fear whatever reminds
us of the original object of absorption or to whatever we see as the "same."
This occurs because we become identified with objects in absorption not so much for themselves as for certain of their features which are positively or negatively reinforcing, although we become explicitly aware of these features only when we think about the object.

A way in which we may desire or fear a new object is through its association with another object with which we have already been identified, although we may be only implicitly aware of such a connection. Thus, for example, we take a negative attitude toward the friend of an enemy, or a positive attitude toward the friend of a friend. We may also become identified with a new object because it is connected in our mind as a means to satisfying another object with which we are already identified. Thus, we may prefer a new object to another because it serves some purpose with which we are positively identified, which the other does not. Then, my previous identification is the reason for preferring this new object, even though I may not be explicitly conscious of this reason.

4. Responses vary both in kind and in strength. Positive and negative responses take any of the following forms depending on the kind of object one responds to. If the object of response is a person or a thing the appropriate response (to mention only the positive responses) is desiring, acquiring, possessing, admiration for or wanting to become like the person, imitating his behavior or acquiring his skills and so on. If it is a place, one wants to visit it, live there, take pictures of it or own it. If it is a position or role (such as that of a teacher) one would wish
to be in that role. If it is an experience one attempts to recreate the circumstances in which he can have a similar experience or a different experience but still in the broad category of the original experience. The proper positive attitude to beliefs or attitudes is approval, defense, and so on.

Positive and negative responses also vary in strength. The strength of a response, to speak of positive responses alone, may range from considering the object (say, the role of a father) as oneself, or as necessary for one's survival, welfare and happiness, to a mere verbal support for or agreement with the object (say, another person's statement). Of course, one could also merely hypothetically consider something, or take a favorable or unfavorable attitude to something "for the sake of argument". Then, either one is positively identified with adopting such a "hypothetical attitude" itself, or one is not yet identified with the object and is still in the process of deciding which attitude he would like to take toward it by calculating its consequences and seeing if it agrees or conflicts with his more basic or fundamental identifications.

Responses vary in strength and quality (valence, i.e., their being positive or negative) depending in part on: 1) the initial attractiveness of the object at the time of absorption; 2) the kind of object it is; 3) the degree of absorption; 4) the quality of experience achieved in absorption; and 5) the agreement or conflict of the object with other identifications, especially the more basic ones. To amplify on the
last factor, a response may greatly increase in strength if it is connected in a person’s mind with more and more agreeing identifications, especially the more basic ones, and fewer and fewer conflicting identifications. A person’s responses are strongest when he is obsessed with their object, or when he ignores everything else in favor of (or at the expense of, if it happens to be a negative response) their object.

Furthermore, a person’s responses to an object become increasingly stronger as he finds the achievement of or thinking about the object more and more reinforcing. The reason for this lies in the fact that when one achieves an object, reflects on one's achievement and derives satisfaction from it, he is absorbed in his achievement. Thus he becomes positively identified with it, and tends to wish to achieve the same object again and this time even more strongly than before.

There is another factor which influences the strength or weakness of responses. There may be more than one identification operating on our perception of an object at the same time. This results in either an increase of the strength of the response (if the identifications agree with each other) or a dilemma (when a positive and a negative identification operate on the same object, and, as it were, cancel each other, or when the desire for the present object conflicts with the desire for another object). For example, a movie looks attractive to me, and the fact that a friend of mine told me that it is a good movie makes it look more attractive. Or, I am unable to decide between going to a movie or spending my time with a friend at his home, to both of which alternatives I am
equally attracted. Or, I am deterred from smoking by an equally strong fear that cigarette smoking might bring lung cancer. In the last case, the conflict might result in a reflection on my desire to smoke from the point of view of the fear of cancer; and I may consequently condemn my desire and suppress it. Or, I might reflect on my fear of cancer in turn from the point of view of my desire to smoke, brush it away as not serious and continue to smoke or decide to free myself from the habit of smoking in the future.

V

Impure Reflection

Consciousness has a tendency to make itself an object to itself. This tendency manifests itself in reflection. Some occasions for such reflection are: when one's previous desire or fear is intense; when there is a delay or frustration in achieving the object of one's desire or avoiding the object of one's fear; when one wants to be sure of his previous response; or, when one is questioned as to the motives for his actions.

I divide reflection into pure and impure reflection. Pure reflection is reflection on a state, experience or response (referred to together as 'response') in which one was previously absorbed (and therefore only implicitly aware of at the time of absorption), without the coloring of one's past experiences, i.e., without one's identifications. In other words, pure reflection is reflection on one's identifications and the resultant responses without the means of further identifications. I shall
discuss pure reflection in depth in chapter VIII. Impure reflection is being explicitly aware of one's previous responses or identifications by means, or from the point of view, of an identification.

Since impure reflection occurs by means of an identification, in it there is a response to what is rejected on and only an implicit awareness of that response. This response in turn can become a coloring for a future consciousness. If the object of reflection is a previous response, the response we make to it in reflection I shall call a 'second level response'. Thus the previous response, which was not reflected on before, but which now becomes the object of the second level response in reflection would be the 'first level response'.

There can be both 'simple' and 'complex' second level responses. If the response is regarded in impure reflection through the same identification which caused it, the response is a 'simple' second level response; if it is regarded through another identification, it is a 'complex' second level response. In the former one reflects, for example, on his desire for an object through his identification with that object, and responds by approving his desire, or by feeling justified in his desire. "What he thus approves (i.e., his desire) he attributes to himself and considers it as an attribute of his "self" or ego. In the latter, i.e., in a complex second level response, one reflects on a previous response of desire through another identification, such as with what "good" people are "supposed" to desire, and responds by perhaps approving his desire or condemning it. Such a response results from his judging his desire from
another frame of reference or identification. Here, the person is only implicitly aware of his second level response and not aware of himself as distinct from it. It is as if he is the guilt or approval (the second level response). The experience of the second level response he is now absorbed in may in turn become the identification through which he reflects on the same or another response, or through which he regards another object, without his ever seeing the true nature of the desire that he originally reflected on. The person reflects on his previous desire, and hence knows that he has it, but that is all.

There are two sources of error due to impure reflection: 1) Since in impure reflection one does not regard his previous response purely as itself, but colors or distorts his perception of it through an identification, he does not know the true nature of the response that he reflects on. For example, if one reflects on his anger through a standard which says he should not feel angry, he responds by feeling guilty, that is, he resists his anger by feeling guilty and thus exaggerates the quality of his anger and does not see it as it is.

2) The second source of error in impure reflection consists in attributing what one reflects on to a substantive ego, as if there is such an entity apart from one's experiences and responses. The two errors which occur in impure reflection result, on the one hand, from the nature of identification itself, which prevents one from distinguishing the object of one's (second level) response from the object of the previous absorption which colors one's present perception, and on the other hand,
from the explicit consciousness of oneself in reflection, which is interpreted as the ego which desires and fears.

Since impure reflection involves an absorption with one's response, and an identification through which one responds to what one reflects on, there is, besides the above two-fold error, a two-fold ignorance. 1) One is not, at the moment of reflection, explicitly aware of (and hence does not know) one's response to what he reflects on; and 2) one is totally ignorant, at the time of his impure reflection, of the identification through which he responds. These errors and ignorance are totally removed only in pure reflection.
CHAPTER VIII

Pure Reflection and Self-Knowledge

In chapter VII, I have tried to explain how identification is responsible for a person's impure reflection in the sense that impure reflection is reflection on oneself through one's identifications. Impure reflection can and does give one superficial knowledge about what he is engaged in at the moment, but it is not sufficient to give one complete and accurate knowledge of himself. In impure reflection one distorts or modifies the facts he is aware of in himself (his experiences, responses or identifications) to suit his conception of himself, i.e., his self-image. Thus impure reflection does not reveal to one the true nature of the phenomena which it reflects upon or their causes and sources, or the true motives for his actions. The shortcomings due to impure reflection can be overcome only by a clear knowledge, of (and the resulting freedom from one's identifications, especially the most fundamental ones. Such a knowledge can itself be obtained only by reflection on oneself, although this reflection must be free from biases due to identifications. Such a reflection is pure reflection. Pure reflection is reflection on one's experiences, responses and identifications without the means of further identifications and with the motive*

*It is doubtful whether such an intention can be called a motive, for the person is not looking for something to be gained out of the inquiry.
of merely learning about oneself.

A question arises here as to how it is possible for a person to purely reflect on himself, when he himself is constituted by his system of identifications. It is true that it rarely occurs to a person to reflect purely on his identifications, especially his basic ones. If a person is integrated, he solves his emotional problems* with the help of his fundamental mental identifications, and resolves the conflicts he faces between his fundamental identifications by placing them in a hierarchy. In this he is not necessarily explicitly aware of the fact that he has these fundamental identifications; he still lives and acts through them. A person may also be reasonably "well adjusted" in a culture when he takes for granted and is satisfied with the solutions and escapes* that are offered to him by his culture. But there are situations in life in which satisfaction of one's fundamental identifications is frustrated to such a degree that the solutions that are offered by the culture do not solve his problems, or the escapes do not help him forget them. In such circumstances the person has usually no choice except to reject the escapes and fall back upon himself and attempt to understand the causes and sources of his problems

*Any psychological situation of a person which he considers as his problem and suffers from is an emotional problem for him.

*An escape is any device which a person uses to avoid facing his problem for to try to "forget" his problem, and which might temporarily alleviate the suffering generated by the problem. Examples of escapes are entertainment, achievement, habits that blunt one's sensitivity and suicide.
by "questioning"* himself. Questioning is a very painful process be-
*See below p. 207 for explanation.
cause it involves separating oneself (i.e., one's identifications) from oneself (his consciousness which has been conditioned by them) so that one becomes aware of these identifications as mere objects. The process of questioning and the consequent awareness of one's fundamental identifications occur in pure reflection.

The knowledge which is thus obtained falls under sense two of self-knowledge described in chapter I (see above pp. 6-7), although the statements expressing such self-knowledge (e.g., "I am aware that I have all along been identified with being loved by someone as the most necessary condition for my being happy") still fall under the list of self-knowledge statements mentioned in chapter II. The sentences and questions in the account given by the woman in chapter II are part of the process of pure reflection; although they do not themselves constitute knowledge, they are part of the process of self-inquiry through which one obtains self-knowledge.

2. The distinction between impure and pure reflection can be further shown in examples. Impure reflection can tell one, for example, that he is now depressed. If he reflected impurly on the reasons for his depression, he might come to think that it is due to the fact that the woman with whom he was having an affair decided to end it. But impure reflection does not tell him why he should suffer if the relationship
has ended, or why he, is still attached to this woman, or for that mutter, why it is that he feels he needs to have a female companion at all.

To consider another example, a student who has been unsuccessful in his grades resents the school he attends, his teachers, and the whole system of education in general. In impure reflection he is aware of his resentment, but attributes it to the fact that the school system makes one into an object by grading his performance, or that the teachers exercise their authority over him merely for their own pleasure, or that they are prejudiced in the evaluation of his performance. If someone were to try to persuade him about the reasons why a student's performance has to be evaluated, or about the fact that the teachers have no special reason to be particularly prejudicial toward him, he would not admit these reasons as facts; on the contrary, he would defend himself against the other person and might even consider him as his enemy. He would adhere to his theory about his resentment, and perhaps would make it more sophisticated in order to better defend it from these challenges. But he would not admit the fact that it was the deficiency in his own performance which caused him to receive low grades, and it is the fact that he is bitter about his low grades which made the school, his teachers and the system of education in general look blameworthy to him; for to admit this would be detrimental to his prestige, in particular to the self-image he has concerning his intelligence, abilities and personal worth. This is not to deny that, "objectively" speaking, the system of education, his teachers or their grading may in fact be deficient; but it is
unlikely that they are wholly at fault. The error of the person lies in ignoring the real cause for his resentment. For, if the person were doing well in terms of grades, he would not have any objections to the system; and even if he did have objections, his response to the system would not be one of personal resentment against his teachers or school.

In the first example, the person would not ordinarily be prompted to look into the real causes for or nature of his depression or resentment, unless he was forced to do so for some reason or other, as for instance, if he fails to rid himself of his depression by various means such as trying to succeed in his scholastic or athletic performance, or by believing that he will meet a more suitable woman, and so on. In the case of the person resenting his school, he is not likely to examine the real reasons for his resentment unless the resentment itself becomes an emotional problem for him; that is, unless his resentment can only be maintained at great cost to himself, such as being forced to quit school, when he is not prepared to do so.

Pure reflection, if used in the first case, would inform the person that there is no reason why he must continue to have a relationship with this woman or any woman for that matter; why he could not remain alone without depending on others emotionally for his happiness except for the fact that he was identified with women in general and with this woman in particular; and why he should be depressed except for the fact that his anticipations based on these identifications have been frustrated. He would learn that the cause of his depression is not as much the woman
ending her relationship with him as his own dependency on her and expectations based on such a dependency. He thus would learn to separate in his mind his identification with the woman from the actual woman herself by beginning to ask why he needs the satisfaction or pleasure which he received from her. This would make his previous absorption with the woman into an object of pure reflection. He would thereby dissociate himself from the identification with her. He would also realize that he is lonely or depressed only in relation to an object which he desires and which he now lacks; and that the object which gave him satisfaction yesterday need not continue to do so today, except for his expectation that it must do so, and his subsequent fear that it may in fact not do so. Thus he would be ready to look at the woman just as she is, and not as a source of his happiness (or misery). When he is able to look at the source of his depression in this way without any identification with the woman, then the depression itself will disappear; for now he is able to look upon, in pure reflection, his identification with the woman as himself having been but is no longer, and the woman herself as someone with whom he once was identified but is no longer.

Similarly, in the second example, the person would realize in pure reflection that it was his deficiency in particular performances which made him feel bitter toward the school and his teachers, that this deficiency in his performance does not mean that he is a deficient person, and that even if he does not succeed in school, he can still live in this world and find some means of livelihood at which he can be successful.
In both cases such pure reflection provides complete and accurate knowledge of one's depression or resentment; in the first case that the depression is a result of the person's anticipations (which are themselves a result of his identification with the woman) being frustrated; and in the second case, that it is the person's identification with success in school, the consequent negative response (or fear) of failure and of being considered worthless by others, which prevented him from recognizing his own deficiencies in performance, and his subsequent projection of his failure on to the school and his teachers.

Thus, in impure reflection one is aware of whatever he is involved in at the moment, but since one's awareness is colored by identification with the same or a different object, he either thinks that his problems are caused by the "world" or are due to his states and qualities; he does not think that his problems are caused by his identification with an object. In this way, one exaggerates, distorts, resists or suppresses what he reflects on in impure reflection, and hence he does not have an accurate and complete knowledge of himself. This in turn is due to the fact that he does not separate himself from the object of his identification, nor does he distinguish the object of identification from the actual object itself. In pure reflection a person corrects these errors. He becomes explicitly aware of not only his superficial but also his basic identifications relevant to the problem on hand, not through the same or other identifications, but as themselves, as separate from himself. The relationship between his problem and his identifications becomes clear. The person
realizes that his states and qualities, which he mistakenly attributed earlier to his ego, are nothing but the constant, continuing and repeated reactions of his identifications to the things in the world and his own experiences and responses. He also realizes that his identifications, and not the "world", are responsible for his problem. Thus one obtains a complete and accurate knowledge about himself, especially concerning that aspect of him which he reflects on: as he is now free from the identifications which were responsible for the particular problem he was confronting, he is now free to look at his defects and motives without the need to justify, resist, distort or suppress them. Such a way of seeing the objectification of his identifications.

3. Pure reflection, or self-inquiry, is a process which involves several stages. The first stage in the process begins when a person sees that his attempts to escape and superficially deal with his problem through sublimation, justification or condemnation of himself, blaming the "world" and so on have not solved his problem. He then realizes that the problem cannot be basically solved by anything outside of itself or through any attempts to escape from the pain caused by the problem, and that it can be solved only by a true knowledge of the problem in terms of its causes and sources. Thus, he turns his attention toward a dispassionate study of the problem itself, without resisting it or being eager to solve it. The person begins his inquiry with the preparatory attitude of not placing his attention on the outcome of the inquiry. He is willing to accept the outcome of his inquiry—whether "good" or "bad"—without any resistance.
And he has the same preparatory attitude toward any resistance which he might in fact exhibit at any point in the course of the inquiry.

The second stage in the process of self-inquiry consists in the 'questioning' of one's problem (e.g., a conflict, a frustration, or an emotional state) or pondering on it with a view to finding its causes or sources, and with a hypothesis in view as to the probable causes or sources. One derives this hypothesis from one's own past experience or from suggestions of others. One observes various examples of one's actions, moods or emotions, thoughts and experiences relevant to the problem on hand, and tries to discover what is their common source or origin. Then he tries to explain them with the given hypothesis, and if he succeeds, then he is able to see that all the instances he has observed are manifestations of the same cause or source.

When one has thus discovered the causes of his problem, the next stage in pure reflection is for one to begin to 'question' the cause or source itself. For instance, if one discovers that the cause of his problem is a desire for some object—such as in the first of the above examples, the person's desire for the woman—then he may ask why he needs to depend on it for his happiness or survival, and he sees that this object is not really necessary to his well-being or survival. Conversely, if one discovers that the cause of his problem is the fear of some object, then he begins by asking why he should be afraid of this particular object. If the fear is a fear of losing something, as for example his prestige or respectability, then he would again ask why he
is so afraid of losing these objects, and why he cannot live without them. To ask oneself these questions seriously is to confront them without being identified with them. Then one is able to confront his past pleasure or pain, this being the original experience of absorption, and see them for what they are, viz. , as merely past experiences, which one no longer has. This dissociation of oneself from the original experience of absorption (especially its quality of being pleasant or painful), and from the object of absorption, also separates, in the person's mind, the original past object of identification from any actual object in the world, such that he no longer projects his past identification to a present object. In such an experience of objectification of one's identification one is aware of his experience of absorption and its object as merely objects, which he has been and is no longer, and which he does not have to seek (if it is an object of desire), or which he does not have to escape from (if it is an object of fear). One realizes that he could live without having to seek any object of desire. He becomes free from the fear of an object by "experiencing" the loss of whatever it threatens in him, such as his prestige, his relationship with others, his limbs, body, property or even his life. One sees the connections between the original identification with the object and his problem, and sees how his problem is a necessary consequence of these identifications conflicting with what he perceives through them as facts contrary to them, or with his own experiences or responses, or with other identifications. Then he is not only free from his problem but also free from the identifications which were
In the last stage of pure reflection a parson "experiences" his own "nothingness", not merely a relative nothingness (as a lack) in relation to the objects of desire, but an experience in which he sees himself as being nothing, as an undetermined, pure and spontaneous awareness. The experience could also be described as pure awareness being aware of itself. This experience may be only momentary, especially at first, and may "collapse" into a body awareness or an awareness of the objects in the world without identifications, until another absorption takes place or an identification from his past becomes active once again by coloring his present consciousness. The objectification of identification could not have occurred without the person learning not to resist the feeling of (relative) nothingness (i.e., anguish) which he initially experiences when he questions his desires. Since he has become at least momentarily free from being identified with the object, he is able to look at actual objects merely as things, as if they no longer made any difference to him. At least temporarily he is able to govern his actions mainly on the basis of whatever he construes to be his actual needs or the needs of the situation at hand.* Since his ego is ultimately rooted in identification, not only his awareness of his ego, but the ego itself and his conception of his ego (the self-image) disappear temporarily, until some other

* I am of course assuming here that there are such objective necessities arising out of situations, which are perhaps necessary for one's survival and which might constitute what could be called "objective morality".
identification manifests itself from his past, or until he becomes identified with another object. From such an experience, the person also acquires an objective attitude toward himself which he then can use in the investigation of his other problems, if he so wishes.

4. The process of questioning in which a person separates his identifications from himself by objectification is a very painful process. This explains why most people are never able to confront their problems directly in pure reflection; even when they are advised by others to do so, or even when they "wish" to do so, their attempts at self-knowledge usually result only in impure reflection. It is only when all escapes from one's problems fail that one sees no alternative except to turn directly toward the problems themselves by confronting them through pure reflection, although such a condition is not necessary for acquiring self-knowledge. Once a person has purely reflected, however, pure reflection tends to be self-perpetuating, generating further and instantaneous pure reflection, even on one's impure reflection of a moment ago. It encompasses wider and wider areas of life, because it generates an interest in knowing oneself. For example, one understands how he tends to project his own identifications on to the world or himself; how, because of this, he desires the things in the world or avoids them, makes expectations, demands, and criticisms on himself and consequently praises or condemns himself; and how certain basic identifications like property, possession of persons, power or superiority over others, and acceptance or admirations by others are at the root of many of his problems. And he sees
similar motives at work in others as well. Thus one comes to an understanding of some basic identifications which operate in his culture as well as some which are common to the whole of humanity, and which are usually referred to by the term "human nature". This knowledge helps one in turn to formulate hypotheses as to the causes or sources of further problems which he or others might confront.

5. **Tests for self-knowledge**: The mere fact that a person thinks that he is free from his problems does not guarantee that he is in fact free from them, or that he has complete and accurate self-knowledge pertaining to his problems, or that he has even acquired an objective attitude toward himself; for he could be successfully, although temporarily, escaping from his problems by thinking he has solved them. But if a person does not have accurate and complete self-knowledge relevant to a certain problem, it is doubtful whether he ever will solve his problem in a fundamental way or in the long run. And conversely, if a person is maladjusted, and has not solved his problems basically, then it is doubtful if he has acquired adequate self-knowledge.

Even supposing one has acquired adequate self-knowledge concerning a problem of his, and shows in general an objective attitude toward himself, his account of himself may not agree with another person’s apparently impartial account. The conflict between the two accounts may either be due, to a disagreement about facts, which can frequently be settled by appeal to further observation, or it may be due to a conceptual dispute.
For another person to judge that a person has self-knowledge in general, it is ordinarily sufficient if the latter freely admits any faults he might have, and confesses his motives, even though these admissions and confessions may be damaging to his prestige, if he seems well-adjusted, if he seems to have adequately dealt with some of his major problems, and if he appears to have a "good" insight into human nature. But in any particular case, if the person does not admit an alleged motive, it does not necessarily mean that he does not have an accurate and adequate knowledge concerning this particular motive. It may be that the other person who alleges that this person's actions derive from a certain motive or intention does not in fact possess all the information about the person necessary to make an accurate judgment.

Disputes about such questions are frequently settled by observing further behavior of the person. For example, a person who is free from an identification with property may act purely out of a motive of generosity or of helping someone, when he gives him liberal sums of money when the other person needs it. But other persons watching him do so may interpret that he has done so in order to gain something from the other person. If, for instance, the person is generous as a practice, even when in a reasonable period of time he does not receive anything in return, or does not seem to care whether or not the other person ever shows gratitude, then in all probability he has given the money purely out of generosity. But if he goes to extremes in order to prove his generous intentions, or if he does things contrary to such intentions when he
thinks he is not being observed, then others would have reason to sus-
pect his motives. However, if he does not try to prove himself, it does
not necessarily moan that his motives are selfless, but only that for
some reason or other he does not care to prove his motives one way or
another. If the act is a single occurrence, and there are no further
demonstrations of the person's behavior from which to judge, then in
case of a dispute, only the person himself knows his actual motives,
and consequently his word must be taken over that of others.

There is, however, another way in which a difficulty (this time,
a conceptual dispute) may arise in the resolution of the conflict. Other
persons may not agree that a person does something out of a purely self-
less generosity or kindness, because they do not believe that. a human
being can ever do anything from a selfless motive. They believe that
this would be impossible, and that everything a human being ever does
is for his own self-interest, interpreting this. to mean that even when a
person appears to do something detrimental to himself, at least the thought
of so doing brings him pleasure, and that his actions must therefore have
been undertaken for the sake of such a pleasure. Such a belief ignores
the possibility that a person may do something without thinking about
doing it, and hence without thinking of the pleasure he is going to re-
ceive from it, and that even if he has thought of the pleasure, he might
still undertake such an action, because in his view the action meets best
the demands of the situation, and not for the sake of the pleasure itself,
In fact .the thought of it may or may not give him pleasure, and the action
may or may not in fact result in pleasure for him.
If, therefore, a person has given indications of having self-knowledge in general, if he claims to have done something purely because the situation itself calls for such an action, and because he was in a position to do something about it, out of no selfish motive on his part, and if there are no indications contrary to such a claim, then in all probability the claim he made is true.
LIST OF REFERENCES

(Abbreviations, if used in the text, are given in parentheses at the end of each reference.)

11. __________. The Philosophical Investigations. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966 (PI). (Paragraph references to this work are preceded by an asterisk (*) and page references by "p." or "pp.").